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BARRIERS TO ACCESSIBLE HOUSING: ENFORCEMENT ISSUES IN "DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION"
CASES UNDER THE FAIR HOUSING ACT
Robert G. Schwemm *
I.

INTRODUCTION

1
In the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 ("FHAA"), Congress added "handicap"2 to the bases of discrimination outlawed
3
by the federal Fair Housing Act ("FHA") and also enacted three
special provisions to further insure equal housing opportunity for
persons with disabilities.4 One of these special provisions-§
3604(f)(3)(C) 5-mandates that all new multi-family housing be
designed and constructed with seven specified accessibility features.6
Despite the accessibility requirements of § 3604(f)(3)(C)-and
similar requirements in scores of state and local fair housing
laws-a great deal of the multi-family housing built since §
Copyright 2006 Robert G. Schwemm. Ashland Professor of Law, University of
Kentucky College of Law; J.D., Harvard Law School; B.A., Amherst College. My thanks to
Michael Barrett, Chris Brancart, Mary Davis, Michael Evans, Sara Pratt, John Relman,
and Sarah Welling for their ideas and helpful comments on prior drafts of this article.
1. Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619.
2. Id.; see also infra note 15 and accompanying text.
3. Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 801-819, 82 Stat. 73, 81-89.
4. See infra notes 18-20 and accompanying text. Although the FHAA used the term
"handicap," its definition of this word in 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h) is identical to the definition of
"disability" in two other principal federal statutes that ban discrimination based on this
factor. See 29 U.S.C. § 705(9) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000). Even with respect to the
FHAA, the term "disability" is often used instead of "handicap." See, e.g., Giebeler v. M &
B Assocs., 343 F.3d 1143, 1146 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003). For these reasons, this article uses the
terms "handicap" and "disability" interchangeably and often uses the term "disability"
with respect to the FHAA's coverage of"handicap" discrimination.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(C) (2000).
6. Id. For a list of these features, see infra text accompanying note 24.
7. The prohibitions of the FHA as amended by the FHAA are mirrored in "substantially equivalent" fair housing laws in some thirty-six states and sixty-four localities. For a
list of these states and localities, see ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION:
LAW AND LITIGATION app. C (2005).
*
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3604(f)(3)(C) became effective has failed to include the features
mandated by this provision. While the precise degree of noncompliance with the FHAA's "design and construction" requirements
is hard to pin down, it is clearly substantial. Virtually every §
3604(f)(3)(C) testing program has found that the vast majority of
multi-family complexes contacted do not comply with the FHAA's
accessibility requirements, and other evidence, including studies
commissioned by the United States Department of Housing and
Urban Development ("HUD"), also confirms the high degree of
noncompliance.' Meanwhile, in the years since the FHAA's accessibility requirements have been in effect, hundreds of thousands
of new multi-family units have been constructed, and a quarter
million more are being built every year.9 To the extent that these
units do not comply with § 3604(f)(3)(C), they not only amount to
discrimination against the tens of millions of Americans with disabilities,1" but they also stand as lawsuits waiting to happen.
Litigation involving § 3604(f)(3)(C) was slow to develop, but its
pace has accelerated in recent years.' From a substantive perspective, much of this litigation is fairly simple-either a multifamily housing complex has the features mandated by §

8. See infra Part III.
9. In the 1992-2001 period, some 3,333,000 units of rental housing were built,
slightly over half of which (1,682,000 units) were in structures with five or more units and
thus potentially subject to § 3604(f)(3)(C). See JOINT CENTER FOR HOUSING STUDIES OF
HARVARD UNIVERSITY, THE STATE OF THE NATION'S HOUSING: 2004, at 40 tbl.A-11 available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/markets/son2004.pdf (last visited Feb.
22, 2006). In 2002 and 2003, multi-family rental starts amounted to 275,000 and 262,000
units, respectively. See id. at 20; see also ROBERT BENNEFIELD & ROBERT BONNETTE, U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STRUCTURAL AND OCCUPANCY CHARACTERISTICS OF HOUSING: 2000,
at 1-3 (2003) (noting that over twenty million housing units in the United States in 2000
were in buildings with five or more apartments, although recognizing that many of these
were constructed before § 3604(f)(3)(C) became effective), available at http://www.census.
gov/prod/2003pubs/c2kbr-32.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2006).
10. According to the 2000 Census, 49.7 million people in the United States (19.3% of
the nation's total civilian noninstitutionalized population aged five or older) had some type
of long-lasting condition or disability. See JUDITH WALDROP & SHARON M. STERN, U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, DISABILITY STATUS: 2000, at 1 (2003), available at http://www.cen
sus.gov/prod/2003pubs/c2kbr-17.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2006). The subset of persons with
mobility impairments, which is the particular concern of § 3604(f)(3)(C), included many of
the 21.2 million persons who had "a condition limiting basic physical activities, such as
walking, climbing stairs, reaching, lifting, or carrying," and the 6.8 million persons who
had "a physical, mental, or emotional condition causing difficulty in dressing, bathing, or
getting around inside the home." See id.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 84-89. For examples of specific cases, see infra
notes 83 and 136-39.
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3604(f)(3)(C) or it does not. 12 The real difficulty in these cases has
turned out to be three other issues that may be raised by builders
and owners of noncompliant dwellings. These issues are:
(1) Who are proper defendants in an action based on a building's noncompliance with § 3604(f)(3)(C)?
(2) Who are proper plaintiffs in such an action? and,
(3) When does the statute of limitations expire on such an action?
The courts have occasionally ruled for defendants on the basis
of these issues, particularly the statute-of-limitations defense,
thereby providing "repose" for some illegally constructed buildings and also encouraging the multi-family housing industry to
continue to ignore the requirements of § 3604(f)(3)(C). The result
has been the frustration of Congress's intent that virtually all
modern multi-family housing be made accessible to people with
disabilities.
This article addresses the problems encountered in litigation
involving the FHAA's accessibility requirements. Part II sets
forth the requirements of § 3604(f)(3)(C) and related laws mandating accessibility in housing and also surveys the relevant enforcement provisions of the FHA. Part III reviews the evidence of
noncompliance with § 3604(f)(3)(C) and examines some of the
reasons for this noncompliance. Part IV analyzes the three main
enforcement issues that arise in § 3604(f)(3)(C) litigation and offers suggestions for how they should be resolved.
II. THE ACCESSIBILITY REQUIREMENTS OF THE FAIR HOUSING ACT
A. The FHA's Prohibitionsof "Handicap"Discrimination
only
The original FHA, passed in 1968, banned discrimination
3 "Sex"
origin.'
national
on the basis of race, color, religion, and
was added as a prohibited basis of discrimination in 1974,14 and
"familial status" and "handicap" were added by the FHAA in

12. Cf infra notes 116-20 and accompanying text.
13. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-06, 3617 (1970).
14. See Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 808, 88 Stat. 633, 728-29.
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1988.15 The FHAA's ban on handicap discrimination was intended
to be "a clear pronouncement of a national commitment to end the
unnecessary exclusion of persons with handicaps from the American mainstream." 6 Furthermore, Congress believed that "[tihe
right to be free from housing discrimination is essential to the
goal of independent living."17
Congress sought to achieve this goal in two ways. First, it
added "handicap" to all of the FHA's basic substantive prohibitions.'" Second, it enacted three special provisions to further ensure equal housing opportunity for persons with disabilities. One
is § 3604(f)(3)(C), the subject of this article. The other two require
that persons with disabilities be allowed to make any "reasonable
modifications" necessary for their "full enjoyment of the premises" 19 and that "reasonable accommodations" be made "in rules,
15. See Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619, 1619-20. In addition to adding handicap
and familial status to the prohibited bases of the FHA, the 1988 FHAA made some alterations to the statute's substantive provision dealing with home financing and also made
substantial changes in the FHA's enforcement procedures. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3605, 3610-14
(2000).
16. H.R. REP. No. 100-711, at 18 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2179
[hereinafter 1988 HOUSE REPORT]. This House Report, along with the floor debates, is the
principal source of legislative intent for the FHAA, because the Senate did not produce a
committee report for this statute. For a description of the FHAA's legislative history, see
SCHWEMM, supra note 7, § 5:4.
17. 1988 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 16, at 18.
18. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(c)-(f), 3605-06, 3617 (2000). Actually, although Congress did
add "handicap" to the list of prohibited bases of discrimination in §§ 3604(c)-(e), 3605-06,
and 3617, it chose a different technique with respect to the FHA's two other major substantive prohibitions, § 3604(a)'s ban on discriminatory refusals to deal and § 3604(b)'s
ban on discriminatory terms and conditions. Rather than adding "handicap" to these provisions, the FHAA copied their basic prohibitory language into two new provisions-§
3604(f)(1) and § 3604(f)(2)-that banned discrimination "because of a handicap" of any
buyer, renter, or person residing or associated with such a buyer or renter. See infra note
22. The reason for treating handicap discrimination in this special way apparently was to
make clear that the amended FHA would not condemn housing that is made available especially for people with disabilities (i.e., that the statute does not authorize "reverse discrimination" suits against such housing by nonhandicapped persons). See, e.g., 1988
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 16, at 23-24 (describing § 3604(f)(1) and § 3604(f)(2) as prohibiting discrimination "against" handicapped persons); 54 Fed. Reg. 3246 (Jan. 23, 1989)
(noting in HUD's commentary on its FHAA regulations that the statute "does not prohibit
the exclusion of non-handicapped persons from dwellings").
19. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(A) (2000). The modifications authorized by § 3604(f)(3)(A)
may be made to a building of any age and at any time during a tenancy, see 54 Fed. Reg.
3248 (Jan. 23, 1989), and the "premises" that may be modified include lobbies, main entrances, and other common-use areas as well as the interior of a disabled tenant's unit. See
24 C.F.R. § 100.201 (2005) (defining "[p]remises"); id. § 100.203(a); 54 Fed. Reg. 3247-48
(Jan. 23, 1989); see also Garza v. Raft, No. C-98-20476-JF-PVT, 1999 WL 33882969, at *3
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 1999). Only a few cases dealing with § 3604(11(3)(A) have been reported, perhaps because the modifications authorized by this provision must be made "at
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policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be
necessary to afford [a handicapped person] equal opportunity to
"20
use and enjoy a dwelling.

Failure to comply with these three provisions was declared by
Congress in the FHAA to be discrimination "[flor purposes of this
subsection."21 The referenced subsection-§ 3604(f)-has only two
substantive prohibitions: § (f)(1) makes it unlawful to discriminate in the sale or rental of a dwelling because of a buyer's or
renter's handicap; and § (f)(2) makes it unlawful to discriminate
"in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection with
2 2 Thus, the
such dwelling" because of a person's handicap.

the expense of the handicapped person." 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(A) (2000). All of the reto install a
ported cases have been brought by mobility-impaired residents who sought
units. See
their
of
accessibility
the
enhance
to
order
wheelchair ramp or similar device in
Supp.
Garza, 1999 WL 32882969, *1; Elliott v. Sherwood Manor Mobile Home Park, 947 F.
159
Ass'n,
Owners
Garden
Club
Country
v.
States
United
1996);
1574, 1576 (M.D. Fla.
(N.J. SuF.R.D. 400, 401 (E.D.N.Y. 1995); Hunter v. Trenton Hous. Auth., 698 A.2d 25, 26
per. 1997); SCHWEMM, supra note 7, § 11D:7, n.4 (citing relevant cases).
§
20. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) (2000). Examples of required accommodations under
tenant to
3604(f)(3)(B) are waiver of an apartment complex's "no pet" rule to allow a blind
have a seeing-eye dog and waiver of a "first come/first served" rule concerning parking
C.F.R. §
spaces to allow a mobility-impaired resident to park near his unit. See 24
100.204(b) (2005). Determining whether a particular accommodation is mandated by §
3604(f)(3)(B) is a "highly fact-specific" endeavor requiring a "case-by-case" determination.
v. Golden
See, e.g., Dadian v. Vill. of Wilmette, 269 F.3d 831, 838 (7th Cir. 2001); Groner
Cal. Mov.
States
United
2001);
Cir.
(6th
1044
1039,
F.3d
250
Apartments,
Gardens
Gate
one
practical
a
is
test
The
1994).
Cir.
(9th
1418
1413,
bile Home Park Mgmt. Co., 29 F.3d
prothat often requires balancing the cost of the requested accommodation to the housing
428-29
vider against its benefit for the claimant. See, e.g., Bronk v. Ineichen, 54 F.3d 425,
(7th Cir. 1995). It is clear, however, that housing providers need not make accommodaa "funtions that impose "undue financial or administrative burdens" on them or require
Assocs.,
B
&
M
v.
Giebeler
e.g.,
See,
programs.
their
of
nature
the
damental alteration" in
343 F.3d 1143, 1157 (9th Cir. 2003); Groner, 250 F.3d at 1044.
21. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3) (2000).
not in22. See id. § 3604(f)(1)-(2). There are other subparts of § 3604(f), but they do
of §
text
full
The
3604(f)(4)-(9).
§
id.
See
discrimination.
of
prohibitions
volve substantive
3604(f)(1) provides that it shall be unlawful:
To discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or
deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a handicap of(A) that buyer or renter,
(B) a person residing in or intending to reside in that dwelling after it
is so sold, rented, or made available; or
(C) any person associated with that buyer or renter.
Section 3604(f)(2) provides that it shall be unlawful:
To discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of
consale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in
ofhandicap
a
of
because
dwelling,
such
nection with
(A) that person; or
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FHAA's accessibility requirements and the other two special provisions of § 3604(f)(3) "augment the general prohibitions under
(f)(1) and (2). "23
B. The FHA's Accessibility Requirements
The FHAA's accessibility provision-§ 3 6 04(f)(3)(C)-provides
that illegal discrimination under § 3604(f) includes:
in connection with the design and construction of covered multifamily dwellings for first occupancy after the date that is 30 months after September 13, 1988, a failure to design and construct those
dwellings in such a manner that(i) the public use and common use portions of such dwellings
are readily accessible to and usable by handicapped persons;
(ii) all the doors designed to allow passage into and within all
premises within such dwellings are sufficiently wide to allow
passage by handicapped persons in wheelchairs; and
(iii) all premises within such dwellings contain the following
features of adaptive design:
(I) an accessible route into and through the dwelling;
(II) light switches, electrical outlets, thermostats, and
other environmental controls in accessible locations;
(III) reinforcements in bathroom walls to allow later installation of grab bars; and
(IV) usable kitchens and bathrooms such that an individual in a wheelchair can maneuver about the space.24

For purposes of this provision, "covered multifamily dwellings"
means elevator buildings containing four or more units and
ground-floor units in non-elevator buildings with four or more
units. 25 The thirty-month grace period provided in § 3604(f)(3)(C)

(B) a person residing in or intending to reside in that dwelling after it

is so sold, rented, or made available; or
(C) any person associated with that person.
For more on these provisions, see supra note 18.

23. 1988 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 16, at 24.
24. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(C) (2000). Although this provision is constructed
in a way
that suggests it imposes six requirements-one each in subparts (i) and
(ii) and four in
subpart (iii)-it has been interpreted by HUD to impose seven requirements,
with the additional mandate of an "[a] ccessible building entrance on an accessible route"
being recognized as a separate requirement implicit in subparts (i) and (iii)(I). See,
e.g., 56 Fed. Reg.
9472, 9503-15 (Mar. 6, 1991) (providing HUD's guidelines for meeting
these seven requirements).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(7) (2000). For the FHA's definition of "[d]welling,"
see id. §
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means that its requirements apply only to units constructed for
first occupancy after March 13, 1991.26
The House Report supporting the FHAA set forth the rationale for the design-and-construction requirements mandated
by § 3604(f)(3)(C):
Because persons with mobility impairments need to be able to get
into and around a dwelling unit (or else they are in effect excluded
because of their handicap), the bill requires that in the future covered multifamily dwellings be accessible and adaptable. This means
that doors and hallways must be wide enough to accommodate
wheelchairs, switches and other controls must be in convenient locations, most rooms and spaces must be on an accessible route, and
disabled persons should be able to easily make additional accommoin the bathroom,
dations if needed, such as installing grab bars
27
without major renovation or structural change.

The House Report also noted: "A person using a wheelchair is
just as effectively excluded from the opportunity to live in a particular dwelling by the lack of access into a unit and by too narrow doorways as by a posted sign saying 'No Handicapped People
Allowed."'28 Furthermore, the accessibility features mandated by
the FHAA were seen as "essential for equal access and to avoid
future de facto exclusion of persons with handicaps."2 9
Congress viewed the accessibility requirements imposed by §
3604(f)(3)(C) as "modest."" It did not intend to impose "unreasonable requirements" or a "standard of total accessibility," 31 but
rather saw the "basic features" required by § 3604(f)(3)(C) as
amounting to "minimal standards" that would be "easy to incor-

3602(b).
26. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.205(a) (2005). The purpose of this thirty-month delay, as explained by one of the FHAA's sponsors, was to "allow architects and builders adequate
time to finish building projects already under way and make design modifications that will
be adequate in the future." 134 CONG. REC. S10,544-02 (Aug. 2, 1988) (statement of Sen.
Hatch).
27. 1988 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 16, at 18.
28. Id. at 25. This point was also made in the Senate floor debates. See 134 CONG.
REC. S10,491 (1988) (statement of Sen. Simon) (noting that the architectural barriers that
§ 3604(f)(3)(C) would eliminate cause the "physical exclusion" of individuals with disabilities from much of the nation's housing stock and "are like 'Keep Out' signs to a substantial
part of our populations").
29. 1988 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 16, at 27.
30. Id. at 18, 25.
31. Id. at 26-27.
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porate in housing design and construction."3 2 Furthermore, according to the House Report, the § 3604(f)(3)(C) requirements
could be met without making new multi-family housing "look unusual" and without "significant additional costs."33
The FHAA directed HUD to promulgate regulations to implement this statute and in particular to provide technical assistance to help achieve its accessibility requirements.3 Pursuant to
these directives, HUD issued implementing regulations in 1989
that expounded on the FHAA's design-and-construction requirements. 35 Two years later, HUD issued a set of "Fair Housing Accessibility Guidelines," which became effective on the same
date-March 13, 1991-as the accessibility requirements themselves. 36 These Guidelines provided detailed technical assistance
about how designers and builders could comply with each of the §
3604(f)(3)(C) requirements. 37 Though not mandatory, the HUD
Guidelines were intended to provide a "safe harbor" by describing
minimum standards of compliance with the FHAA's accessibility
requirements. 38 In 1996, HUD published another "safe-harbor"
document entitled "Fair Housing Act Design Manual," which was
updated in 1998. 3 ' As the agency charged by Congress with en-

32. Id. at 27.
33. Id. at 18; see also 134 CONG. REC. H4898-04 (1988) (statement of Rep. Shumer)
(noting, as a supporter of the bill, that the FHAA's accessibility requirements "present a
reasonable framework for tearing down longstanding barriers to discrimination at minimal cost" and amount to "a carefully crafted compromise ... [that] strikes the correct balance between the needs of the handicapped and the costs to society of accommodating
these individuals"); 134 CONG. REC. S10,464 (1988) (statement of Sen. Harkin) (noting, as
a supporter of the bill, that the FHAA's accessibility requirements "are the result of
lengthy negotiations between the disability community and architects, builders, and managers to achieve a reasonable balance between meeting the intent of the bill, to assure
equal opportunity in housing for individuals with handicaps, while minimizing both construction costs and potential issues of marketability").
34. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 note, 3604(f)(5)(C), 3614(a) (2000); see also infra text accompanying note 240.
35. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.201 (2005) (listing relevant definitions); id. § 100.205 (listing
substantive design-and-construction requirements); 54 Fed. Reg. 3243-44, 3249-52 (Jan.
23, 1989).
36. 56 Fed. Reg. 9472-9515 (Mar. 6, 1991) [hereinafter HUD Accessibility Guidelines].
Three years later, HUD supplemented this guidance with additional information on this
subject. See 59 Fed. Reg. 33,362-68 (June 28, 1994) [hereinafter HUD Questions and Answers].
37. See, e.g., 56 Fed. Reg. 9472-74 (Mar. 6, 1991).
38. See id. at 9472-73, 9476.
39. OFFICE OF FAIR Hous. AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. AND URBAN
DEV., FAIR HOUSING ACT DESIGN MANUAL (1988) [hereinafter HUD DESIGN MANUAL],
available at http://www.huduser.org/publications/destech/fairhousing.html (last visited
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forcing the FHA-FHAA, HUD's views encompassed in these regulations and other materials are entitled to substantial deference
in applying the statute.4 °
Reflecting the FHAA's legislative history, HUD's accessibility
regulations recognize that certain conditions (e.g., a hilly terrain)
may justify not complying with some of the FHAA's design-andconstruction requirements in specific cases. 4' However, because
the FHA-FHAA is remedial civil rights legislation that is to be accorded a generous construction,4 2 the courts have made clear that
43
exemptions from this statute are to be narrowly construed, and
defendants who claim the benefit of such an exemption bear the
burden of proving that their situation qualifies for the particular

Feb. 20, 2006) . By 2005, HUD had recognized a total of seven different documents as safe
harbors for compliance with § 3604(f)(3)(C). See 70 Fed. Reg. 9740 (Feb. 28, 2005).
40. See, e.g., Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 287-88 (2002). See generally Chevron
U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984) (holding that an agency's
regulations interpreting a statute are to be followed so long as they are "a permissible construction of the statute").
HUD interpretations of the FHA, even when not encompassed in a regulation, have
historically been accorded substantial deference by the Supreme Court of the United
States. See, e.g., Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 107 (1979) (stating
that the fact that HUD "consistently has treated [the issue presented here in a certain
way] . . . commands considerable deference"); Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S.
205, 210 (1972) (stating that a long-standing interpretation of the FHA by HUD fair housing staff "is entitled to great weight"). See generally United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S.
218, 228-31 (2001) (describing the degree of deference owed to an agency's non-regulation
interpretations of the statutes it enforces).
Cases that have accorded deference to HUD's accessibility regulations or guidelines include: United States v. Edward Rose & Sons, 384 F.3d 258, 263 n.4 (6th Cir. 2004); Memphis Ctr. for Indep. Living v. R. & M. Grant Co., 3 Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. 16,779,
at 16,779.3-.9 (W.D. Tenn. Apr. 27, 2004); Fair Housing Council v. Vill. of Olde St. Andrews, 250 F. Supp. 2d 706, 718-19 (W.D. Ky. 2003). But see United States v. Taigen &
Sons, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1142-43 (D. Idaho 2003) (refusing to follow the view expressed in the HUD Design Manual concerning the timeliness of § 3604(f)(3)(C) claims, see
infra note 415 and accompanying text, on the ground that this view does not deserve the
same degree of deference as a HUD regulation).
41. See 1988 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 16, at 27 (recognizing "the possibility that
certain natural terrain may pose unique building problems" justifying noncompliance with
the FHAA's accessibility requirements because of "the need to protect the physical integrity of multi-family housing that may be built on such sites"); 24 C.F.R. § 100.205(a) (2005)
(waiving § 3604(f)(3)(C)'s "accessible route" requirement where "it is impractical to [provide such a route] because of the terrain or unusual characteristics of the site"). Cases
dealing with the "impracticable site" defense are cited infra note 118.
42. See, e.g., City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725, 731-32 (1995);
Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 205, 212; see also Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363,
380 (1982) (noting the "broad remedial intent of Congress embodied in the Act").
43. See, e.g., City of Edmonds, 514 U.S. at 731-32; see also SCHWEMM, supra note 7, at
§ 9:3, n.4 (providing examples of such cases).
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exemption claimed." These principles apply to § 3604(f)(3)(C)
cases, 45 and courts have also held that housing providers whose
dwellings depart from the HUD Guidelines have the burden of
showing that their construction features nonetheless comply with
§ 3604(f)(3)(C). 46 In short, absent proof justifying an individualized exemption, all covered multi-family dwellings constructed after March 13, 1991, must contain each of the accessibility fea47
tures mandated by § 3604(f)(3)(C).
C. Other Laws RequiringAccessible Housing
Congress explicitly provided in the FHAA that this statute does
not "invalidate or limit any [other law] ... requiring dwellings to
be designed and constructed in a manner that affords... greater
access than is required by § [3604(f)(3)(C)] ."4 As noted above,
scores of state and local fair housing laws impose substantially
equivalent requirements to those in § 3604(f)(3)(C). 49 In addition,
two other federal statutes barring disability discrimination apply

44. See, e.g., SCHWEMM, supra note 7, at § 9:3, n.2 (referencing such cases).
45. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.205(a) (2005) (providing that, in FHAA design-andconstruction cases, "[t]he burden of establishing impracticality because of terrain or unusual site characteristics is on the person or persons who designed or constructed the
housing facility"); see also infra note 118 (citing cases that reject the "impractical site" defense).
46. See, e.g., Memphis Ctr. for Indep. Living v. R. & M. Grant Co., 3 Fair Hous.-Fair
Lending Rep.
16,779, at 16,779.3 (W.D. Tenn. 2004); Taigen & Sons, Inc., 303 F. Supp.
2d at 1154; United States v. Hallmark Homes, Inc., No. CV01-432-N-EJL, 2003 WL
23219807, at *8 (D. Idaho Sept. 29, 2003).
47. That § 3604(f)(3)(C)'s accessibility requirements apply to all covered multi-family
dwellings is underscored by fact that in both the House and Senate floor debates on this
provision, efforts to limit its requirements to only a certain percentage of covered units
were overwhelmingly rejected. See 134 CONG. REC. H4898-4902 (1988) (rejecting by a 33078 vote in the House an amendment offered by Rep. McCollum that would have permitted
housing providers to construct only ten percent of covered multi-family dwellings in such a
manner that they are, or can be adapted to be, accessible and usable by handicapped persons); 134 CONG. REC. S10,532-42 (1988) (rejecting by a 84-12 vote in the Senate an
amendment offered by Sen. Humphrey that would have limited the design-andconstruction requirements to only twenty percent of the units or in the case of multiple
building units, twenty percent of the buildings). In advocating his amendment, Sen. Humphrey regularly noted that the bill as proposed-and ultimately enacted-provided for
"100 percent" coverage of the units in new multi-family housing. See id. at S10,533,
S10,536.
48. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(8) (2000).
49. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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to certain types of housing and include some accessibility requirements of their own.5"
One is § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which prohibits
discrimination against people with disabilities in any program or
5
activity receiving federal financial assistance. This law covers
municipal housing authorities and other housing providers that
receive financial assistance from HUD or some other federal
agency.5 2 HUD regulations promulgated under § 504 impose accessibility requirements on the housing covered, at least for some
units. 3
The other relevant federal statute is the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 4 which includes two titles that may
apply in some housing cases. Title II of the ADA applies a § 504like mandate to services, programs, and activities of state and local governments,5 5 which includes housing facilities that receive

50. In addition to the two statutes discussed in the text, under the authority of the
Architectural Barriers Act of 1968 ("ABA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4151-56 (2000), HUD has issued
regulations requiring that United States-constructed, -leased, and -financed residential
structures containing fifteen or more housing units "be designed, constructed or altered to
ensure that physically handicapped persons have access to, and use of, these structures."
24 C.F.R. § 40.4 (2005). This requirement may be satisfied by complying with the specifications contained in the Uniform Federal Accessibility Standards. Id. ABA cases involving
housing are rare. For one example, see Indep. Hous. Servs. v. Fillmore Center Assocs., 840
F. Supp. 1328, 1342-43 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (holding that the subject property was not covered by the ABA).
51. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000).
52. See, e.g., Three Rivers Ctr. for Indep. Living, Inc. v. Hous. Auth. of the City of
Pittsburgh, 382 F.3d 412, 416-17 (3d Cir. 2004); Cason v. Rochester Hous. Auth., 748 F.
Supp. 1002, 1006-07 (W.D.N.Y. 1990).
53. These regulations, which went into effect on June 2, 1988, require that at least
five percent of the total dwelling units in newly constructed or substantially rehabilitated
multi-family housing projects meet the Uniform Federal Accessibility Standards ("UFAS")
for people with mobility impairments, and that an additional two percent of such units be
made fully accessible to people with hearing or vision impairments. See 24 C.F.R. §§ 8.22,
8.23 (2005); see also 53 Fed. Reg. 20,233 (June 2, 1988). Furthermore, when one or more
dwelling units in an existing facility are altered-but the alterations do not rise to the
level of substantial alterations-the units must be made accessible to the mobility impaired, until five percent of the units in the facility are accessible. See 24 C.F.R. §
8.23(b)(1) (2005). In addition, accessible dwelling units must, to the "maximum extent feasible," be distributed throughout projects. Id. § 8.26. And they must "be available in a sufficient range of sizes and amenities so that a qualified individual with handicaps' choice of
living arrangements is, as a whole, comparable to that of other persons eligible for housing
assistance under the same program." Id. In addition to these construction requirements,
the HUD regulations require all existing § 504-covered housing to make reasonable modifications to units and common areas so that the housing is "readily accessible to and usable by individuals with handicaps." Id. § 8.24; see also id. § 8.33.
54. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (2000).
55. Id. § 12132.
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assistance from such governments.5 6 Title III of the ADA prohibits disability discrimination in public accommodations.5 7 Facilities
covered by Title III generally do not include housing units subject
to the FHA,"8 but this part of the ADA may nevertheless be relevant to housing matters in two ways: (1) it applies to housing developments' sales and rental offices that might not be covered by
the FHA;59 and (2) its coverage extends to homeless shelters,
nursing homes, and similar establishments whose provision of
temporary-stay lodging may or may not be subject to the FHA.6'
Public accommodations covered by Title III must comply with
that statute's accessibility standards, which require that covered
facilities designed and constructed for first occupancy after January 26, 1993, or substantially altered after that date, must comply with the ADAAG standards.6 ' Title III also requires removal
of "architectural barriers ... in existing facilities ... where such
removal is readily achievable."6 2
Thus, depending on factors such as the nature of the facility
involved and whether it receives government assistance, a housing complex may be covered by § 504 and/or the ADA as well as

56. See, e.g., Indep. Hous. Servs., 840 F. Supp. at 1343-44. Under federal regulations
implementing Title II, units in housing facilities covered by this law and constructed after
January 26, 1992, must comply with UFAS or the ADA's Accessibility Guidelines for
Buildings and Facilities ("ADAAG"). See 28 C.F.R. § 35.151 (2005); see also id. pt. 36, app.
A (setting forth the ADAAG standards). In addition, alterations to existing Title II-covered
housing must, to the "maximum extent feasible," be done "in such manner that the altered
portion of the facility is readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities."
Id. § 35.151(b). A further requirement applicable to existing Title II-covered housing is
that it must be operated so that, "when viewed in its entirety," it "is readily accessible to
and usable by individuals with disabilities." Id. § 35.150(a).
57. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2000).
58. See 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (2005) (providing the definition of "commercial facilities").
59. See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(E) (2000) (providing that Title III's coverage includes a
"sales or rental establishment"); see, e.g., Taigen & Sons, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 2d at 1149-50
(holding that apartment complex's ground-floor unit which had been converted into a
rental office is covered by Title III); Sapp v. MHI P'ship, 199 F. Supp. 2d 578, 583-87 (N.D.
Tex. 2002) (holding that housing development's sales office in model home is covered by
Title III).
60. See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(A), (F), (K) (2000) (providing that Title III's coverage includes any privately owned "place of lodging" (other than those with five or fewer rooms
for rent where the proprietor resides), "hospital, or other service establishment," and any
"senior citizen center, homeless shelter .... or other social service center establishment");
28 C.F.R. pt 36, app. B, at 683 (2005) (providing that nursing homes that provide certain
services may be covered by the ADA's Title III).
61. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182(a), 12183(a)(1) (2000); 28 C.F.R. §§ 36.401-.406 (2005).
62. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv) (2000).
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the FHA. Indeed, a number of cases have been reported where
63
both the FHA and one of these other laws were held to apply.
While a given design-and-construction case may thus support
claims under a variety of laws, the focus of this article is the FHA
because it is the most comprehensive of all federal laws dealing
with disability discrimination in housing. The FHA is also the
model for most state and local fair housing laws, many of which
impose housing accessibility standards identical to or stronger
than those of the FHA.6 4 Furthermore, as described more fully in
the next section, the FHA's enforcement provisions are generally
superior to other federal laws barring disability discrimination,
because the FHA provides for a full range of relief for a wide variety of potential plaintiffs against an unlimited class of defendants6 5 while under the other federal disability statutes the relief
66
available and proper parties may be substantially narrower.
D. The FHA's Enforcement Procedures
The FHA provides for three methods of enforcement. First,
pursuant to § 3613, a civil action may be brought by any "aggrieved person ... not later than 2 years after the occurrence or
67
the termination of an alleged discriminatory housing practice."
The class of potential plaintiffs covered by the phrase "aggrieved
63. See, e.g., Oconomowoc Residential Programs, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 300 F.3d
775, 781-87 (7th Cir. 2002); Reg'l Econ. Cmty. Action Program, Inc. v. City of Middletown,
294 F.3d 35, 45-55 (2d Cir. 2002); Dadian v. Vill. of Wilmette, 269 F.3d 831, 836-41 (7th
Cir. 2001); Cason v. Rochester Hous. Auth., 748 F. Supp. 1002, 1006 (W.D.N.Y. 1990); see
also 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B, at 682-83 (2005) (providing that nursing homes and other
"mixed use" facilities may be covered by both the FHA and ADA).
64. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
65. See infra Part II.D.
66. See, e.g., Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 189 (2002) (holding that punitive damages may not be awarded in private suits under the ADA's Title II or § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act); Three Rivers Ctr. for Indep. Living, Inc. v. Hous. Auth. of the City of Pittsburgh, 382 F.3d 412, 430-31 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that private plaintiffs may not sue to
enforce HUD's accessibility regulations promulgated under § 504); United States v. Forest
Dale, Inc., 818 F. Supp. 954, 969-70 (N.D. Tex. 1993) (holding that the wife of a disabled
person may sue under the FHA but not under § 504); infra note 162 (noting that only injunctive relief is available in private suits under Title III of the ADA and describing Title
III's restrictive language concerning the types of entities that may be sued).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a) (2000). The FHA's definition of "aggrieved person" is provided
infra note 273. For purposes of § 3613 and the FHA's other enforcement techniques, a
"[d]iscriminatory housing practice'" is defined as "an act that is unlawful" under the
FHA's substantive provisions (i.e., 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-06, 3617). See id. § 3602(f). For a detailed description of § 3613 actions, see SCHWEMM, supra note 7, at ch. 25.
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person" includes all individuals and entities who are injured in
any way by an FHA violation,68 with standing to sue extending to
the outer limits allowed by Article III of the Constitution. 69 Section 3613 does not specify who may be named as a defendant,
which means that anyone who is responsible under general tort
principles for an FHA violation is a proper defendant." Relief
available in a § 3613 case includes actual and punitive damages,
injunctions and other orders, and attorney's fees. 7'
The second method of enforcing the FHA is an administrative
proceeding pursuant to §§ 3610-3612.72 Such a proceeding is initiated by the filing of a complaint with HUD "not later than within
one year after an alleged discriminatory housing practice has occurred or terminated" by an "aggrieved person," a phrase that
covers the same broad class of potential complainants as in §
3613 cases. 73 HUD itself may also file such a complaint on its own
initiative.74 FHA complaints to HUD may end up being referred
to a "substantially equivalent" state or local agency; 75 being taken
to court where the case will be prosecuted by the Department of
Justice (or its state or local equivalent) and may result in the
same types of relief being awarded to the aggrieved person as in a
§ 3613 action;76 or tried before an administrative law judge who
may award actual (but not punitive) damages to the aggrieved
person, injunctive relief, and civil penalties of up to $55,000.77

68. "Person" is defined in the FHA to include "corporations," "associations," and many
other entities. See 42 U.S.C. § 3602(d) (2000); see also Havens, 455 U.S. at 378-79 & n.19
(applying this definition to include a non-profit corporation).
69. See, e.g., Havens, 455 U.S. at 372; Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S.
91, 109 (1979); Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972). Article III requires three elements: (1) the plaintiff must have suffered some actual, particularized "injury in fact" (2) that is causally connected ("fairly ... traceable") to the defendant's challenged action and (3) that is likely to be "redressed by a favorable decision." E.g., Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (citations omitted).
70. See infra note 132 and accompanying text.
71. See 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c) (2000).
72. Id. §§ 3610-12. For a detailed description of such administrative proceedings, see
SCHWEMM, supra note 7, at ch. 24.
73. See 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a)(1)(A)(i) (2000); see Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 100-09 (holding
that standing to sue is equally broad under the FHA's direct-suit and complaint-to-HUD
provisions).
74. See 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a)(1)(A)(i) (2000).
75. See id. § 3610(f).
76. See id. § 3612(a), (o).
77. See 24 C.F.R. § 180.670(b)(3) (2005).

2006]

ACCESSIBLE HOUSING

The third method of FHA enforcement is a civil action brought
by the Attorney General pursuant to § 3614.78 This provision may
be invoked only if the defendant has "engaged in a pattern or
practice of resistance" to FHA rights or if a "group of persons has
been denied any [FHA] rights ...and such denial raises an issue
79
of general public importance." Such a case may result in injunctive relief, monetary damages to aggrieved persons, and civil
penalties of up to $110,000.80 The FHA itself does not provide a
statute of limitations for such § 3614 actions; under these circumstances, courts have generally allowed § 3614 claims for injunctive relief at any time, but have imposed a three-year limitations
period for § 3614 claims for monetary damages and a five-year
limitations period for § 3614 claims for civil penalties."'
Overall, therefore, the FHA's three enforcement methods provide for a full range of monetary and injunctive relief to the widest possible group of potential plaintiffs in a variety of tribunals.
Furthermore, the FHA, unlike some other civil rights statutes,
generally does not limit the types of defendants who may be held
82
responsible for its substantive violations. Finally, and of particular importance for purposes of this article, the FHA's authorization of injunctive relief has been held to include orders requiring such defendants to retrofit inaccessible housing units or
8 3
otherwise correct their § 3604(f)(3)(C) violations.
While the FHA thus provides for a generally strong enforcement system, the reality is that compliance with the FHA's accessibility requirements has proven to be a serious problem. The de-

78. 42 U.S.C. § 3614(a) (2000). For a detailed description of § 3614 actions, see
SCHWEMM, supra note 7, at ch. 26.

79. 42 U.S.C. § 3614(a) (2000). For FHA design-and-construction cases that have been
held to satisfy § 3614(a)'s "pattern or practice" and "group denial of rights" requirements,
see, respectively, infra notes 431 and 280.
80. See 42 U.S.C. § 3614(d)(1); 28 C.F.R. § 85.3(b)(3) (2005).
81. See infra notes 381-85 and accompanying text.
82. See infra note 122 and accompanying text.
83. See, e.g., Taigen & Sons, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 2d at 1148; United States v. Pac. Nw.
Elec., Inc., No. CV-01-019-S-BLW, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7990, at *46 (D. Idaho Mar. 19,
2003); Baltimore Neighborhoods, Inc. v. LOB, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 456, 465-67 (D. Md.
2000); Balachowski v. Boidy, No. 95-C-6340, 2000 WL 1365391, at *14-15 (N.D. Ill. Sept.
25,136, at 26,128-30 (HUD
20, 2000); HUD v. Perland, Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep.
ALJ 1998); see also United States v. Quality Built Constr., Inc., 358 F. Supp. 2d 487, 49091 (E.D.N.C. 2005) (discussing defendant's claim that proposed retrofits would be too
costly).
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gree of noncompliance with § 3604(f)(3)(C) and some of the reasons proffered for such noncompliance are explored in Part III.
III. THE DEGREE OF NONCOMPLIANCE WITH THE FHA's
ACCESSIBILITY REQUIREMENTS AND SOME REASONS THEREFOR
A. Early Testing Studies and Litigation
The degree of noncompliance with the FHA's accessibility requirements appears to be substantial, although precise estimates
are difficult to come by. Virtually no § 3604(f)(3)(C) litigation occurred in the 1991-1995 period. 4 During this period, however,
the first serious effort to test for § 3604(f)(3)(C) violations occurred when a Baltimore fair housing organization investigated
fifty-seven multi-family developments in its area, determined
that forty-four were noncompliant, and eventually brought suit
against six of these developers." In 1996, the Department of Justice, in cooperation with a Chicago disability-rights group, investigated some forty-nine multi-family housing developments in the
Chicago metropolitan area and determined that only one was in
full compliance with the FHA's accessibility requirements. 6 In
August of 1998, a review of some fifty multi-family developments
in Idaho found that none complied with § 3604(f)(3)(C)'s accessible-front-entrance requirement. 7 In June of 1999, a disabled minister in Denver looked at the nine apartment complexes in her
area that claimed to have accessible units in her price range and

84. The only case reported during 1991-1995 that the author has been able to find is
Van Rafelghem v. Gunn, 2 Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep.,
19,378 (S.D. Ohio May 4,
1993), where the plaintiff-couple settled with the defendant-builder for modifications to
the plaintiffs' unit, one dollar in damages, and attorney's fees. This case did not produce a
decision on the merits.
85. See Baltimore Neighborhoods, Inc. v. LOB, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 456, 460 n.5 (D.
Md. 2000). The BNI testing program began in 1993, id. at 460, and resulted in a number of
reported decisions in addition to the one involving LOB. See, e.g., Baltimore Neighborhoods, Inc. v. Rommel Builders, Inc., 40 F. Supp. 2d 700 (D. Md. 1999); Baltimore
Neighborhoods, Inc. v. Rommel Builders, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d 661 (D. Md. 1998); Baltimore
Neighborhoods, Inc. v. Cont'l Landmark, Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. 16,236 (D. Md.
1997).
86. See Justice in FairHousingEnforcement Act of 1999: Hearingon H.R. 2437 Before
the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 10-

11 (1999) [hereinafter 1999 House Hearings] (statement of William J. Malleris, President,
Maple Court Development, Inc.).
87. See id. at 27, 29.
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found that none met the FHA's accessibility requirements." More
recent studies continue to find a high degree of noncompliance
with § 3604(f)(3)(C)." 9
B. The HUD Conformance Study
In 1997, HUD commissioned a study to estimate 9 conformance
°
with its 1991 Fair Housing Accessibility Guidelines. This study
examined a randomly selected sample of 397 multi-family developments constructed in various parts of the country between 1991
and 1997. 9"
One of the oddities of this study is that it made no effort to determine whether these developments complied with §
3604(f)(3)(C) and therefore did not provide any measure of "the
degree of overall conformance" with the FHA's accessibility requirements.9 2 Rather, it identified for each of the seven FHA requirements a number of subsidiary elements and then gave each
development a score of 0 to 100 for each of these 291 identified
elements.9 3 The developments' scores were then added together to

88. See id.at 62.
89. See, e.g., OFFICE OF POLICY DEV. AND RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. AND URBAN
DEV., DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES: BARRIERS AT EVERY STEP 3,
42, 51 (2005) (finding, based on 2004 testing program, that over one-third of advertised
rental dwellings in the Chicago area were not accessible for wheelchair users to visit),
Feb.
available at http://www.huduser.org/publications/pdf/DDS-Barriers.pdf (last visited
multi22, 2006). In 2005, a study in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, found that none of the sixty-five
on file
family complexes contacted fully complied with the § 3604(f)(3)(C) mandates (copy
author).
the
with
90. See OFFICE OF POLICY DEV. AND RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV.,
MULTIFAMILY BUILDING CONFORMANCE WITH THE FAIR HOUSING ACCESSIBILITY
at
GUIDELINES, at v (2003) [hereinafter HUD CONFORMANCE STUDY], available
20, 2006).
http://www.huduser.org/publications/fairhsg/multifamily.html (last visited Feb.
prompted
The 1991 Guidelines are cited supra note 36. The HUD Conformance Study was
litigation
in part "because evidence from the field, complaints filed with HUD, and private
multibuilding
were
...
owners
building
and
contractors,
architects,
some
that
suggested
requireconstruction
and
design
[FHA's]
the
with
family projects that did not comply
ments." Id. at v.
91. HUD CONFORMANCE STUDY, supra note 90, at v, vi, 2. The data gathering, which
included physical inspections of the developments, was done in 1998-99. Id. at 2-3.
on §
92. Id. at v. The study acknowledged that its determination not to focus
Id. at 3.
3604(f)(3)(C) compliance meant that it was not usable "for enforcement purposes."
was
93. See id. at vi-viii. For example, § 3604(f)(3)(C)'s accessible-route requirement
unit conconsidered to involve five such subsidiary elements, and a multi-family housing
to
forming to all five of these elements received a score of 100, while a unit conforming
on
so
and
sixty,
of
score
a
received
three
to
four received a score of eighty, one conforming
at
down. Id. at vii. For a detailed description of most of the 291 subsidiary items, see id.
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produce a composite score for each element, thereby supposedly
giving a "broad national view of conformance."9 4 The study concluded that "[olver 80 percent of surveyed elements were in conformance for a large majority of buildings."95
From an enforcement perspective, the relevance of this and
other conclusions reached in this study is hard to fathom. The
FHA mandates the inclusion of seven specified accessibility features, not a certain percentage of their perceived subsidiary elements. Thus, it is quite possible for a development to be found in
violation of each FHA requirement even though it complies with
over eighty percent of the subsidiary elements surveyed in the
HUD study. Furthermore, § 3604(f)(3)(C) requires that all seven
of its requirements be included; it is no defense in an individual
case for a developer to show that its building complies with some,
or even most, of these requirements. 6

34-46.
94. Id. at v; see also id. at iii (claiming that this study provides a "useful baseline assessment of conformance levels at a national level").
95. Id. at iii. Overall conformance scores were also produced for each of the seven
FHA requirements. The study characterized these scores as "uniformly high" for Requirements 1, 2, 3, and 4 (in the 76-98 range); "somewhat lower" for Requirements 5 and 7 (in
the 72-97 range); and "lowest overall" for Requirement 6 (in the 73-85 range). Id. at ix,
28-33 (presenting the composite conformance scores for each of the measures).
96. See, e.g., United States v. Edward Rose & Sons, 384 F.3d 258, 263-65 (6th Cir.
2004) (holding that builder-owner's violation of the first requirement of § 3604(f)(3)(C) is
sufficient for liability justifying preliminary injunctive relief); Pac. Northwest Elec., Inc.,
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7990, at *41-42 (determining that defendants are liable for violating only some of § 3604(f)(3)(C)'s requirements); Baltimore Neighborhoods, Inc. v. LOB,
Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 456, 463 (D. Md. 2000) (determining that developer is liable for violating the grab-bar-reinforcement requirement of § 3604(f)(3)(C)(iii)(III)); Baltimore
Neighborhoods, Inc. v. Rommel Builders, Inc., 40 F. Supp. 2d 700, 713-14 (D. Md. 1999)
(determining defendants' liability based on evaluation of each of the seven § 3604(f)(3)(C)
requirements).
Thus, even if one were to believe that each of § 3604(f)(3)(C)'s seven requirements was
complied with by ninety percent of all developments-a conclusion that the HUD study
manifestly did not reach-this would not indicate an overall rate of total FHA-compliance
of ninety percent unless the same ten percent of developments accounted for all of the
noncompliance. Indeed, in this scenario, the overall rate of full FHA-compliance could be
as low as forty-eight percent if there were no overlap among those developments that
failed to comply with Requirement 1, those that failed to comply with Requirement 2,
those that failed to comply with Requirement 3, and so on, so that the overall figure for
some noncompliance among all developments would be derived by multiplying ninety percent by itself seven times, which equals just under forty-eight percent.
This exercise shows that what might appear at first blush to be an impressively high
figure for compliance with individual requirements can mask a fairly high degree of overall noncompliance, given that the statutory mandate in § 3604(f)(3)(C) is that all requirements be complied with. The exercise also serves to reinforce the need to understand that
the HUD study's findings of "high" levels of conformance with most of § 3604(f)(3)(C)'s re-
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C. Some Excuses for Noncompliance and the Role of Local
Building Codes
By 1999, the combination of a growing number of enforcement
suits and what was perceived to be a high degree of noncompliance so alarmed the multi-family housing industry that it sought
to have the FHA amended to bar application of § 3604(f)(3)(C) to
all current buildings that had been constructed after receiving a
building permit (i.e., to virtually all existing multi-family housing)." The proposed amendment did not pass, but in House hearings on it, representatives of the National Association of Home
Builders and other builder advocates provided some reasons for
the high degree of noncompliance with § 3604(f)(3)(C). The principal reason they cited was lack of awareness by builders of the
9
FHA's accessibility requirements. " Two related justifications
were that HUD's guidance and other educational efforts concerning these requirements had been inadequate and that because the
process of obtaining a building permit was thought to guarantee
compliance with all legal requirements, and not just those of the
local building code, builders in areas where the local code did not
incorporate the FHA's accessibility requirements were often surprised to learn after construction was completed that their dwell99
ings did not comply with § 3604(f)(3)(C).

of full compliance
quirements, see supra note 95, do not establish a similarly high level
provision.
this
to
subject
among all those developments
by Con97. The proposed amendment was in the form of a bill, H.R. 2437, introduced
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not
would
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§
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the
that
providing
gressman Walter Jones,
of this bill that
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code." See
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the
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a period
years,"
eight
last
the
in
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"77
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37
at
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thermore, in litigation conducted years after this hearing, builders
provision as the reaof violating § 3604(f)(3)(C) continued to cite lack of awareness of this
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Supp.
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These points were hotly contested by disability advocates, the
Department of Justice, and even some individual builders who
had constructed FHA-compliant developments."' These witnesses
suggested that some builders deliberately ignored the §
3604(f)(3)(C) requirements, even to the point of not following the
accessibility features provided for in their buildings' architectural
plans, and that many others consciously avoided learning about
the FHA's requirements. °1
Even if the reason many builders fail to comply with §
3604(f)(3)(C) is good faith ignorance of its mandates, it is clear
that such ignorance is not a sufficient legal excuse to avoid liability for violating this provision.10 2 Nor does HUD's perceived failings in educating the building industry legally justify the latter's
noncompliance with this provision.0 3 Indeed, as a general matter,
a defendant's state of mind is simply not relevant to the liability
issue in § 3604(f)(3)(C) cases, and in particular, a showing that

Builders, Inc.); id. at 14 (statement of Mark Ellis Tipton, builder and past president
of the
National Association of Home Builders).
100. See id. at 19-20, 27, 56, 58, 62 (statements of disability advocates); id. at
50-52
(statements of a representative of the Dep't of Justice); id. at 10-11 (statement of
an individual builder).
101. See id. at 11, 19-20, 27, 56, 58, 62; see also id. at 52 (noting that the Department
of Justice has seen "situations where a builder simply ignored the accessible features
of an
architect's design plan"); HUD CONFORMANCE STUDY, supra note 90, at 48 (finding
that
architectural "[pilans consistently show higher conformance with the Guidelines
than
completed buildings").
102. See Taigen & Sons, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 2d at 1137; Hallmark Homes, Inc., 2003
WL
232119807, at *7; see also 1999 House Hearings, supra note 86, at 37 (statement
of Rep.
Frank) (noting the applicability to § 3604(f)(3)(C) cases of the "old principle" that
"ignorance of the law is no excuse"); Quality Built Constr., Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d
at 761-62
(holding that builder cannot escape § 3604(f)(3)(C) liability based on reliance on
its architect's assurance of FHA compliance); Quality Built Constr., Inc., 358 F. Supp. 2d
at 490
(holding that perceived lack of need for accessible housing in the area is irrelevant
to and
thus provides no defense for builder's liability under § 3604(f)(3)(C)). See generally
Texaco,
Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 532 (1982) ("[Plersons owning property within a State
are
charged with knowledge of relevant statutory provisions affecting the control or
disposition of such property."); id. at 532 n.25 ("All persons are charged with knowledge
of the
provisions of statutes. . . .") (quoting North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268
U.S. 276,
283 (1925)); Fed. Crop Ins. Co. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 384 (1947) ("[E]veryone is
charged
with knowledge of the United States Statutes at Large..
").
In a related point, courts have made clear that § 3604(f)(3)(C)'s requirements
are not
too "vague" to be enforced. See Taigen & Sons, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 2d at 1150-51; Hallmark
Homes, Inc., 2003 WL 23219807, at *6-7.
103. See Taigen & Sons, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 2d at 1151-53; Hallmark Homes, Inc.,
2003
WL 23219807, at *7; cf. Quality Built Constr., Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d at 761 (holding
that
builder can not escape § 3604(f)(3)(C) liability based on prior approval of its plans
by local
HUD officials).
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the defendant was motivated by discriminatory intent is not required in such cases.1" 4
The one point made by noncompliant builders that has generated some positive response is the need to have local building
codes better reflect the FHA's accessibility requirements.
Throughout the 1990s, there was no clear relationship between
local building codes and the § 3604(f)(3)(C) requirements. In some
states and localities, these codes included § 3604(f)(3)(C)-like requirements, and indeed some did so even before this provision became effective. 0 5 Many other jurisdictions, however, did not in06
Thus, the tens of thousands of
clude such requirements.
building codes throughout the country lacked anything like a na0 7 and indeed there were even four
tional accessibility standard,
different "model" codes-the International Building Code, the
Standard Building Code, the Uniform Building Code, and the
code of the Building Officials and Code Administrators, International, Inc. (BOCA).'i 8
A number of steps have been taken to have building codes better reflect the FHA's accessibility requirements. In 1997, the De-

Northwest Elec.,
104. See Quality Built Constr., Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d at 760, 762; Pac.
v. City of
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*46-48;
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Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7990,
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sepaliability"
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theory
alternative
"an
3604(f)--is
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Arena Corp., 982 F.
rate from intentional discrimination); Indep. Living Res. v. Oregon
state (i.e, whether its
Supp. 698, 707 (D. Or. 1997) (holding that the defendant's mental
to the issue of
irrelevant
generally
is
violations were intentional, negligent, or innocent)
This factor, howliability in a design-and-construction case under Title III of the ADA).
Built Constr.,
ever, may be relevant to punitive damages and/or civil penalties. See Quality
Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d at 760, 766-67.
of Brian D. Black,
105. See, e.g., 1999 House Hearings,supra note 86, at 19 (statement
Association) (reDirector of Building Codes and Standards, Eastern Paralyzed Veterans
building codes that
enforced
have
[that]
jurisdictions
local
and
State
"many
to
ferring
Act," including New
meet or exceed the construction requirements of the Fair Housing
Wilde, Oregon AdYork, New Jersey, and Philadelphia); id. at 60 (letter from Kathleen L.
regarding adaptstandards
federal
the
[where]
states
"many
to
(referring
vocacy Center)
code" and in parbuilding
state
the
into
incorporated
able multi-family housing have been
from Joy Weeber, Ron
ticular to Oregon where this was done in 1993); id. at 61 (letter
North Carolina buildMace Center for Disability Community Development) (referring to a
ing code that pre-dated § 3604(f)(3)(C)).
of accessible hous106. See, e.g., id. at 41 (statement of William J. Malleris, developer
provision in their
accessibility
an
include
to
not
ing) (referring to municipalities that opted
local building codes).
that had adopted and
107. In 1999, there were over 40,000 state and local jurisdictions
were enforcing building codes. See id. at 24.
108. See id. at 52; HUD CONFORMANCE STUDY, supra note 90, at v.
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partment of Justice, HUD, and a number of state attorneys general wrote to local permitting officials urging them to provide notice of the FHA's accessibility requirements. 9 For its part, Congress, in its fiscal year 2000 appropriations, directed HUD to
review the various model building codes to determine whether
their accessibility provisions were consistent with HUD guidance
on the § 3604(f)(3)(C) requirements, 110 a review that was completed in 2000."' In the meantime, officials responsible for the
various model building codes undertook, through the creation of
the International Code Council, to produce a single document
governing multi-family housing accessibility requirements. 112 In
2000, the ICC produced an "International Building Code" whose
accessibility provisions met or exceeded § 3604(f)(3)(C)'s requirements and which is now regarded by HUD as an additional "safe
harbor" for § 3604(f)(3)(C) compliance. 13
While these code-based efforts to achieve compliance with §
3604(f)(3)(C) will no doubt be helpful, they provide no guarantees.
For one thing, there are still many places in the country that
have not adopted a modern building code as part of their housing
permitting process." 4 For another, individual jurisdictions that
have adopted such a code may not include all of the accessibility
features mandated by § 3604(f)(3)(C) in their particular version of
the code."' Finally, even if by some future time all multi-family
housing proposals would be denied building permits unless they
were to comply with § 3604(f)(3)(C)-so that only "rogue" builders
would not be adhering to the FHA accessibility requirementsthe question of what to do with the millions of noncompliant units
built between 1991 and this future full-compliance date would
still remain.
109. See 1999 House Hearings, supra note 86, at 52.
110. See id.
111. See Final Report of HUD Review of Model Building Codes, 65 Fed. Reg.
15,740-94
(Mar. 23, 2000).
112. See 1999 House Hearings, supra note 86, at 22.
113. See id. at 25; HUD CONFORMANCE STUDY, supra note 90, at 3; see also
Final Report of HUD Review of the Fair Housing Accessibility Requirements in the
2003 International Building Code, 70 Fed. Reg. 9738 (Feb. 28, 2005) (providing HUD's
grant of conditional safe harbor approval to the 2003 edition of this Code and anticipating
similar
approval for the 2006 edition).
114. For a list of the states and localities that have adopted the International
Building
Code since its promulgation in 2000, see the International Code Council's
website at
http://www.iccsafe.org/government/adoption.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2006).
115. See, e.g., 1999 House Hearings, supra note 86, at 41 (referring to
municipalities
that opted not to include an accessibility provision in their local building codes).
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IV.

LEGAL BARRIERS TO ENFORCING THE

FHA's

ACCESSIBILITY REQUIREMENTS

A. Overview: Substantive vs. Other Defenses
As noted in the previous section, a variety of "lack-of-badintent" and "partial compliance" defenses have been asserted in §
3604(f)(3)(C) cases, all of which have failed, at least with respect
to the basic issue of liability. 116 The only other substantive defenses in these cases are that the dwellings involved are not covered by § 3604(f)(3)(C) 1 17 or that noncompliance is excused due to
an "impractical site.""' These substantive defenses must be
evaluated on a case-by-case basis, but, as a general rule, they
have failed in most reported § 3604(f)(3)(C) cases. 1 9 Once all such
substantive excuses have been rejected, there is little left for a
developer to do beyond accepting responsibility for its noncomplieither through a settlement or an adverse court rulant building,
120
ing.
Of course, a successful § 3604(f)(3)(C) lawsuit requires a proper
defendant, a proper plaintiff, and a timely claim. Defendants accused of violating this provision have on occasion questioned the
presence of one or more of these three elements. Indeed, given the
substantive clarity of § 3604(f)(3)(C) as outlined above, 12 1 a challenge to these elements is often the only possible defense to liability in such a case. These elements are dealt with in the next three
sections.

116. See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
117. See, e.g., Fair Hous. Council v. Vill. of Olde St. Andrews, 250 F. Supp. 2d 706,
716-19 (W.D. Ky. 2003); see also supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text (describing the
dwellings covered by § 3604(f)(3)(C)).
118. See supra note 41 and accompanying text for a description of the "impractical site"
defense; see also Memphis Ctr. for Indep. Living v. R. & M. Grant Co., 3 Fair Hous.-Fair
16,779, at 16,779.4-6 (W.D. Tenn. 2004) (rejecting the "impractical site"
Lending Rep.
defense); Montana Fair Hous. v. Am. Capital Dev., Inc., 81 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1066 (D.
Mont. 1999) (rejecting the "impractical site" defense); Baltimore Neighborhoods, Inc. v.
Rommel Builders, Inc., 40 F. Supp. 2d 700, 706-07 (D. Md. 1999) (rejecting the "impractical site" defense); HUD v. Perland, Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. 1 25,136, at 26,125-27
(HUD ALJ 1998) (rejecting the "impractical site" defense).
119. See supra notes 117-18.
120. See, e.g., Hallmark Homes, Inc., 2003 WL 23219807, at *8; Pac. Northwest Elec.,
Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7990, at *47.
121. See supra notes 24-26, 41-47 and accompanying text.
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B. Identifying ProperDefendants: Who May be Sued for §
3604(f)(3)(C) Violations?
1. The Basic Liability Standard and Obvious Defendants
Unlike some other federal civil rights statutes, the Fair Housing Act's substantive prohibitions generally do not specify the
types of persons or entities that may be held liable for engaging
in the discriminatory practices outlawed.1 22 Specifically with respect to the FHA's accessibility requirements, § 3604(f)(3)(C)
makes the "failure to design and construct" multi-family dwellings with the required features "discrimination" for purposes of §
3604(f)(1) and § (f)(2), 1 23 provisions which simply outlaw disability
discrimination in certain housing transactions without specifying
1 24
who may be held accountable for such a violation.
The "failure to design and construct" language of § 3604(f)(3)(C)
might be thought to limit the targets of this provision to those
who "design" or "construct" covered multi-family dwellings, but
this interpretation seems wrong. As one court has observed, §
3604(f)(3)(C) "is not a description of who is liable. Rather, it is a
1 25
description of what actions constitute discrimination."

122. See, e.g., infra notes 128-29. By way of contrast, Title VII, the principal federal
employment discrimination statute, limits its prohibitions to "employers," "labor organizations," and two other specified entities. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a)-(d); see also id. §§
12111(2), 12112(a) (limiting the ADA's employment provisions to "employer[s," "labor organization[s]," and two other specified entities); id. §§ 12181(7), 12182(a) (limiting the
ADA's public accommodations provisions to "any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or
operates" certain specified types of private entities).
One exception to the FHA's general approach of not identifying specific types of potential defendants is 42 U.S.C. § 3605(a), which prohibits "any person or other entity whose
business includes engaging in residential real estate-related transactions" from discriminating in such a transaction. Id. § 3605(a). This provision, however, is not relevant to the
§ 3604(f)(3)(C) cases that are the subject of this article.
123. See supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
124. See, e.g., infra note 125; Baltimore Neighborhoods, Inc. v. Cont'l Landmark, Fair
Hous.-Fair Lending Rep.
16,236, at 16,236.4 (D. Md. 1997) ("The FHA does not specify
who may be held liable for violations of these [accessibility] provisions"). As discussed supra note 18, the texts of § 3604(f)(1) and § 3604(f)(2) are patterned after § 3604(a) and §
3604(b), which, as Judge Easterbrook has observed in another context, are written "in the
passive voice-banning an outcome while not saying who the actor is, or how such actors
bring about the forbidden consequence." NAACP v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d
287, 298 (7th Cir. 1992); see also Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 285 (2003) (noting that the
FHA "focuses on prohibited acts").
125. Doering v. Pontarelli Builders, Inc., No. 01-C-2924, 2001 WL 1464897, at *4 (N.D.
Ill. Nov. 16, 2001); see also Baltimore Neighborhoods, Inc. v. Rommel Builders, Inc., 3 F.
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Some § 3604(f)(3)(C) defendants have argued that the phrase
"design and construct" means that only someone who does both of
these tasks can be held liable for violating this provision (e.g.,
that an architect who only designs, but does not also construct, a
noncompliant building should escape liability). The courts have
generally rejected this view, 126 noting that its acceptance would
essentially mean that no single entity could then be held responsible for a "failure to design and construct" (i.e., because neither
7
the "designer" nor the "constructor" did both functions). 2
In rejecting this defense, one court suggested an alternative interpretation of Congress's use of the conjunction in the "design
and construct" phrase-that is, that it requires both acts for a
violation, albeit not necessarily by the same party, so that, for exSupp. 2d 661, 664 (D. Md. 1998) (the '-design and construct'" phrase "addresses" but "[b]y
its own terms . . . does not specify the parties who may be held liable"); Brief for United
States, as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, in Baltimore Neighborhoods, Inc. v. T.R.
Seven Oaks, No. 1:96-cv-02071-WEB (D. Md. 1997), available at http://www.usdoj.
gov/crt/housing/documents/amicusl.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2006) (noting that "[tihe focus of [§ 3604(f)(3)(C)] is on the failure to achieve the desired legislative goal, not on the
identities of parties responsible for that failure").
126. See, e.g., Doering, 2001 WL 1464897, at *1, 4; Montana Fair Hous. v. Am. Capital
Dev., Inc., 81 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1062, 1068-69 (D. Mont. 1999); Baltimore Neighborhoods,
Inc. v. Rommel Builders, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d 661, 662, 664-65 (D. Md. 1998); United States
v. Hartz Constr. Co., No. 97C8175, 1998 WL 42265 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 28, 1998). But see
Whitaker v. West Vill. Ltd. P'ship, No. Civ. A. 3:03-CV-0411-P, 2004 WL 2046771, at *1
(N.D. Tex. Sept. 10, 2004) (accepting this argument and dismissing § 3604(f)(3)(C) claim
against a builder who was not also accused of designing the subject property).
A similar defense has been accepted in some cases under the ADA's Title III (public accommodations). See, e.g., Lonberg v. Sanborn Theaters, Inc., 259 F.3d 1029, 1033-36 (9th
Cir. 2001); Whitaker, 2004 WL 1778963, at *2-3; Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Ellerbe
Becket Architects & Eng'rs, 945 F. Supp. 1-2 (D.D.C. 1996). But see Johanson v. Huizenga
Holdings, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 1175, 1177-78 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (upholding Title III claim
against architect); United States v. Days Inns of Am., 151 F.3d 822, 824-27 (8th Cir. 1998)
(holding that Title III liability may extend to motel owner's franchisor if it exercised a significant degree of control over the design and construction of the owner's inaccessible motel). The basis for accepting this defense, however, is specific language in Title III that differs from that used in the FHA and is therefore not persuasive in § 3604(f)(3)(C) cases. See
16,712, at
infra note 162; Barker v. Emory Univ., 3 Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep.
16,712.2 (N.D. Ga. June 24, 2003); Doering, 2001 WL 1464897 at *3-4; Rommel Builders,
Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d at 664.
127. See supra note 126. As Judge Shadur observed in an early decision on this point,
"the notion that each of two parties working together, one performing the first function
and the other performing the second function, is thereby insulated from liability is a frank
absurdity." Hartz Constr. Co., 1998 WL 42265, at *1; see also Rommel Builders, Inc., 3 F.
Supp. 2d at 664 ("Defendant's narrow interpretation of the 'design and construct' provision
would defeat the purpose of the FHAA by allowing architects and builders who are in"). But see
volved in either the design or construction, but not both, to escape liability ..
Whitaker, 2004 WL 1778963, at *4 (assuming that both actions must be done by a particular defendant, but upholding claim against architect accused of both designing and supervising construction).
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ample, "a nonconforming design that was never constructed"
would not violate § 3604(f)(3)(C). 12 ' According to this opinion, "the
statute should probably be read to imply that for discrimination
to occur, there must be both nonconforming design and nonconforming construction; an architect who designs a nonconforming
building that is never constructed should probably escape liabil129
ity."
In any event, the general view has emerged that a wide range
of participants in the "design-and-construct" process may be
named as proper defendants in § 3604(f)(3)(C) cases. Thus, according to one influential district court opinion: "When a group of
entities enters into the design and construction of a covered
dwelling, all participants in the process as a whole are bound to
follow the FHAA .... In essence, any entity who contributes to a
violation of the FHAA would be liable." 3 0 HUD and the Department of Justice have agreed with this approach. 3 '

128.
129.

Doering,2001 WL 1464897, at *4.
Id. This is also the position taken by the Department of Justice, which has argued:
Had Congress used the word "or," the Act would have made unlawful the
mere "design" of an inaccessible dwelling, even where actual construction was
never contemplated or achieved. Congress was concerned with a "failure to
design and construct... [accessible] dwellings," 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(C), not
the mere drafting of blueprints for dwellings that never get built.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supporting petitioners, T.R. Seven Oaks, No.
1:96-cv-02071-WEB (D. Md. 1997) (alterations in original).
On the other hand, where a building is designed in conformance with § 3604(f)(3)(C)
but is not built with the mandated accessibility features, a violation by the builder would
presumably occur. See infra note 141 and accompanying text.
130. Rommel Builders, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d at 665 (emphasis in the original). Accord
Quality Built Constr., Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d at 761 (quoting the Rommel Builders standard
set forth in the text); Taigen & Sons, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 2d at 1149 (quoting the Rommel
Builders standard set forth in the text); Pac. Northwest Elec., Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
7990, at *43 (quoting the Rommel Builders standard set forth in the text); Montana Fair
Hous. v. Am. Capital Dev., Inc., 81 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1069 (D. Mont. 1999) (quoting Rommel Builders standard set forth in the text); see also Doering, 2001 WL 1464897, at *4
(stating that "those who are wrongful participants [in such discrimination] are subject to
liability for violating the FHAA"); cf. Days Inns of Am., 151 F.3d at 826 (interpreting similar provision in Title III of the ADA to extend liability to anyone possessing a "significant
degree of control over the final design and construction of a facility").
131. See HUD DESIGN MArNUAL, supra note 39, at 22 ("[Rlesponsibility for complying
with the law rests with any and all persons involved in the design and construction of covered multi-family dwellings. This means [that the] complaint could be filed against all persons involved in the design and construction of the building, including architects, builders,
building contractors, the owners, etc."); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supporting petitioners, T.R. Seven Oaks, No. 1:96-cv-02071-WEB (D. Md. 1997) (providing
that § 3604(f)(3)(C) "requires all parties involved in that 'design and construction' process
to conform their involvement, whatever its scope, to the requirements of the Fair Housing
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This seems correct, as least for those entities whose contribution to the design-and-construction process is substantial. The
Supreme Court of the United States has made clear that an FHA
violation is essentially a tort and that FHA claims are to be governed by ordinary tort principles absent explicit instruction to the
contrary in the statute. 3 2 Under ordinary tort principles, an actor
is liable for harm to another if the actor's tortious conduct is a
"legal cause" of that harm (i.e., is a "substantial factor" in bringing about the harm).133 Thus, each entity whose participation in
the design-and-construction process of a multi-family housing
complex could reasonably be seen as a substantial factor in causing a § 3604(f)(3)(C) violation should be liable.
This would obviously include a single company that owns the
underlying land and also develops the project, builds the physical
34
structure, and becomes landlord to the building's tenants. Some
or all of these functions, however, may be carried out by separate
entities. It is not uncommon, for example, for a builder to be employed by the landowner/developer and have "no right to work on
the development outside of its contractual relationship with the
owner/developer.""'3 Still, the cases generally assume that the

Act").
132.

See Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 285-91 (2003); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189,

195-96 (1974).
133.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 430-31 (1965)

[hereinafter SECOND

TORTS RESTATEMENT]. These provisions of the Torts Restatement deal with negligent conduct, but a more recent version of this Restatement makes clear that the "legal cause""substantial factor" standard deals with all types of tortious conduct. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY §§ 1, B18 cmt. c (2000) [hereinafter AP-

PORTIONMENT RESTATEMENT] (noting that, for all tort claims, the basic requirement for an
actor's liability is "legal cause," which means that the actor's tortious conduct "must be a
factual cause of the plaintiffs injury and a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiffs damages" (citing SECOND TORTS RESTATEMENT § 431, cmt. a)); see also id. §§ A18 cmt.
C, C18 cmt. c, D18 cmt. e, El8 cmt. f (citing SECOND TORTS RESTATEMENT § 431, cmt. a).
A "substantial" cause, according to the cited Comment a in § 431 of the Second Torts
Restatement, means that "the defendant's conduct has such an effect in producing the
harm as to lead reasonable men to regard it as a cause, using that word in the popular
sense" and distinguishing this concept from causes that are "so insignificant that no ordinary mind would think of them as causes." SECOND TORTS RESTATEMENT § 431, cmt. a.
134. Builder-landlords are mentioned in the modern Torts Restatement as examples of
entities whose contribution to harm suffered by another as a result of a defect in the building is assumed to be substantial enough to make them liable. E.g., APPORTIONMENT RESTATEMENT, supra note 133, § 22 cmt. f, illus. 8 (describing a builder-landlord that is assumed to be liable for defects in construction); see also id. § B19 cmt. k, illus. 5 (describing
a landlord that is assumed to be liable for furnace explosion along with furnace's manufacturer and installer).
135. Rommel Builders, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d at 665.
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builder is liable for a project's § 3604(f)(3)(C) violations 136 along
with the owner/developer, 3 ' perhaps because the builder and
owner/developer are often part of a single corporate entity or perhaps because the builder's participation in the design-andconstruction process is so substantial. As for other entities, §
3604(f)(3)(C) claims have also been maintained, consistent with
the "substantial participant" standard, against architects 3 8 and a
variety of other participants in the design-and-construction proc39
ess. 1
Of course, not every participant in this process should be liable
when the resulting dwelling violates § 3604(f)(3)(C). Only those
entities that design or construct in violation of the statute (i.e.,
behave tortiously) would be held responsible. 4 ° Thus, for exam-

136. Many cases exist where § 3604(f)(3)(C) claims have been brought against builders.
See Edward Rose & Sons, 384 F.3d at 260; Quality Built Constr., Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d at
758-59, 762; Moseke v. Miller and Smith, Inc., 202 F. Supp. 2d 492, 493-94 (E.D. Va.
2002); Montana FairHous., 81 F. Supp. 2d at 1059-60; Rommel Builders, Inc., 3 F. Supp.
2d at 662-65; see also 56 Fed. Reg. 9495 (Mar. 6, 1991) (providing that the builder must
bear "[aill costs associated with incorporating the new design and construction requirements of the Fair Housing Act").
137. Many cases exist where § 3604(f)(3)(C) claims have been brought against
owner/developers. See Edward Rose & Sons, 384 F.3d at 260; Quality Built Constr. Inc.,
309 F. Supp. 2d at 762; Taigen & Sons, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 2d at 1148-49; Baltimore
Neighborhoods, Inc. v. LOB, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 456, 459-60 (D. Md. 2000); Eastern Paralyzed Veterans Ass'n v. Lazarus-Burman Assocs., 133 F. Supp. 2d 203, 205 (E.D.N.Y.
2001) (claim against original developer); see also 24 C.F.R. § 100.205(b), (d) (2005) (giving
examples of FHA accessibility requirements that focus on the role of the "real estate developer" or "developer").
138. See, e.g., Edward Rose & Sons, 384 F.3d at 260 n.1; Quality Built Constr., Inc.,
309 F. Supp. 2d at 758-59, 765; Hallmark Homes, Inc., 2003 WL 23219807, at *7; Barker
v. Emory Univ., 3 Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. [ 16,712 (N.D. Ga. June 24, 2003);
Moseke, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 493-94; Doering, 2001 WL 1464897, at *1; Montana Fair
Hous., 81 F. Supp. 2d at 1059-60.
139. See, e.g., Memphis Ctr. for Indep. Living v. R. & M. Grant Co., 3 Fair Hous.-Fair
Lending Rep.
16,779, at 16,779.1 (W.D. Tenn. 2004) (maintaining claims against engineers); Whitaker, 2004 WL 1773704, *1 (maintaining claims against civil engineer); Eastern Paralyzed Veterans Ass'n, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 205 (maintaining claims against designer-builder of pre-fabricated units used in the development); Baltimore Neighborhoods,
Inc. v. Cont'l Landmark, Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. 16,236, at 16,236.4 (D. Md. 1997)
(maintaining claims against real estate firm that exercised authority over condominium's
"Architectural Review Board" which "had considerable influence over a myriad of features
arguably relevant to FHA compliance").
140. See APPORTIONMENT RESTATEMENT, supra note 133, §§ 1, A18, B18, C18, D18,
El8 (providing that, for liability in all tort claims, an actor's "independent tortious conduct" must be a legal cause of the plaintiffs injury); see also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 46, at 324 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter
PROSSER & KEETON]:

[It is] essential that each particular defendant who is to be charged with responsibility shall be proceeding tortiously, which is to say with the intent
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ple, if the architect's plans call for accessible entrance ways and
the builder deviates from those plans in violation of the FHA,
not be liable because he was not a
then the architect would
"wrongful participant."1 4 1 Furthermore, "entities such as subcontractors and individual workers who do not participate in the
wrongful conduct resulting in a [§ 3604(f)(3)(C)] violation" would
also not be liable. 14 2 On the other hand, "if an architect draws up
plans with noncomplying entrance ways, and a builder follows the
plan resulting in a covered dwelling with an inaccessible entranceway, both entities would be liable as both were wrongful
participants."
2. Effect of Sale of the Property
a. Overview: "Piercing the Veil" and "Successor Liability"
Theories
How would the sale of a multi-family dwelling constructed
without the features mandated by § 3604(f)(3)(C) affect the potential liability of its new owner and the original owner-developerbuilder?14 Little has been written about this issue, but it is exrequisite to committing a tort, or with negligence. One who innocently, and
carefully, does an act which happens to further the tortious purpose of another is not acting in concert with the other.
141. See Rommel Builders, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d at 665 n.2; see also Quality Built Constr.,
Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d at 762 n.2, 765 (noting that liability was not sought regarding noncompliant outside features against architect who was only responsible for designing the
units' interiors). The scenario described in the text is apparently not an unusual one. See
supra note 101 and accompanying text.
142. Rommel Builders, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d at 664; Days Inns of Am., 151 F.3d at 826
(interpreting similarly worded provision in Title III of the ADA not to cover those persons
who are only "tangentially or remotely connected with" the design-and-construction process).
This is not to say that employees or other agents of a proper defendant who carry out
orders in violation of the FHA cannot also be held liable, for indeed they can. See, e.g., Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 597 F.2d 556, 562-63 (5th Cir. 1979); Jeanty v. McKee & Poague,
Inc., 496 F.2d 1119, 1120-21 (7th Cir. 1974). The assumption of the Rommel Builders
statement quoted in the text, however, is that such agents did not actually play a substantial role in the design-and-construction violation alleged. To the extent that they do, then
even subcontractors and workers may be liable along with their builder-employers.
143. Rommel Builders, 3 F. Supp. 2d 661 at 665 n.2; see also Quality Built Constr., Inc.,
309 F. Supp. 2d at 761-62 (rejecting builder's argument that it is shielded from liability
because its architect was responsible for designing the units properly). For a discussion of
indemnification, contribution, and other claims between defendants in § 3604(f)(3)(C)
cases, see infra Part IV.B.4.
144. For purposes of this section, "builder" will be used to connote the entity primarily
responsible for the original design-and-construction process, although it is recognized that
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tremely important, because virtually all of the millions of noncompliant units constructed since 1991 will eventually be sold,
and some multi-family developments, such as condominiums, are
built with the intention of being sold promptly. If only the original builder is responsible for bringing a development into compliance with § 3604(f)(3)(C)-and then only for so long as the builder
is involved with that development-the chances of this responsibility actually being fulfilled will fade over time. Furthermore,
the continued status of the development as inaccessible housing
will mean that persons with disabilities are discouraged from living there indefinitely unless the current owner is also responsible
for correcting the facility's § 3604(f)(3)(C) violations.
Few courts have considered this issue. What opinions there are
have generally concluded that the original builder remains liable
even after the property is sold, 145 but that the new owner is not
liable, 146 although little helpful analysis is offered to buttress
these conclusions. For example, in Silver State Fair Housing
Council v. ERGS, Inc., 4 the court upheld a § 3604(f)(3)(C) claim
against the original builder of an apartment complex completed
some years earlier under a "continuing violation" theory, 4 but
refused to apply this theory against the current owner, a whollyowned subsidiary of the builder that had taken no part in the design-and-construction process of the complex. 49 Silver State, however, was essentially concerned with statute-of-limitations issues,
a separate matter that is considered later in Part IV.D. Most
other opinions that have commented on the effect of an inaccessible development's sale have involved condominiums, where the
purchasers were seen primarily as consumers rather than business ventures intent upon offering their newly acquired units to
the public for profit. 5 ° This latter situation (e.g., the sale of an
apartment building to a commercial buyer) is the one most likely
such an entity might also be the developer, landowner, or other such participant. See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
145. See infra notes 147-48; Balachowski v. Boidy, No. 95-C-6340, 2000 WL 1365391,
at *15 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 20, 2000) (holding that the original builder is the "appropriate" entity to be ordered to retrofit and pay damages because he caused the violations and should
have corrected them).
146. See infra notes 147, 191.
147. 362 F. Supp. 2d 1218 (D. Nev. 2005).
148. Id. at 1220-22. For a discussion of the "continuing violation" theory, see infra Part
IV.D.2.b.
149. 362 F. Supp. 2d at 1220.
150. See infra notes 188-91 and accompanying text.
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to raise difficult and important issues as to who is responsible for
the building's § 3604(f)(3)(C) violations.
Before proceeding, it should be noted that sales to companies
closely related to the builder would not significantly alter §
3604(f)(3)(C) liability in two particular situations. One is where
the property is sold to a subsidiary corporation that is so clearly
just a shell of the builder that a court would be justified in "piercing" the subsidiary's "corporate veil" to hold the builder responsible for the sub's liabilities. The veil-piercing doctrine, being a
"fundamental principle of corporate law, "151 can certainly be invoked in FHA cases. 152 Thus, for example, a builder that has constructed an inaccessible apartment complex might create a subsidiary to which it sells this property, which is what occurred in
Silver State. 53 If the subsidiary is a well-funded company that
observes the corporate formalities, then this arrangement is
likely to shield the parent from the subsidiary's liabilities, but the
absence of these factors could well make the parent liable
through veil-piercing where the subsidiary's corporate form has
15 4
been misused to accomplish a wrongful purpose.

151. United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 62 (1998).
152. See, e.g., Holley v. Crank, 400 F.3d 667, 674-75 (9th Cir. 2005). See generally
Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 285-91 (2003) (holding that FHA claims are generally to be
governed by traditional legal principles).
rela153. See 362 F. Supp. 2d at 1220. Another typical scenario involving a parent-sub
a
create
to
company
development
large
a
for
be
would
setting
3604(f)(3)(C)
§
a
in
tionship
circumthese
Under
complex.
apartment
new
parent's
the
subsidiary corporation to build
stances, the question raised by the potential applicability of the veil-piercing doctrine
§
would be whether the parent, along with its builder sub, would be liable for the latter's
3604(f)(3)(C) violations. Cf. Johanson v. Huizenga Holdings, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 1175, 1176
di(S.D. Fla. 1997) (holding the parent of a construction company that had no officers or
the
of
III
Title
under
case
design-and-construction
a
in
defendant
proper
rectors to be a
ADA).
154. See, e.g., Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 61-64. One of the oddities of the Silver State opinion was that it referred to veil-piercing as a way to impose liability on a subsidiary for the
wrongs of its parent, see 362 F. Supp. 2d at 1220, an upside-down approach that ignores
the fact that this doctrine is used to impose liability on parent-shareholders for the wrongs
veilof their subsidiary corporations. See, e.g., Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 62-63 (describing
(7th
piercing principles in CERCLA case); Papa v. Katy Indus., Inc., 166 F.3d 937, 940-41
poto
cases
VII
Title
in
apply
principles
veil-piercing
Cir. 1999) (describing how Bestfoods
tentially hold parent liable for the discriminatory acts of its subsidiary corporation); Johanson, 963 F. Supp. at 1176. Thus, while the veil-piercing doctrine is certainly available
to attribute liability to a parent for its subsidiary's § 3604(f)(3)(C) violations, this theory
subsidipresumably could not be used, as Silver State suggested, to impose liability on a
362 F.
See
parent.
its
from
development
inaccessible
an
purchases
ary corporation that
Supp. 2d at 1222.
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A second type of sale that will not allow related entities to
avoid liability is when a builder of inaccessible housing sells all of
its assets to, or merges or consolidates with, another company.
Under traditional "successor liability" principles, the purchaser
(successor) company would ordinarily be liable for the harm
caused by its predecessor's defective products if the sale "constitutes a consolidation or merger with the predecessor" or "results
in the successor becoming a continuation of the predecessor."1"5
Successor liability principles have been applied in civil rights
and other federal statutory actions,' 5 6 and they would presumably
govern FHA cases as well. 5 7 These principles would justify attributing a builder's liability to its successor company where, for
example, the new company, as a result of a merger or consolidation with the builder or the purchase of all of the builder's assets,
simply amounts to a continuation of the builder's business.15 This
is not, however, the typical § 3604(f)(3)(C) situation. Presumably
in most cases where a builder constructs an inaccessible multifamily dwelling and sells it to another, the builder remains in
business and is only selling this one particular property. When
such a "piecemeal" sale of assets is involved, the purchaser ordinarily does not succeed to the builder's liability, absent an
agreement for the assumption of such liability or a fraudulent
conveyance designed to shield the builder from liability.15 9 How-

155.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 12(c), (d) (1998) [hereinaf-

ter PRODUCTS LIABILITY RESTATEMENT]. The other two circumstances provided in this rule
for successor liability are when the sale "is accompanied by an agreement for the successor
to assume such liability" or "results from a fraudulent conveyance to escape liability
for
the debts or liabilities of the predecessor." Id. § 12(a), (b). Imposing liability on successor
companies is considered appropriate in the four situations listed in § 12(a)-(d), because
a
contrary result would "unfairly deprive future products liability plaintiffs of the remedies
that would otherwise have been available against the predecessor." Id. § 12 cmt. b. On
the
other hand, successor liability is not deemed appropriate when another's assets are
acquired "piecemeal, other than as part of a going concern, [because the purchaser] cannot,
by that fact alone, be said to have either manufactured or sold defective products." Id.
For a discussion of whether an inaccessibly constructed multi-family dwelling is a "defective product" under modern tort principles, see infra notes 172-78 and accompanying
text.
156. See, e.g., Worth v. Tyler, 276 F.3d 249, 260-61 (7th Cir. 2001) (applying successor
liability principles in Title VII case); Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240,
1245-47 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that traditional successor liability principles govern
CERCLA cases); EEOC v. Vucitech, 842 F.2d 936, 944-46 (7th Cir. 1988) (applying successor liability principles in Title VII case).
157. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
158. See supra text accompanying note 155.
159. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
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ever, where the purchasing company acquires and continues to
operate another firm's entire product line (e.g., all of the apartment complexes of a large building company that has other busicompany liable for
nesses), some courts have held the acquiring
161
products.
the selling company's defective
b. Continuing Liability of the Original Builder
In Silver State, the court clearly felt that the original builder
was fully responsible for the § 3604(f)(3)(C) violations alleged and
concluded that, as a policy matter, it would be inappropriate to
allow such a defendant to "evade FHA liability simply by offload6
ing the property after completion."' ' To support this conclusion,
the court cited certain features of the FHA, such as its provision
for punitive damages to punish violators and the absence of any
statutory language limiting the types of entities that may be
sued.'62 According to the Silver State opinion: "If Congress had
In the absence of the circumstances described in Subsections (a) through (d),
is
a successor company that buys productive assets from another company
not liable for harm caused by a defective product sold or otherwise distributed by the predecessor prior to the successor's acquisition of assets. When
the assets are purchased piecemeal, the alleged successor did not "sell or distribute" the product under the liability rule stated in § 1 [the basic products
liability rule]; and attempts to establish continuation of the corporate entity
are recognized only under the terms set forth in this Section.
PRODUCTS LIABILITY RESTATEMENT, supra note 155, § 12 cmt. c.
DOBBS];
160. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 375, at 1040 (2000) [hereinafter
(applying this
(1973)
181-85
170-71,
168,
U.S.
414
NLRB,
v.
Co.
Bottling
State
cf. Golden
Court upheld an
principle to a labor law case). In Golden State Bottling, the Supreme
of another comNLRB reinstatement order against the purchaser of one of the businesses
The Court
172.
at
U.S.
414
See
practices.
labor
unfair
in
engaged
earlier
pany that had
of all of a
refused to limit the doctrine of successor liability to situations involving sale
industry,'
predecessor's assets, because, "so long as there is a continuity in the 'employing
Id. at
application."
broad
its
by
served
be
will
doctrine
the
the public policies underlying
183 n.5.
161. 362 F. Supp. 2d at 1222.
the
162. Id. Although not mentioned in the Silver State opinion, the contrast between
III
Title
ADA's
the
in
provision
design-and-construction
the
and
points
FHA on these two
can yield
(public accommodation) is noteworthy. First, while privately initiated FHA cases
71 and 76-77
actual and punitive damages and all other appropriate relief, see supra notes
to equitalimited
generally
is
III
Title
under
cases
such
in
and accompanying texts, relief
means that
ble orders to make the facility accessible, see 42 U.S.C. § 12188 (2000), which
of the buildsuch relief can only be "meaningful against the person currently in control
while
Second,
2001).
Cir.
(9th
1036
1029,
F.3d
259
Inc.,
ing." Lonberg v. Sanborn Theaters,
notes 68-69 and
the FHA does not limit the class of persons who may be sued, see supra
"any person
73 and accompanying texts, Title III's prohibitions are explicitly limited to
42 U.S.C. §
who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation."
two years
12182(a) (2000). Indeed, the legislative history of Title III, which was enacted
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wished to remove liability for construction-based discriminatory
housing practices upon the sale or transfer of the offending prop16 3

erty, it could have said

so."

Reliance on the absence of statutory language, however, is not
an entirely satisfactory basis for determining whether a former
owner remains liable for § 3604(f)(3)(C) violations. As noted
above, the Supreme Court has made clear that congressional silence in the FHA should be interpreted as a directive from Congress to apply traditional tort principles in determining who is a
proper defendant under this statute,"6 and Silver State did not
consider these principles.
Two sets of traditional tort principles are relevant to the problem of assessing liability in the sale-of-an-inaccessible-dwelling
situation: (1) those governing the liability of a vendor of real
property; and (2) those governing products liability. As to the
first, the basic rule is that a vendor of real property is ordinarily
permitted to
shift all responsibility for the condition of the
chaser ....

land

to

the pur-

Thus, in the absence of express agreement or misrepre-

sentation, the purchaser is expected to make his own examination
and draw his own conclusions as to the condition of the land; and the
vendor is, in general, not liable for any harm resulting to him or others from any defects existing at the time of transfer. 1 6

The main exception to this rule is that "the vendor is under a
duty to disclose to the vendee any hidden defects which he knows
or should know may present an unreasonable risk of harm to persons on the premises, and which he may anticipate that the

after the 1988 FHAA, shows that, while it was originally proposed without a limitation
on
who could be sued, the "owns, leases (or leases to), or operates" language was later
added
as a restriction on the types of entities that could be named as defendants. See
Lonberg,
259 F.3d at 1035 n.7. This limiting language is the reason some courts have held
that Title
III claims cannot be brought against architects and others who, while participating
in the
design-and-construction process, do not own, lease, or operate the resulting facility.
See,
e.g., id. at 1033-36; supra note 126 (citing other Title III cases). In any event,
the Silver
State opinion appropriately pointed to the more expansive provisions of the FHA
in justifying its holding that the original builder there could be made liable for noncompliance
with
§ 3604(f)(3)(C).
163. 362 F. Supp. 2d at 1222.
164. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
165. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 140, § 64, at 446-47. See also DOBBS, supra
note
160, § 376, at 1043 (noting that, traditionally, a builder was subject neither to strict
liability nor liability even for negligence once it had turned over improved real property
to a
new owner).
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vendee will not discover."166 Even if a § 3604(f)(3)(C) violation
could be considered a "hidden defect" triggering this exceptionhardly an obvious conclusion given that most § 3604(f)(3)(C) viowould presumalations are not "hidden" from anyone and indeed
6 7-this exception only
bly be quite apparent to disabled residents
requires the vendor to disclose such defects to the purchaser in
order to avoid liability. Even if this is not done, the vendor's liability is still subject to some time limit, usually expiring "once
the vendee has had a reasonable time to discover and remedy the
condition."16 Under this set of principles, therefore, the builder of
an inaccessible dwelling could expect to avoid liability for such
defects by simply "offloading" the property after its completion.
Tort principles dealing with liability for defective products,
however, do point toward continuing liability for the original
builder. The basic rule in this field is that an entity "engaged in
the business of selling or otherwise distributing products who
to liability for
sells or distributes a defective product is subject 69
This is basidefect."'
the
by
harm to persons or property caused
7 ' and it applies not only to a prodcally a rule of strict liability,
uct's manufacturer but also to all other commercial entities that
7
sell or distribute the product.' ' Furthermore, courts have, begindeals with
166. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 140, § 64, at 447. Another exception
this presumably is less
the risk of harm to those outside of the premises, id. at 448, but
premises.
relevant in § 3604(f)(3)(C) cases than the risk to persons on the
(9th Cir. 2004)
167. See, e.g., Smith v. Pac. Props. & Dev. Corp., 358 F.3d 1097, 1103
§ 3604(f)(3)(C)
other
and
barriers
accessibility
that
contention
(noting apartment builder's
rent or buy"). One excepviolations "would be readily apparent to anyone attempting to
in bathroom
tion might be the requirement in § 3604(f)(3)(C)(iii)(III) of "reinforcements
RESTATEMENT,
TORTS
SECOND
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See
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grab
of
walls to allow later installation
in real property that
supra note 133, § 353(1) (describing a hidden defective condition
not know or have readoes
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"(a)
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being
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vendor's
a
to
might lead
has reason to bevendor...
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(b)
and
involved,
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son to know of the condition or the
lieve that the vendee will not discover the condition or realize the risk").
168. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 140, at 449.
169. PRODUCTS LIABILITY RESTATEMENT, supra note 155, § 1.
liability since the
170. See, e.g., id. § 1 cmt. a (describing the evolution of products
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974-75
at
353,
§
160,
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supra
DOBBS,
tort);
in
liability
strict
1960s as
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from
dating
as
products
defective
their
for
evolution of manufacturers' liability
(Cal. 1963)).
liability" holding in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 377 P.2d 897
cmt. e (noting that the
171. See PRODUCTS LIABILITY RESTATEMENT, supra note 155, § 1
sellers and
basic strict liability rule for defective products "provides that all commercial
distributors such as
and
sellers
nonmanufacturing
including
products,
of
distributors
that are defective");
wholesalers and retailers, are subject to liability for selling products
sellers such
see also id. § 2 cmt. o (noting that strict liability extends to nonmanufacturing
entities that
commercial
covers
only
liability
such
However,
retailers).
and
as wholesalers
'are engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing the type of product that
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ning in the 1960s, come to include many types of housing among
the products subject to' this rule, 1 72 overcoming the traditional
view described in the previous paragraph that a vendor of improved real estate is not liable for defects in the property after it
is sold.'7 3 Under modern products liability rules, therefore, multifamily housing builders along with other manufacturers of defective products remain liable after their products are sold for harm
caused by defects in the products.
There are three principal ways in which a product may be held
to be defective, one of which is when it is "defective in design,"
i.e., "when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product
could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design by the seller or other distributor, . . . and
the omission of the alternative design renders the product not
reasonably safe." 74 The concept of a "reasonable alternative design" in design-defect cases generally requires courts to apply "a
risk-utility test to determine whether a harmful design is also a

harmed the plaintiff. The rule does not apply to a noncommercial seller
or distributor of
such products. Thus, it does not apply to ...the private owner of an automobile
who sells
it to another." Id. § 1 cmt. c.
172. See id. § 19 cmt. e, at 281-82. The Restatement rule dealing with
whether improved real property should be considered a product is inconclusive, providing
an affirmative answer only "when the context of [the real property's] distribution
and use is sufficiently analogous to the distribution and use of tangible personal property
that it is
appropriate to apply [products liability rules]." Id. § 19. The commentary
on this rule,
however, suggests that most multi-family housing complexes subject
to § 3604(f)(3)(C)
would be considered products. This commentary notes that, while courts
historically were
reluctant to view a contractor that builds and sells one house at a time as
a mass producer
of manufactured products, this reluctance has been overcome "in a number
of contexts,"
including those involving mass builders, prefabricated homes, and, of particular
importance here, in cases where strict liability is imposed "for defects in construction
when
dwellings are built ... on a major scale, as in a large housing project." Id.
§ 19 cmt. e; see
also APPORTIONMENT RESTATEMENT, supra note 133, § 32 cmt. f, illus. 8 (builder-landlord
assumed to be liable for defects in construction). The commentary dates
the beginning of
this shift toward viewing housing as a product to a 1965 case, Schipper
v. Levitt & Sons,
Inc., 207 A.2d 314 (N.J. 1965), and notes numerous cases and articles from
the 1980s and
1990s that extended the new strict-liability standard to builders of individual
houses and
condominiums. PRODUCTS LIABILITY RESTATEMENT, supra note 155, § 19 reporters'
note.
173. See supra notes 165-68 and accompanying text.
174. PRODUCTS LIABILITY RESTATEMENT, supra note 155, § 2(b). Alternatively,
a product is defective if it "contains a manufacturing defect when the product
departs from its
intended design," id. § 2(a), or if "inadequate instructions or warnings" have
been given in
certain circumstances. Id. § 2(c). The former basis for finding a multi-family
housing development defective would presumably occur when the building's plans called
for all of the
features required by § 3604(f)(3)(C) but the builder departed from those
plans, a situation
that apparently has occurred with some frequency. See supra note 101 and
accompanying
text.
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defective design."'7 5 In § 3604(f)(3)(C) cases, this has presumably
already been done by Congress through its enactment of this provision.176 Thus, assuming that § 3604(f)(3)(C) can be177seen for purposes of products liability law as a safety statute, a builder of
inaccessible multi-family housing, like any other manufacturer of
a defective product, would be liable for the harm caused by its
housing even after the property is sold to another. Such a
builder's liability might eventually be excused by the expiration
would be equally
of the FHA's statutes of limitations, but this
178
property.
the
to
on
true for a builder that held
c. Subsequent Owners' Liability
i. Overview: Connection to the § 3604(f)(3)(C) Violation
Does § 3604(f)(3)(C) liability extend to entities that have purchased inaccessible multi-family dwellings? This would certainly
be possible in those situations, discussed above, where the new
a
owner is simply the corporate alter ego of the builder or is
builder's
the
sell
to
is
commercial entity whose sole function

175. DOBBS, supra note 160, § 355, at 980. See also PRODUCTS LIABILITY RESTATEMENT,
supranote 155, § 2 cmt. d:
unreason[Deciding] whether the [product's] specifications themselves create
able risks ... requires reference to a standard outside the specifications....
reasonable
[Tihe test is whether a reasonable alternative design would, at
and, if
product
the
by
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harm
of
risks
cost, have reduced the foreseeable
or a predecesso, whether the omission of the alternative design by the seller
safe.
sor in the distributive chain rendered the product not reasonably
§ 4 (dealing with the sig176. See PRODUCTS LIABILITY RESTATEMENT, supra note 155,
safety statutes); DOBBS,
nificance in defective design cases of noncompliance with product
design cases of
defective
in
significance
the
with
supra note 160, § 360, at 992 (dealing
noncompliance with product safety statutes).
are primarily intended to
177. The fact that § 3604(f)(3)(C)'s mandated design features
not bar it from being seen
expand housing opportunities for persons with disabilities does
is clear that accessibilas a safety statute for purposes of products liability law. Indeed, it
and safety of persons
health
the
protect
do
ity requirements like those in § 3604(f)(3)(C)
See, e.g., Sapp v.
with mobility impairments, as a number of cases have demonstrated.
judgment to
summary
(granting
2002)
Tex.
(N.D.
581
578,
2d
MHI P'ship, 199 F. Supp.
and elbow"
shoulder
her
to
injuries
serious
disabled homeseeker who allegedly "sustained
sales area
defendant-builder's
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of
result
a
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wheelchair
her
of
out
propelled
being
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2000 WL
95-C-6340,
No.
Boidy,
v.
Balachowski
ADA);
the
of
being inaccessible in violation
features of plain1365391, at *3-6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 20, 2000) (noting that the inaccessible
serious injuries, feel "extiffs apartment caused her to, inter alia, be in "constant fear" of
underneath it, and be
land
and
wheelchair
her
"flip"
tremely unsafe," fear that she would
injured on several occasions, some of which required emergency-room care).
178. Statute-of-limitations issues are discussed infra in Part IV.D.
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flawed product.17 0 The focus here, however, is purchasers that are
genuinely independent from those responsible for the design-andconstruction process. Such a subsequent owner, having not participated in the "failure to design and construct" as mandated by
§ 3604(f)(3)(C), would presumably argue that it has not acted in
any way that violates the FHA.
This is not entirely obvious, however, given the manner in
which the FHA deals with § 3604(f)(3)(C)-based violations. As
noted above, the FHA makes the failure to design and construct
in accordance with § 3604(f)(3)(C) "discrimination" for purposes of
§ 3604(f)(1) and § 3 6 0 4 (f)(2)-provisions that ban disability discrimination in, respectively, "the sale or rental" of a dwelling and
"the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling,
or in the provision of services or facilities in connection with such
a dwelling."8 ° Thus, the FHA violation that noncompliance with §
3604(f)(3)(C) leads to is disability-based discrimination in the sale
or rental of a dwelling. Obviously, the entity that is most clearly
engaged in such a sale or rental would be the building's current

owner. 181

179. See supra notes 151-54 and accompanying text (explaining corporate
alter ego);
supra note 171 and accompanying text (describing liability rules applicable
to commercial
sellers and distributors of defective products).
180. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text. The full texts of § 3604(f)(1)
and §
3604(0(2) are set forth supra note 22.
181. The FHA's statutory structure described in the text is similar to that
employed in
the ADA's Title III, which has a general rule banning disability discrimination
in public
accommodations and then provides in subsequent provisions that certain activities,
including the failure to design and construct new facilities so that they are readily
accessible,
amounts to discrimination within the general rule. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12 182(a), 2
1 183(a)(1)
(2000) (respectively, the general rule and design-and-construct provision).
Case law dealing with who is a proper defendant under Title III is not particularly helpful
in analyzing
the comparable problem under the FHA, however, because, unlike the
FHA, Title III's
general rule is explicitly limited to "any person who owns, leases (or leases
to), or operates" a place of public accommodation. See supra note 162.
In addition, the specific issue dealt with in the text-whether a subsequent
purchaser
of an inaccessibly constructed property should be liable under the FHA-has
rarely been
important in Title III litigation. This is probably because Title III has other
provisions
that make current owners of public accommodations liable for, inter alia:
denying their
disabled customers the same opportunity "to participate in or benefit from
. . . [the] accommodations" as is afforded other individuals; "fail[ing] to take such steps
as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied
services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of
the absence of
auxiliary aids and services"; and "fail[ing] to remove architectural barriers
... in existing
facilities. . . where such removal is readily achievable." See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182(b)(1)(A)(i),
(b)(2)(A)(iii), (b)(2)(A)(iv) (2000). Liability under these provisions exists whether
or not the
owner participated in the accommodation's design and construction, which
means that a
disabled customer may successfully sue the current owner of an inaccessible
facility with-
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Consider the situation in which the owner-landlord of a nonaccessible apartment building is visited by a mobility-impaired prospective tenant. According to the Congress that passed the 1988
FHAA, such a prospect is "just as effectively excluded from the
opportunity to live in [that] particular dwelling by [its] lack of access . . .as by a posted sign saying 'No Handicapped People Al-

lowed.""82 The assumption of this statement is that such a sign
would clearly violate the FHAA as a form of discriminatory exclusion by the current landlord, and the thrust of the statement is
that the same conclusion should result from the building's inaccessible features. This would be so even if a prior owner originally
put up the "No Handicapped People Allowed" sign or constructed
the building's inaccessible features. If either the sign or the absence of mandated accessibility features are still in place, Congress assumed that the current landlord was responsible for excluding mobility-impaired tenants.
Furthermore, even if the inaccessible features do not literally
"make unavailable" a dwelling to the disabled prospect in violation of § 3604(f)(1), they would surely violate § 3604(f)(2), which
bars discrimination against persons with disabilities in, inter
alia, the "privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling" and in the "facilities in connection with such dwelling."18 3 The analogy here

would be not to a sign excluding disabled persons, but to a landlord's policy of forbidding them to use certain facilities or enjoy
certain privileges that are made available to non-disabled persons. A policy of not allowing persons with disabilities to use, say,
the public areas of an apartment building would be a blatant vio-

out having to rely on the design-and-construction provision. See, e.g., Spector v. Norwegian
Cruise Line, 125 S. Ct. 2169, 2179-81 (2005); Neff v. Am. Dairy Queen Corp., 58 F.3d
1063, 1064 n.1, 1069-70 n.15 (5th Cir. 1995); Brother v. CPL Invs., Inc., 317 F. Supp. 2d
1358, 1369-70 (S.D. Fla. 2004).
The FHA does not include such additional accessibility-related provisions, and, in particular, its "reasonable modifications" provision puts the financial burden for making additional structural changes on disabled persons, not building owners. See supra note 19 and
accompanying text; see also infra notes 210-14 (discussing the interplay between the
FHA's 'reasonable modifications" and "design and construction" provisions). The result is
that, unlike Title III, the FHA's mandates concerning physical accessibility are primarily,
if not exclusively, defined by its design-and-construction provision, making the issue of
whether subsequent owners are proper defendants with respect to this provision uniquely
important to this law's enforcement.
182. See supra text accompanying note 28.
183. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2) (2000); see Smith v. Pac. Props. & Dev. Corp., 358 F.3d 1097,
1104 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that (f)(2) "prohibits a broader set of behavior" than (f)(1)).
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lation of § (f)(2) by the current landlord 184 and one that presumably could not be defended on the ground that it had originated
with a prior owner. If, as Congress insisted, the failure to have
the accessibility features mandated by § 3604(f)(3)(C) can effectively exclude disabled persons from a building, then such a failure can surely amount to discrimination in "privileges" and "facilities" in violation of § (f)(2) regardless of whether the current
owner was initially responsible for the building's improper construction.
A current owner's responsibility for the relevant FHA violation
would seem even more clear in the case of a non-disabled tenant
who later becomes mobility-impaired, say due to a stroke or car
accident. Now for the first time suffering discrimination as a result of his building's inaccessible features, this newly disabled
tenant would surely look to the current landlord as the one responsible for limiting his "privileges of rental" in violation of §
(f)(2). Indeed, no one other than the current landlord
has control
85
of the rental terms that are the focus of § (f)(2).1
This is not to say that a disabled tenant or would-be tenant
might not also have an FHA claim against the original builder or
that the current owner against whom a § (f)(1)-(2) claim is
brought may not be able to seek contribution or other relief from
that builder.'8 6 But these possibilities do not bar the concept of a §
8 7
3604(f)(3)(C)-based § (fl(l)-(2) claim against the current owner.
Indeed, placing some responsibility on current owners to bring
their dwellings into compliance with § 3604(f)(3)(C) might be necessary to achieve this provision's fundamental goal of insuring
that all multi-family housing built after 1991 contain the mandated accessibility features.

184. See, e.g., Schroeder v. De Bertolo, 879 F. Supp. 173, 175-78 (D.P.R. 1995) (upholding § 3604(f)(2) claims on behalf of mentally disabled resident who was prohibited from
using the common areas of her condominium building); see also 1988 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 16, at 23 (noting that § 3604(f)(2) guarantees "that an individual could not be discriminatorily barred from access to recreation facilities, parking privileges, cleaning and
janitorial services and other facilities, uses of premises, benefits and privileges made
available to other tenants").
185. Cf. Lonberg v. Sanborn Theaters, Inc., 259 F.3d 1029, 1036 (9th Cir. 2001) (commenting that retrofit orders in design-and-construction cases under Title III of the ADA
can only be "meaningful against the person currently in control of the building").
186. Contribution among multiple defendants in § 3604(f)(3)(C) cases is discussed infra
in Part IV.B.4.
187. Cf. APPORTIONMENT RESTATEMENT, supra note 133, § B19 cmt. k, illus. 5 (assuming that landlord would be strictly liable for furnace explosion along with furnace's manufacturer and installer).
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In determining whether to impose liability on new owners for
their dwellings' noncompliance with § 3604(f)(3)(C), it may be
useful to distinguish those owners who have acquired the property as homeowner-consumers (e.g., in condominium situations)
from those commercial entities that have purchased multi-family
developments as business ventures with the intention of renting
or selling their units to the public. These two categories of new
owners are discussed separately in the next two sections.
ii. Condominium Purchasers
Thus far, courts have been reluctant to impose liability on new
owners of condominiums for § 3604(f)(3)(C) violations. For exam8
HUD's Chief Administrative Law
ple, in HUD v. Perland,'
Judge held the developers of a condominium complex liable, but
assumed that relief could not also extend to the buyer of an individual unit or the condominium association that had become
owner of the common areas, an assumption apparently shared by
HUD as the charging party which had not named these entities
as defendants." 9 Similarly, in a series of decisions involving a
Baltimore-area condominium development, the court held that,
while an effective retrofit order against the original builder required the joinder of the association that now held title to the
19 °
common areas as a party necessary for complete relief, such an

188. Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. 25,136, at 26,124-30 (HUD AL 1998).
189. Id. at 26,128 (citing HUD's brief in support of the proposition that the developers'
transfer of ownership of the individual unit and common areas bars injunctive relief affecting the non-party purchasers of these properties).
190. See Baltimore Neighborhoods, Inc. v. LOB, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 456, 471-73 (D.
Md. 2000); Baltimore Neighborhoods, Inc. v. Rommel Builders, Inc., 40 F. Supp. 2d 700,
705, 712 (D. Md. 1999); Baltimore Neighborhoods, Inc. v. Rommel Builders, Inc., 3 F.
Supp. 2d 661, 662 (D. Md. 1998); see also 1999 House Hearings,supra note 86, at 54-56
(statement of the National Association of Realtors) (opposing liability of subsequent purchasers of inaccessible buildings while recognizing the appropriateness of naming them as
parties for the purpose of effectuating retrofit relief). See generally SECOND TORTS
RESTATEMENT, supra note 133, § 211 ("A duty ... imposed or created by legislative enactment carries with it the privilege to enter land in the possession of another for the purpose
of performing or exercising such duty ... in so far as the entry is reasonably necessary to
such performance or exercise, if, but only if, all the requirements of the enactment are fulfilled."). In Rommel Builders, the court concluded that it was "appropriate to keep LGGCI
[the condominium association] in the case so long as it represents the owners of the common areas with alleged violations," noting that "LGGCI's presence as a party in the suit
appears imperative in order to afford full relief." 40 F. Supp. 2d at 712.
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owner was not liable for any other relief or for any substantive
violation of § 3604(f)(3)(C). 9 '
It seems to be the sense of these condominium decisions that
the homeowner-buyers of inaccessible properties have not only
not participated in the flawed design-and-construction process,
but, as final consumers of a defective product, are among the victims, rather than the perpetrators, of whatever FHA violations
exist in their homes. Furthermore, as long as such purchasers
simply live in their units and do not offer them for sale or rent,
the theory of liability outlined in the previous section-that a §
3604(f)(1)-(2) claim may lie against a new owner for the sale or
rental of a dwelling not built in compliance with § 3604(f)(3)(C)would not apply.19 However, whether a condominium owner who
sells or rents his inaccessible dwelling may thereby be subject to
a § (f)(1)-(2) claim is obviously a more difficult issue, as will be
seen when the obligations of a non-builder landlord are explored
in the next section. Even in these situations, however, application
of traditional tort principles would not extend the same degree of
liability to noncommercial sellers and renters of defective prod-

191. See Rommel Builders, 40 F. Supp. 2d at 712 (recognizing that condominium association that now owns inaccessible common areas "bears no financial obligation to plaintiffs in this case").
192. Another possible source of protection for such individual condominium buyers is
42 U.S.C. § 3613(d), a provision that protects bona fide home purchasers from having their
contract rights disrupted by the relief ordered in private FHA lawsuits. See also 42 U.S.C.
§ 3612(g)(4) (2000) (providing virtually identical restriction in FHA cases resulting from
complaints to HUD). See generally Gresham v. Windrush Partners, Ltd., 730 F.2d 1417,
1424 (11th Cir. 1984) (noting that § 3613(d) precludes courts from ordering "innocent
white tenants to vacate apartments to remedy discrimination against blacks or other minorities by the apartment management"). In Rommel Builders, the condominium association argued that § 3613(d) barred a retrofit order relating to the common areas it controlled, but the court disagreed. 40 F. Supp. 2d at 711-12. According to the Rommel
Builders opinion:
In this case, plaintiffs are not seeking an order to retrofit individual units
owned by bona fide purchasers, but rather for an order establishing a fund
for retrofitting common areas .... This relief sought is akin to the relief ordered in [Simovits v. Chanticleer Condominium Ass'n, 933 F. Supp 1394,
1407-08 (N.D. Ill. 1996)1 where the sales of individual units were not voided,
but some aspect of bona fide purchasers' property rights were affected.
Id. at 712. Thus, the Rommel Builders court, while believing that § 3613(d) did not bar the
relief requested there, did suggest that it might be invoked to protect individual purchasers of condominium units from retrofit orders in § 3604(f)(3)(C) cases. Thus far, however,
no court has so ruled, and indeed none has held that § 3613(d) has any applicability beyond protecting bona fide residents from being ousted from their homes. In addition, it
should be noted that this provision only limits equitable relief, not also damage awards, in
private FHA suits, and that it does not apply at all in FHA cases brought by the Attorney
General pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 3614.
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ucts as to those who distribute such products as part of a business
venture.'9 3 Still, once a purchaser of a condominium unit offers it
for re-sale or rental, the nondiscrimination commands of § (f)(1)(2) would apply,'94 and, for its part, the condominium association
that controls the common areas would presumably be subject to
liability based on the inaccessible features of those areas to the
same degree that the individual selling or renting his unit would
95
be for the inaccessible features of that unit.
iii. Commercial Purchasers
This section deals with entities independent of the builder that
purchase inaccessibly constructed multi-family dwellings as a
business venture with the intention of renting their units to the
public. As will be shown, based on traditional tort principles dealing with a landlord's liability for defects in its property, such purchaser-landlords might well be liable under § 3604(f)(1)-(2) for
their dwellings' noncompliance with § 3604(f)(3)(C) despite their
lack of participation in the flawed design-and-construction process.
Historically at common law, a landlord bore no responsibility
"either to the tenant or to others entering the land for defective
conditions existing at the time of the lease." 196 In the decades
leading up to enactment of the 1988 FHAA, however, virtually
every state abandoned this position in favor of a rule imposing a

193. See PRODUCTS LIABILITY RESTATEMENT, supra note 155, § 1 cmt. c (providing that
the private owner of an automobile who sells it to another is not subject to the same rule of
strict liability for the product's defects as is a commercial seller of that product).
194. The statute would apply subject to the FHA's "Mrs. Murphy" and single-familyhouse exemptions in 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b). For a description of these exemptions, see
SCHWEMM, supra note 7, at § 9:4.
195. Indeed, a condominium association might even be sued in these circumstances by
one of its own homeowner-members if, for example, that person becomes disabled or his
ability to sell his unit is hampered by the lack of accessible features in the overall development. Cf. Simovits v. Chanticleer Condo. Ass'n, 933 F. Supp. 1394, 1403-05 (N.D. Ill.
1996) (rejecting condominium association's defenses of estoppel, laches, unclean hands,
and waiver in connection with individual owner's suit based on his attempt to sell his unit
encumbered by an age-restrictive covenant that violated the FHA's ban on familial status
discrimination); HUD v. Guglielmi, Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. 1 25,004 (HUD ALT
1990) (ruling for mobile home owner whose landlord prevented the sale of her home to a
family with children); HUD v. Murphy, Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. 25,002, at 25,01819, 25,053-58 (HUD ALT 1990) (ruling similarly for multiple complainants).
196. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 140, § 63, at 435; see also DOBBS, supra note 160,
§ 240, at 625-26, § 376, at 1044-45.
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duty of reasonable care on landlords in the management of their
residential properties, a rule that included an obligation to maintain leased dwellings in a habitable condition. 9 7 This duty of reasonable care with its implied warranty of habitability means that
a landlord is subject to liability "for conditions of which he is
aware, or of which he could have known in the exercise of reasonable care."'98 Furthermore, a landlord is under a duty to "inspect[]
the rental dwelling and correct[] any defects disclosed by that inspection that would render the dwelling uninhabitable,"'9 9 and is
ordinarily "chargeable with notice of conditions which existed
prior to the time that the tenant takes possession."2 0 Importantly
for purposes of this article, this duty to reasonably inspect and
repair the premises includes complying with applicable housing
laws, and the failure to do so may constitute negligence per se.2 '
197. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: LANDLORD AND TENANT ch. 17, at
155-56, § 17.6 cmt. c, at 233 (1977) [hereinafter LANDLORD AND TENANT RESTATEMENT]
(noting that the position of landlord nonliability set forth in the 1965 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS was being replaced by a rule holding landlords liable "to tenants and others
on the leased property on the basis of the general law of negligence" and taking the position that "there is an implied warranty of habitability by the landlord in regard to residential property"); see also Peterson v. Superior Court, 899 P.2d 905, 909-10 (Cal. 1995) (reviewing various states' positions); Eric T. Freyfogle, The Installment Land Contract as
Lease: HabitabilityProtectionsand the Low-Income Purchaser,62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 293, 297
(1987) (noting that "[iun the 1960s and 1970s nearly all states imposed on landlords an obligation to maintain the habitability of leased premises"). According to the Supreme Court
of California's opinion in Peterson, replacing "the outmoded common law doctrine" of no
duty with a rule "that every lease of a dwelling contains an implied warranty of habitability" was "more in line with the modern reality," reflecting an awareness of "'the typical
inequality in bargaining positions of the landlord and tenant," that "'landlords were usually better positioned to make needed repairs'," and "'the public policy concern over the
quality of the nation's housing stock.'" 899 P.2d at 915-16 (quoting Freyfogle, supra, at
297-99).
198. LANDLORD AND TENANT RESTATEMENT, supra note 197, § 17.6 cmt. c. "Where the
landlord is able to discover the condition by the exercise of reasonable care, he is subject to
liability after he has had a reasonable opportunity to discover the condition and to remedy
it." Id.
199. Peterson, 899 P.2d at 917; see also id. at 918 n.13 (noting that "a landlord's responsibility ... to maintain residential rental property in a habitable condition gives rise
to a duty to inspect the property"); cf. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 140, at 449 (noting
that harm caused by defects in real property would traditionally result in liability attaching to the new owner, at least once the new owner "acquires notice of the condition and
fails within a reasonable time thereafter to act reasonably to rectify it").
200. LANDLORD AND TENANT RESTATEMENT, supra note 197, § 17.6 cmt. c. In addition,
a landlord must repair "promptly any conditions, of which the landlord has actual or constructive notice, that arise during the tenancy and render the dwelling uninhabitable."
Peterson, 899 P.2d at 917. Furthermore, a landlord who makes repairs negligently so as to
make the leased property more dangerous or give it a deceptive appearance of safety is
also subject to liability for any harm resulting therefrom to the tenant or others. See LANDLORD AND TENANT RESTATEMENT, supra note 197, § 17.7.
201. See Peterson, 899 P.2d at 916-17 & n.10; DOBBS, supra note 160, § 241, at 628. See
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The fact that the tenant is aware of the defective condition does
not excuse the landlord's liability.2 °2
The duty of a landlord who purchases an apartment building
from another has been likened to that of a seller of used machinery,2°3 i.e., such a person is generally not subject to strict liability
for defects in the property,20 4 unless he "rebuilds or reconditions
the product and thus assumes a role analogous to that of a manufacturer."20 5 Thus, while structural defects in an apartment complex would presumably justify holding the original builder strictly
liable, 2 6 a landlord who purchases such a complex may only be
held liable for injuries resulting from defects in the premises if he
has breached the applicable negligence standard.2 7
The point here is not to establish that a post-construction purchaser of an inaccessible apartment complex would be liable for
the property's § 3604(f)(3)(C) violations based on state negligence
law, although this is a real possibility. 2 8 Rather, the point is to

generally SECOND TORTS RESTATEMENT, supra note 133, §§ 286-288C (describing the circumstances under which violation of a legislative enactment amounts to negligence per
se).

202.

LANDLORD AND TENANT RESTATEMENT, supra note 197, § 17.6 cmt. b.

203.

See Peterson, 899 P.2d at 914. A commercial seller of a defective used product is

liable for harm caused by the defect if the defect arises either from the seller's "failure to
exercise reasonable care" or from the product's noncompliance "with a product safety statute or regulation applicable to the used product." PRODUCTS LIABILITY RESTATEMENT, supra note 155, § 8(a), (d).
204. See Peterson, 899 P.2d at 907-11, 914-16; DOBBS, supra note 160, § 241, at 62829. But see APPORTIONMENT RESTATEMENT, supra note 133, § B19 cmt. k, illus. 5 (assuming landlord to be strictly liable for furnace explosion along with the furnace's manufacturer and installer).
205. Peterson, 899 P.2d at 914.
206. See supra notes 169-78 and accompanying text. As a result, in those cases where
the landlord participated in the construction of the building, strict liability might attach to
such a landlord "based on the landlord's status as a builder who is engaged in the business
of constructing (i.e., manufacturing) rental properties." Peterson, 899 P.2d at 914; see also
APPORTIONMENT RESTATEMENT, supra note 133, § 22 cmt. f, illus. 8 (assuming builderlandlord is strictly liable for defects in construction).
207. Peterson, 899 P.2d at 920-21. Bringing an action for negligence against the landlord does not, of course, bar an injured tenant from also asserting a strict liability claim
against the manufacturer of the building. See id. at 921.
208. Cf. Saedi v. Kriz, No. B167250, 2004 WL 2537568 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 10, 2004)
(upholding $250,000 jury verdict based on negligence per se theory against landlord who
failed to reasonably accommodate disabled tenant in violation of state law equivalent of
the FHA's § 3604(f)(3)(B)). See generally Grable & Sons Metal Prods. Inc. v. Darue Eng's &
Mfg., 125 S. Ct. 2363, 2370 (2005) ("The violation of federal statutes and regulations is
commonly given negligence per se effect in state tort proceedings."); PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 140, § 36, at 221 n.9 (noting that "the breach of a federal statute may support a
negligence per se claim as a matter of state law"); see supra note 201 and accompanying
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show that well established tort principles, which were in place at
the time of the 1988 FHAA's enactment and which continue in
force today, provide for liability for residential landlords based on
their property's defects, even if such a landlord had no role in
causing those defects and so long as he has had sufficient time to
discover and correct the defects. Based on these principles, it is
surely plausible to conclude that Congress intended for landlords
to be liable to disabled residents and prospective residents under
§ 3604(f)(1)-(2) as a result of their offering rental units that do not
comply with § 3604(f)(3)(C).
Nor is this conclusion inconsistent with the decision in Silver
State, which, in ruling for the defendant-purchaser of an inaccessible apartment complex on statute-of-limitations grounds, did
not address the issue of whether such a purchaser could be made
liable to disabled prospective tenants through timely claims
based on § 3604(f)(1)-(2). °9 Indeed, no court has yet ruled on this
issue, but the nature of the FHA violation prompted by noncompliance with § 3604(f)(3)(C) and the congressional goal in enacting
this provision suggest that current landlords of inaccessible
dwellings may well be liable.
A final note is in order concerning the responsibilities of current landlords of inaccessible multi-family dwellings. Apart from
the design-and-construction mandates of § 3604(f)(3)(C), the FHA
in § 3604(f)(3)(A) requires all landlords, regardless of the age of
their buildings or who constructed them, to allow disabled tenants, at their own expense, to make "reasonable modifications...
necessary [to afford them] full enjoyment of the premises."2 1 ° The
interplay between this reasonable-modifications provision and
the FHA's design-and-construction requirements has not yet been
the subject of any judicial opinion, but it has been addressed by
HUD. In commenting on who is responsible for the costs of making dwellings accessible, HUD's 1991 Accessibility Guidelines
noted that, while the costs of the design-and-construction requirements are to be "borne by the builder," a tenant who needs
to make additional modifications to make a particular unit accessible "for that person's particular type of disability ... would in-

text (describing negligence per se theory based on landlord's failure to comply with applicable housing laws).
209. See supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
210. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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2 11 Thus, according to
cur the cost of this type of modification."
HUD:

For dwellings subject to the statute's accessibility requirements, the
tenant's costs would be limited to those modifications that were not
covered by the Act's design and construction requirements. (For example, the tenant would pay for the cost of purchasing and installing
grab bars... [but not for] the costs associated with adding bathroom
by § 3604(fX3)()].)
wall reinforcement [which is required

However, if the dwelling is not subject to § 3604(f)(3)(C) (e.g., bethe
cause it was constructed prior to 1991), "the tenant would pay
2 13
needs.
her
or
his
meet
to
necessary
cost of all modifications
This commentary does not address the responsibilities of postconstruction purchasers of multi-family dwellings built in violation of § 3604(f)(3)(C), but it does purport to protect tenants in
such dwellings from having to incur the costs of making their
units comply with this provision. Consider the situation of a mobility-impaired individual who, though not deterred from moving
into a building that fails to comply with § 3604(f)(3)(C), now
wants to make his dwelling fully accessible. According to HUD,
such a tenant should be financially responsible only for those
modifications that go beyond what is required by § 3604(f)(3)(C)
(i.e., someone else must pay for the § 3604(f)(3)(C)-mandated
modifications). 214 The HUD commentary says that this someone
else should be the builder, but this may not be a realistic possibility if the builder has departed after selling the development to a
new owner-landlord.
In these circumstances, a tenant who is entitled to have his
costs limited to those modifications not covered by § 3604(f)(3)(C)
might well accuse a landlord that tries to put all of these costs on
the tenant of discriminating in the "privileges of ... rental of a
215 Obviously, if such a tenant is
dwelling" in violation of § (f)(2).
required to pay for the entire cost, then he is worse off than a
comparable tenant in a § 3604(f)(3)(C)-compliant building. This
211. See 56 Fed. Reg. 9495 (Mar. 6, 1991), in HUD Accessibility Guidelines, supra note
36.
212. Id. at 9495-96.
213. Id. at 9496.
214. See id. at 9495-96.
215. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2) (2000) see also Baltimore Neighborhoods, Inc. v. Sterling
Homes Corp., 1999 WL 1068458, at *5 (D. Md. Mar. 25, 1999) (holding that § (f)(2) prohibit's a provider of housing covered by § 3604(f)(3)(C) from charging "a premiun for accessibility features requried by the FHAA").
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seems a perverse result. It not only puts the financial burden for
§ 3604(f)(3)(C) compliance on the very class of persons that this
law was intended to help, it also provides an additional barrier
against persons with disabilities moving into or remaining in
noncompliant buildings. While this perspective does not inevitably lead to the conclusion that new owner-landlords should bear
the costs of § 3604(f)(3)(C)-mandated modifications-the builder
may, after all, continue to be available as a source of funds-it
does suggest an additional argument for this result that is based
both on equity to disabled tenants and on the congressional
goal of having all post-1991 multi-family dwellings comply
with § 3604(f)(3)(C).21 6
3. Other Potential Defendants
a. Those Making or Failing to Make Renovations or Repairs
The previous section argued that there may be a duty on current owners of noncompliant buildings covered by § 3604(f)(3)(C)
to provide the features mandated by this law. If so, the natural
follow-up question, addressed here, is whether that duty extends
to making whatever renovations or repairs may be necessary to
maintain such compliance. For purposes of this section, therefore,
it is assumed that the buildings involved are covered by §
3604(f)(3)(C) and have at one time contained the required features, either through proper initial design and construction or
through post-construction improvements.
A necessary preliminary step in cases involving new work is to
determine whether § 3604(f)(3)(C) even applies to the buildings
involved; that is, are they "covered multi-family dwellings for first

216. Apart from the question of who is responsible for the costs of accessibilityenhancing modifications, it would at least seem clear that current landlords of noncompliant buildings would be required to approve all § 3604(f)(3)(A)-based modification requests
that simply seek to provide the accessibility features mandated by § 3604(f)(3)(C) (i.e.,
that
all such requests would be considered "reasonable modifications" as a matter of law).
See,
2
e.g., 24 C.F.R. § 100. 03(c), ex. 2 (2005) (providing that a landlord must, pursuant
to §
3604(f)(3)(A), allow a tenant to widen the bathroom doorway so that the tenant's
wheelchair could pass through); cf. Moseke v. Miller & Smith, Inc., 202 F. Supp. 2d 492,
494-95,
510 (E.D. Va. 2002) (noting that disabled plaintiff still retains a reasonable accommodation claim under § 3604(f)(3)(A) against her condominium association despite the
court's
dismissal of her § 3604(f)(3)(C)-based claims against entities involved in the property's
original construction on statute-of-limitations grounds).
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occupancy after [March 13,

1991]?

217

The quoted language means

that some types of work after the triggering date are not covered.
For example, an older building that was used for a nonresidential
purpose (e.g., a warehouse) and that has been converted post1991 to multi-family housing is apparently not subject to §
3604(f)(3)(C), because HUD has interpreted the phrase "first occupancy" to mean "a building that has never before been used for
any purpose."21' Furthermore, as to housing built before 1991, §
3604(f)(3)(C) "does not require any renovations to [such] existing
buildings."21 9 However, when a post-1991 "addition is built as an
extension to an existing building, the addition of four or more
units is regarded as a new building and must meet the design requirements of [§ 3604(f)(3)(C)] .... If, for example, an apartment
220
are covered."
wing is added to an existing hotel, the apartments
Assuming that a structure is covered by § 3604(f)(3)(C) and has
at one time included the features mandated by this law, does its
current owner have a duty to maintain these features without
facing liability under § 3604(f)()-(2)? No court has addressed this
issue, and the signals given by HUD are mixed, although traditional tort principles do suggest that there may be an on-going
duty of repair.2 2 1
As for HUD, it announced just prior to § 3604(f)(3)(C)'s effective
date in 1991 that "alteration, rehabilitation or repair of covered
multifamily dwellings are not subject to the Act's accessibility requirements."2 2 2 Some years later, however, in its Accessibility Design Manual, HUD opined that the corridor space in an accessible

217. See supra text accompanying notes 24 and 26.
HUD
218. 24 C.F.R. § 100.201 (2005) (providing definition of "first occupancy"); see also
are
that
facilities
('Existing
9477
Reg.
Fed.
56
at
36,
note
supra
Guidelines,
Accessibility
converted to dwelling units are not subject to the Act's accessibility requirements."); HUD
in QuesQuestions and Answers, supra note 36, at 59 Fed. Reg. 33,362, 33,365 (indicating
not covare
purposes
nonresidential
from
converted
buildings
that
tion and Answer No. 9
does
ered). However, where only the facade of such a building is preserved, § 3604(f(3)(C)
ceilings
and
floors
of
portions
structural
all
including
building,
the
of
interior
"the
if
apply
is removed, and a new building is constructed behind the old facade" that would otherwise
be covered. HUD DESIGN MANUAL, supra note 39, at 11.
219. HUD DESIGN MANUAL, supra note 39, at 12.
220. Id. at 11.
221. Apart from the duty-of-repair question, it would seem clear that a landlord should
at least have the duty to avoid taking action that would un-do existing features mandated
by § 3604(f)(3)(C), as, for example, by putting in a new sidewalk that transforms a previously accessible front entrance to an inaccessible one.
222. HUD Accessibility Guidelines, supra note 36, at 56 Fed. Reg. 9477.
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route "must be free of hazardous protruding objects that project
from walls and posts," 223 implying that a continuing duty exists
with respect to at least some of § 3604(f)(3)(C)'s requirements.2 2 4
As for traditional tort principles, the modern view is that a
residential landlord has a duty to reasonably inspect and repair
the rental premises, which includes complying with applicable
housing codes, and that a breach of this duty should result in liability to tenants and others for harm resulting from defects in
the property.2 2 5 If this duty is sufficient to make a current landlord liable under § 3604(f)(1)-(2) for the absence of § 3604(f)(3)(C)mandated features to disabled tenants and prospective tenants as
discussed above in Part JV.B.2.c, then it would seem a necessary
corollary that such a landlord would also have to take all reasonable steps to maintain these features.
b. Real Estate Agents and Other Facilitators of Sales and
Rentals of § 3 604(f)(3)(C)-Covered Dwellings
Real estate agents often play a key role in housing transactions, making them a natural target for liability when such
transactions involve FHA violations,22 6 but thus far, no reported
case has considered their potential liability for facilitating the
sale of a building constructed in violation of § 3604(f)(3)(C). The
threat of such liability does exist, however, as demonstrated by
the fact that the National Association of Realtors ("NAR") in 1999
sought, unsuccessfully, to have Congress amend § 3604(f)(3)(C) to
specify that realtors would not be liable "for brokering a transaction involving a property which was designed and constructed
improperly." 227 According to the NAR, one such claim had been
filed with HUD, which ultimately "exonerated the real estate
agents" involved and provided "verbal assurances" to the NAR
that HUD would not charge such cases in the future. 228 HUD has
not formally taken this position, however, and even if it did, pri-

223. HUD DESIGN MANUAL, supra note 39, at 2.13.
224. See also text accompanying note 435 (noting that the requirements
of §
3604(f)(3)(C) are written in the present tense).
225. See supra text accompanying notes 197-202.
226. See, e.g., ScHwEMM, supra note 7, at § 12B:2 n.5.
227. 1999 House Hearings,supra note 86, at 56.
228. Id. at 55.
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vate litigants would remain free to bring such claims under §
3613.229
23 °
Realtor liability could arise in two types of situations. One is
where a real estate agent represents the buyer of a multi-family
dwelling that lacks the features mandated by § 3604(f)(3)(C), and
the buyer is subsequently sued for disability discrimination as a
result of the absence of these features. Whether such a buyer
could be made liable under the FHA is an open question, but, as
discussed above in Part IV.B.2.c, an affirmative answer is a distinct possibility. A buyer who is sued in these circumstances
might be expected to bring a claim against his realtor if the latter
had failed to point out the building's noncompliance with §
3604(f)(3)(C) and/or the buyer's potential liability for such noncompliance .231
The other situation in which a real estate agent might risk liability in connection with a noncompliant building is where the
agent represents a disabled homeseeker. Presumably, a competent agent will notice and point out to his client the absence of §
3604(f)(3)(C)-mandated features in any dwelling being considered. An agent failing to do so might be liable for whatever damages the client suffers as a result of moving into such a unit, although, as in the situation discussed in the preceding paragraph,
such liability would be based on the agent's violation of his statelaw duties and not on the FHA.
The competent agent, however, may risk FHA-based liability if
care is not taken in how the § 3604(f)(3)(C) information is conveyed to the client. In an analogous situation, real estate agents
who volunteered racial information in an effort to influence their
clients' housing choice have been held liable for illegal steering
under the FHA.23 2 The corresponding problem in accessibility

229. See text accompanying notes 67-71.
cases.
230. Realtors may also prosecute their own FHA-based claims in § 3604(f)(3)(C)
369-71.
notes
See infra text accompanying
in the
231. Not surprisingly, therefore, the NAR's position is that buyers not involved
buildtheir
on
based
FHA
the
under
liable
be
not
should
design-and-construction process
at 54ings' noncompliance with § 3604(f)(3)(C). See 1999 House Hearings, supra note 86,
the latter
56. If they are liable, then their realtors could face derivative liability, although
than
rather
duties
state-law
their
of
violation
realtors'
would presumably be based on the
on the FHA.
Cir. 1990)
232. See, e.g., Vill. of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521, 1529-34 (7th
preferences in
(opining that the FHA prevents agents from trying to mold their customers'
serve customers'
favor of choosing segregated housing, but that the law allows agents to
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cases would be agents who assume that their clients would choose
(or reject) housing based on its § 3604(f)(3)(C) status and therefore steer them illegally instead of simply providing information
and allowing the clients to decide for themselves.
In addition to real estate agents, other facilitators of housing
transactions involving dwellings covered by § 3604(f)(3)(C) may
be targets of suit. The FHA prohibits disability-based discrimination in the insuring, financing, and appraisal of housing.23 3 Thus,
for example, in situations where the features mandated by §
3604(f)(3)(C) are present, an insurance company's decision to
treat such features negatively (e.g., through a refusal to insure or
higher rates) would presumably violate the FHA.23 4 A similarlybased negative decision by a mortgage provider or appraiser
might also violate the FHA, at least if it made housing unavailable in violation of § 3604(f)(1) or resulted in discriminatory
terms or conditions in violation of § 3604(f)(2). 23 With regard to
preferences by providing racial information requested by them). See generally
SCHWEMM,
supra note 7, at §§ 13:5-13:7.
233. Home insurance is not explicitly mentioned in the FHA, but a HUD regulation
and many judicial decisions have held that insurance discrimination violates
§ 3604(a)/§
3604(f)(1) and § 3604(b)/§ 3604(f)(2). See 24 C.F.R. § 100.70(d)(4) (2005); SCHWEMM,
supra
note 7, at § 13:15; text accompanying notes 13-32 (discussing cases under § 3604(a)
and §
3604(b)); see also infra note 234 (listing disability cases under § 3604(f)(1)
and §
3604(f)(2)).
Housing-related financial discrimination is explicitly outlawed by the FHA's
§ 3605
and may also violate § 3604(f)(1) and § 3604(f)(2). See, e.g., Hargraves v. Capital
City
Mortgage Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 7, 22 (D.D.C. 2000) (upholding race-based claims
under §
3604(a) and § 3604(b)); United States v. Mass. Indus. Fin. Agency, 910 F. Supp.
21, 27-29
(D. Mass 1996) (upholding claims under § 3604(f)(1) and § 3605); SCHWEMM, supra
note 7,
at § 13:15 n.4 (citing cases upholding § 3604(a) claims).
Appraisal discrimination is explicitly outlawed by § 3605 and may also violate
§
3604(f)(1). See Hanson v. Veterans Admin., 800 F.2d 1381, 1386 (5th Cir. 1986) (upholding
claim based on § 3604(a)); United States v. Am. Inst. of Real Estate Appraisers,
442 F.
Supp. 1072, 1079 (N.D. Ill. 1977); SCHWEMM, supra note 7, at §§ 18:-1, 18:7-18:8.
234. See, e.g., Nevels v. Western World Ins. Co., 359 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1117-20
(W.D.
Wash. 2004) (upholding § 3604(f)(1) and § 3604(f)(2) claims based on defendant's
refusal to
insure long-term-care facilities that housed many disabled residents); Wai v. Allstate
Ins.
Co., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5-7 (D.D.C. 1999) (upholding § 3604(f)(1) and § 3604(f)(2)
claims
based on defendant's refusal to provide standard insurance at ordinary rates to
landlords
with disabled tenants).
235. Financing and appraisal claims based on § 3604(f)(3)(C) may be somewhat
more
difficult to maintain than those against insurance companies. This is because
the FHA
provision most clearly applicable to financial and appraisal discrimination (i.e.,
§ 3605),
see supra note 233, is not one for which noncompliance with § 3604(f)(3)(C) is
considered
discrimination. See supra text accompanying notes 19-23; cf. Gaona v. Town &
Country
Credit, 324 F.3d 1050, 1056-57 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that a mortgage lender
accused of
violating § 3605 was under no obligation to provide reasonable accommodations
pursuant
to § 3604(f)(3)(B)); Webster Bank v. Oakley, 830 A.2d 139, 152 (Conn. 2003) (agreeing
with
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those buildings that do not have the features mandated by §
3604(f)(3)(C), insurance companies and other housing facilitators
could presumably treat this fact as a negative without violating
the FHA, so long as they do not do so in a way that discriminates
against persons with disabilities (e.g., by charging higher rates to
than are
disabled individuals who live in a noncompliant building
23 6
building).
same
the
in
tenants
charged to non-disabled
c. Local Governments and Building Officials
Before any multi-family housing development may be built, it
must go through a review-and-approval process by a unit of local
government, whose officials are charged with determining
whether it meets the requirements of that government's building
code and other applicable laws. Put another way, every dwelling
constructed in violation of § 3604(f)(3)(C) was once approved by
local building officials. This fact, which the home-building industry contends is one of the principal reasons for the high degree of
237 suggests that local officials
noncompliance with § 3604(f)(3)(C),
bear at least some responsibility for violations of this statute. As
noted above, proper defendants in § 3604(f)(3)(C) cases generally
include anyone whose conduct is a substantial factor in causing a

to §
Gaona that § 3604(f)(3)(B)'s reasonable accommodations requirement does not apply
held
have
courts
some
financing,
discriminatory
of
coverage
3605 claims). As to § 3604's
that this provision, unlike § 3605, applies only where financing is sought in connection
acwith "acquiring a home" and not also to loans "for maintaining a dwelling previously
Bank,
Mortgage
Nat'l
Midwest
v.
Eva
(quoting
quired." Webster Bank, 830 A.2d at 152
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violation of this provision,2 38 and it could certainly be argued that
local building officials fit within this category.
The problem is that this general standard and the torts principles on which it is based only govern FHA cases if Congress has
not explicitly provided to the contrary, 23 9 and the 1988 FHAA
does include some explicit provisions relating to the role of local
governments vis-a-vis § 3604(f)(3)(C). In one such provision, Congress directed HUD to "encourage, but.., not require, States and
units of local government to include in their existing procedures
for the review and approval of newly constructed covered multifamily dwellings, determinations as to whether the design and
construction of such dwellings are consistent with [§
3604(f)(3)(C)]." 240 This provision, which gives local governments
the option of ignoring § 3604(f)(3)(C)'s requirements in their review-and-approval procedures, implies that such governments
should not be made liable for § 3604(f)(3)(C)-related violations
based on their building codes' failure to include the FHAmandated features.2 4 '
A more difficult question, however, would be presented where a
local government's building laws do include the § 3604(f)(3)(C)mandated features, but municipal officials mistakenly approve a
proposed development that fails to include these features. Congress in the FHAA was aware of this possibility, but provided
only limited guidance as to what legal consequences should follow. Thus, where a local government has incorporated in its laws
accessibility requirements equivalent to § 3604(f)(3)(C), the
FHAA specifies that compliance with such laws "shall be deemed

238. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
239. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
240. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(5)(C) (2000).
241. Even traditional tort principles might support this result, for ordinarily:
[Flailure to object to [the commission of a wrong] is not enough to charge one
with responsibility. It is, furthermore, essential that each particular defendant who is to be charged with responsibility shall be proceeding tortiously,
which is to say with the intent requisite to committing a tort, or with negligence. One who innocently, and carefully, does an act which happens to further the tortious purpose of another is not acting in concert with the other.
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 140, § 46, at 323-24 (citations omitted). Cf.
City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Cmty. Hope Found., 538 U.S. 188, 195 (2003) (holding
that city engineer's decision as to whether to issue a building permit was, being controlled
by local
law, merely a "nondiscretionary ministerial act" and thus could not be the basis
for a finding of discriminatory intent in violation of the Equal Protection Clause).
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to satisfy the requirements of [§ 3604(f)(3)(C)],"2 42 and local officials are invited to review proposals for new multi-family developments "for the purpose of making determinations as to whether
the design and construction requirements of [§ 3604(f)(3)(C)] are
met."243 The statute makes clear, however, that such local compliance determinations "shall not be conclusive in [FHA] enforcement proceedings." 2'
This latter provision shows Congress's awareness that local officials might err in their evaluation of a proposed development's
compliance with § 3604(f)(3)(C), but it does not say what the legal
implications of such an occurrence should be. For its part, HUD
has commented that it "is reluctant to assume that State and local jurisdictions, by performing compliance reviews, will subject
themselves to liability under the Fair Housing Act." 245 But HUD's
being "reluctant to assume" is not a guarantee, much less an authoritative interpretation of the statute. Thus, if a local government approves a multi-family housing proposal in violation of its
own § 3604(f)(3)(C)-like building laws and thereby negligently
permits construction of a dwelling that violates § 3604(f)(3)(C),
traditional torts principles might well suggest that this conduct,
being a substantial factor in producing the violation, is sufficient
responsible officials proper
to make such a government and its
246
suit.
3604(f)(3)(C)
§
a
in
defendants
4. Liability Issues Among Potential Defendants
Thus
entities
indeed
based

far, Part IV.B has established that a variety of different
might be liable for § 3604(f)(3)(C)-based violations, and
many reported cases have named multiple defendants
on a single development's noncompliance with §

242. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(5)(A) (2000).
243. Id. § 3604(f)(5)(B).
244. Id. § 3604(f)(6)(B).
245. HUD Accessibility Guidelines, supra note 36.
246. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. Historically, the common law provided
immunity for local governments and their officials from most tort actions. See DOBBS, supra note 160, § 269, at 718-19. In recent decades, however, this immunity has generally
been abandoned, although it still applies in certain situations. See SECOND TORTS
RESTATEMENT, supra note 133, §§ 895C, 895D. FHA claims have always been considered
appropriate against local governments, although their officials have occasionally been
granted immunities from damage claims similar to those applicable in § 1983 suits. See
SCHWEMM, supra note 7, at § 12B:5.
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3604(f)(3)(C). 47 This section discusses how liability should be apportioned in multiple-defendant cases and the extent to which an
individual defendant may have a right of contribution against
other potentially liable entities. As with most other issues concerning proper defendants and their respective liabilities under
the FHA, this matter is not explicitly dealt with in the statute
and thus must be resolved by resorting to traditional tort princi248
ples.
Once it is determined that a particular defendant is liable in a
§ 3604(f)(3)(C) case, the question becomes, "Liable for what?" (The
related question of "Liable to whom?" is dealt with below in Part
IV.C.) As noted earlier, the FHA provides for a full range of
monetary and equitable relief in § 3604(f)(3)(C) cases, 249 but the
statute does not say whether each proper defendant should be responsible for all of the relief ordered. In one early § 3604(f)(3)(C)
opinion, a district court seemed to find unpersuasive the plaintiffs' argument that "all entities involved in" a § 3604(f)(3)(C) violation "should be liable as joint tortfeasors," 2' 0 but it later did hold
three of the defendants "jointly and severally liable." 2 1' Neither
opinion, however, provided any real analysis of how liability
might be apportioned among multiple defendants nor how traditional tort principles might resolve this question.
Thereafter, in 2003, in Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v.
Ayers,25 2 the Supreme Court dealt with contribution issues in a
Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA") case. In Ayers, the
Court ruled unanimously that a FELA defendant was not entitled
to have its liability reduced based on the contribution of others to
the plaintiffs' injuries, 2" a ruling that was justified in part because "joint and several liability is the traditional rule." 254 Thus,

247. See, e.g., United States v. Edward Rose & Sons, 384 F.3d 258, 260 & n.1 (6th Cir.
2004); Quality Built Constr., Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d at 771; Fair Hous. Council v. Vill. of
Olde St. Andrews, 250 F. Supp. 2d 706, 708-09 (W.D. Ky. 2003).
248. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 71, 77, 80, and 83 and accompanying texts.
250. Baltimore Neighborhoods, Inc. v. Rommel Builders, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d 661, 662
(D. Md. 1998).
251. Id. at 664-65; Baltimore Neighborhoods, Inc. v. LOB, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 456, 460
(D. Md. 2000).
252. 538 U.S. 135 (2003).
253. Id. at 159-66.
254. Id. at 163. The modern meaning ofjoint and several liability is that:
(1) the plaintiff may sue each tortfeasor, A or B, separately; (2) the plaintiff
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the Court in Ayers employed the same technique of statutory construction that it had earlier held was appropriate for the FHAthat is, interpreting statutory silence as an indication that Congress intended the statute to be governed by traditional tort principles .255
It seems likely, therefore, that joint and several liability should
be the rule in FHA cases. Certainly this would be appropriate in
those situations where the potential defendants are involved in a
"joint enterprise," as, for example, where a builder and developer
work together in the design and construction of a multi-family
structure.25 6 But even in situations where the potential defendants have not worked together (e.g., where the original developer has sold the property to an unrelated entity that is now the
landlord), the traditional rule of joint and several liability would
probably govern pursuant to Ayers. 5 7

may sue both tortfeasors in a single action; (3) the plaintiff may obtain a
judgment against one tortfeasor alone and enforce it against that one; (4) the
plaintiff may obtain a judgment against both tortfeasors and enforce it
against both; but (5) the plaintiff may not actually collect more than one full
compensation.
DOBBS, supra note 160, § 170, at 413.
255. See Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 285-91 (2003); supra note 132 and accompanying text. In Ayers, the Court responded to the defendant's argument that the modern trend
is to apportion damages between multiple tortfeasors by first noting that "the more important inquiry" in interpreting the FELA would be the state of the law when that statute
was enacted (i.e., in 1908). 538 U.S. at 145, 164. This suggests that the proper focus in a §
3604(f)(3)(C) case would be 1988 when the FHAA was enacted, but even with this later
perspective, joint and several liability would probably be the proper rule. Citing the modern Torts Restatement on apportionment, the Ayers opinion noted that "many States retain full joint and several liability, even more retain it in certain circumstances, and most
of the recent changes away from the traditional rule have come through legislative enactments rather than judicial development of common-law principles." Id. at 164-65 (citations omitted). Significant here to the Court's decision to apply the traditional rule was the
fact-also true for the FHA-that Congress "has not amended the FELA" to reflect a new
view of apportionment. Id. at 165. The Ayers opinion also found support for applying the
traditional joint-and-several-liability rule in the fact that requiring apportionment among
potential defendants "would handicap plaintiffs and could vastly complicate adjudications." Id.
256. For purposes of tort law, a joint enterprise is a form of joint venture in which "two
or more persons tacitly or expressly undertake an activity together" and share a pecuniary
interest. DOBBS, supra note 160, § 340, at 933. Thus, "persons who act in concert, pursuant to a common plan or design, to commit a . . . tort are true joint tortfeasors; each is liable for harm done by the others involved." Id. § 170, at 413.
257. The textual conclusion here is limited by "probably" because Ayers recognized that
this issue must be answered for each statute based on its own structure, purpose, and time
of enactment. See 538 U.S. at 165 n.22 (rejecting the analogy of decisions holding that apportionment of liability is appropriate under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, because that statute's "structure, purpose, and
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Joint and several liability means that each proper defendant
may be held fully responsible for all appropriate relief in a §
3604(f)(3)(C) case.25 8 It does not mean, however, that such a defendant is barred from recouping some of its liability by asserting
a right of contribution against other responsible entities.2 9 Although there was no right to contribution at common law, that
rule had been changed in most American jurisdictions by 1988
when § 3604(f)(3)(C) was enacted.2 ° As the Court in Ayers pointed
out in 2003, its holding that a FELA defendant was subject to
joint and several liability still allowed such a defendant to identify "other responsible parties and demonstrat[e] that some of the
costs of the injury should be spread to them."26 '
While Ayers strongly suggests that a right of contribution
should be recognized in § 3604(f)(3)(C) cases, there is a counter
argument based on the Court's 1981 decision in Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union,262 which held that no such
right exists for employers in Title VII cases. Noting that Title VII
did not expressly create such a right, Northwest Airlines rejected
the idea that a right of contribution should be implied for this
statute, principally because it was clear that Title VII was not
created for the benefit of the employers who would be claiming
such a right.263

more recent vintage may differentiate that measure from the FELA in ways relevant to
the question presented").
258. See supranote 254.
259. "Typically, a right to contribution is recognized when two or more persons are liable to the same plaintiff for the same injury and one of the joint tortfeasors has paid more
than his fair share of the common liability." Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers
Union, 451 U.S. 77, 87-88 (1981).
260. See id. at 87-88 & n.17 (noting in 1981 that thirty-nine states and the District of
Columbia had come to recognize some right to contribution among joint torttfeasors). The
trend in favor of contribution has continued. In 2000, Professor Dobbs observed "a right of
contribution is now a generally accepted part of the joint and several liability system" for
all except intentional torts (i.e., for negligent tortfeasors and those who are strictly liable).
DOBBS, supra note 160, § 386, at 1078-80; see also id. § 170, at 413 ("If the plaintiff collects all her damages from one tortfeasor [who is jointly and severally liable], most states
today permit the defendant who paid more than his just share of liability to recover contribution or indemnity from the other tortfeasor.").
261. 538 U.S. at 165. Furthermore, according to Ayers, such defendants "may be able to
implead third parties and thus secure resolution of their contribution actions in the same
forum as the underlying FELA actions." Id. at 165 n.23.
262. 451 U.S. 77 (1981).
263. Id. at 91-92. Furthermore, since Title VII itself did not intend to create such a
right, the Court in Northwest Airlines felt that it would be inappropriate to establish this
right as part of the judiciary's power to create federal common law. Id. at 95-99.
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Lower courts, including one in a § 3604(f)(3)(C) case, have read
Northwest Airlines to bar FHA defendants from asserting a right
to contribution.2 6 4 The § 3604(f)(3)(C) case is United States v.
Quality Built Construction, Inc.,265 where a district court held
that the builders had no claim for either contribution or indemni26 6 The Quality
fication against their architect under the FHA.
Built court felt that Northwest Airlines governed the contribution
issue, because the FHA, like Title VII, is silent on this matter and
the parties asserting the right of contribution (i.e., the builders)
267
clearly were not the intended beneficiaries of § 3604(f)(3)(C).
At this stage, therefore, the contribution issue in § 3604(f)(3)(C)
cases must be considered unresolved. The only case on point is
Quality Built, and the district court there did not consider Ayers,
which the Supreme Court had decided just a few months earlier.
For its part, Ayers neither made clear whether the defendant's
right of contribution recognized therein was to be based on the
federal statute, federal common law, or state law, nor did it show
any awareness of Northwest Airlines, much less discuss whether
this old Title VII precedent was being distinguished or disapproved. The fact that, in the same year as Ayers, the Supreme
264. See, e.g., United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 594 F. Supp. 466, 473-75
(S.D.N.Y. 1984).
265. 309 F. Supp. 2d 767, 778-79 (E.D.N.C. 2003).
266. "Indemnity differs from contribution. While contribution contemplates that two
defendants will share in the ultimate liability, indemnity contemplates that one will fully
repay the other. Indemnity was and is permitted in only a few situations [in the joint and
several liability system]." DOBBS, supra note 160, § 386, at 1079.
267. 309 F. Supp. 2d at 778-79. Although Quality Built Construction held that there
was no right of contribution under the FHA, it did recognize that the builders there might
have state law claims against the architect. Id. at 779; see also Options Ctr. for Indep. Living v. G & V Dev. Co., 229 F.R.D. 149 (C.D. Ill. 2005) (upholding defendant-developer's
cross claims against defendant-architect based on the latter's alleged breach of contract
and professional malpractice in § 3604(f)(3)(C) case).
In Quality Built Construction,the builders' state law claims were apparently not based
on the state law of contribution, but rather on the architect's alleged negligence and
breach of contract. See 309 F. Supp. 2d at 779. The court refused to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over these claims, dismissing them without prejudice so that the builders
could file them in state court. Id. With respect to the builders' claim for indemnification
based on state law, the court dismissed this on the merits, holding that
to allow a wrongdoer to shift the entire liability to another party "Would run
counter to the basic policy" of the [federal] statute designed to regulate or restrict specific behavior. To allow [the builders] to seek indemnity from [the
architect] would run counter to the purpose of the FHAA and undermine the
regulatory goal by allowing the builder to escape any liability for violating
the Act.
Id. (quoting Baker, Watts & Co. v. Miles & Stockbridge, 876 F.2d 1101, 1108 (4th Cir.
1989) (citation in omitted)).
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Court held that liability issues under the FHA should generally
be governed by traditional torts principles hardly clarifies the
matter, because the "common law" of contribution has changed
substantially in modern times. Fairness considerations do support the idea that a single defendant-among the many who
might be sued for a particular § 3604(f)(3)(C) violation-should be
able to make the other responsible entities bear their share of the
liability. This factor, however, was also present in Northwest Airlines, and the Court simply responded that it was up to Congress,
not the judiciary, to determine whether to include such considerations in Title VII law.268
Thus, while the parameters of how the § 3604(f)(3)(C) contribution issue should be decided can be set forth here, its ultimate
resolution requires further judicial or congressional attention.
Furthermore, a related, though distinct, issue-the degree to
which the settlement of a plaintiffs § 3604(f)(3)(C) claim against
one or more joint tortfeasors is to be credited in favor of the nonsettling defendants-also remains in an uncertain state.26 9

268. See Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 88-89, 97-98; see also Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 646 (1981) (declining to provide a right of contribution
under either the Sherman Act or the Clayton Act on the ground that "regardless of the
merits of the conflicting [policy] arguments, this is a matter for Congress, not the courts,
to resolve").
269. Compare Miller v. Apartments & Homes of N.J., Inc., 646 F.2d 101, 108-10 (3d
Cir. 1981) (holding that nonsettling defendants in a fair housing case are entitled to a pro
tanto reduction in the judgment against them for the amount that other defendants have
settled for), with Pinchback v. Armistead Homes Corp., 907 F.2d 1447, 1453 (4th Cir.
1990) (holding that nonsettling defendant in a fair housing case is not entitled to any reduction in its judgment as a result of plaintiffs settlement with other defendants).
In the one § 3604(f)(3)(C) case to deal with this issue, the court in Baltimore Neighborhoods, Inc. v. LOB, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 456, 474-75 (D.Md. 2000), held that it was bound
by Pinchback to deny any reduction in the judgment against the nonsettling defendant for
the plaintiffs' earlier settlement with other defendants. The LOB opinion noted that this
"permits the seemingly peculiar result of allowing the plaintiffs to recover more
than the
total amount of the judgment," a result that "contradicts the 'almost universally held principle that there can only be one satisfaction for an injury or wrong.'" Id. at 474 (quoting
Atlas Food Sys. & Servs., Inc. v. Crane Nat'l Vendors, Inc., 99 F.3d 587, 596 (4th Cir.
1996)); see also McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202, 208 (1994) ("It is generally
agreed that when a plaintiff settles with one of several joint tortfeasors, the nonsettling
defendants are entitled to a credit for that settlement."). Furthermore, the LOB court
identified a number of decisions in addition to Miller that permitted some credit to nonsettling defendants where civil rights plaintiffs had settled with other defendants. See 92 F.
Supp. 2d at 475 n.19. Nevertheless, LOB noted that "there is no federal statute addressing
a joint tortfeasor's right to a setoff" and that "[t]he law contains no rigid rule against overcompensation.'" Id. at 475 (quoting McDermott, 511 U.S. at 219). Thus, if felt bound to follow Pinchback'sno-setoff rule.
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Even if one were able to resolve apportionment, contribution,
and setoff issues among § 3604(f)(3)(C)-liable entities, two difficult questions would remain concerning the assessment of liability in these cases: (1) what types of plaintiffs can recover? and (2)
how long does a defendant's liability continue? These questions
are dealt with next in Parts IV.C and IV.D.
C. Identifying ProperPlaintiffs: Standing to Sue
1. Overview and Government-Initiated Claims
As described above in Part II.D, the FHA provides for enforcement by HUD- and Department of Justice-initiated actions and
27 °
by private claims brought by any "aggrieved person." Even before the 1988 amendments added the disability prohibitions to
the FHA,27 1 the Supreme Court had decided three cases holding
that persons aggrieved under the FHA extended well beyond the
direct targets of a defendant's discrimination to include a variety
of other individuals and entities. 2 The Congress that passed the
1988 FHAA endorsed these decisions and actually expanded the
of "aggrieved person" for purposes of the amended
definition
FHA. 273
The accessibility mandates of § 3604(f)(3)(C) do not specify who
would be proper plaintiffs in litigation based on this provision. As

270. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3610(a), 3613(a)(1)(A) (2000). See supra notes 67-69, 73-74 and 78
and accompanying texts.
271. See supra notes 15-23 and accompanying text.
272. See Havens, 455 U.S. at 372-79 (upholding standing of fair housing organization
and minority tester to challenge racial steering by real estate firm); Gladstone Realtors v.
Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 109-15 (1979) (upholding standing of community residents
and municipality to challenge defendants' racial steering); Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins.
Co., 409 U.S. 205, 208-12 (1972) (upholding standing of white residents of apartment
complex to challenge their landlord's discrimination against minority applicants).
273. As a result of the 1988 FHAA, the FHA now defines "aggrieved person" as "any
person-who (1) claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice; or...
(2) believes that such person will be injured by a discriminatory housing practice that is
about to occur." 42 U.S.C. § 3602(i) (2000). "Discriminatory housing practice" here means
any act that is unlawful under the FHA's substantive provisions. See id. § 3602(f). The
comparable pre-1988 definition was similar but more narrow with respect to the second
element as a result of inclusion of the word 'irrevocably" to describe the injury required
(i.e., a "person aggrieved" was defined as "[a]ny person who claims to have been injured by
a discriminatory housing practice or who believes that he will be irrevocably injured by a
discriminatory housing practice that is about to occur"). See id. § 3610(a) (1970) (amended
by Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (1988)).

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:753

noted above, § 3604(f)(3)(C) simply identifies certain behaviorfailure to design and construct covered multi-family dwellings in
specified ways-as "discrimination" for purposes of § 3604(f)(1)
and § 3604(f)(2).114 True, one of these referred-to provisions-§
3604(f)(2)-is directed against discrimination "against any person" in the terms or conditions of a housing transaction "because
of a handicap of that person" or of someone residing or associated
with that person.2 75 Therefore, a person with a disability who is
seeking housing and applies for a unit that is built without the §
3604(f)(3)(C)-mandated features would be a proper plaintiff,276 as
would anyone residing or associated with that person. 7 In addition, other types of "aggrieved persons" injured by a §
3604(f)(3)(C)-based violation may be entitled to sue, along with
HUD and the Department of Justice in certain circumstances.
To date, HUD has not initiated any of these cases,2 7' but the
Department of Justice has filed quite a few actions pursuant to
its authority under § 3614 of the FHA.2 79 In § 3614 cases, the De274. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
275. See supra note 22 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2) (2000)).
276. See infra note 282.
277. The fact that § 3604(f)(1) and § 3604(f)(2) outlaw discrimination against buyers
and renters who reside or are associated with disabled persons means that these provisions were intended to "prohibit not only discrimination against the primary purchaser or
named lessee, but also to prohibit denials of housing opportunities to applicants because
they have children, parents, friends, spouses, roommates, patients, subtenants or other
associates who have disabilities." 1988 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 16, at 24; see also 134
CONG. REC. S10,539, S10,541 (Aug. 2, 1988) (statement of Senator Kennedy) (noting, as a
principal sponsor of the FHAA, the value of § 3604(f)(3)(C) for nondisabled tenants who
want to have visitors with disabilities).
Just how far the "associated with" phrase in subsections (f)(1) and (f)(2) goes is unclear.
Even without the benefit of this phrase, courts have long held that white tenants who are
discriminated against because they entertain black guests have a cause of action under §
3604(a) and/or § 3604(b). See SCHWEMM, supra note 7, at § 13:16, n.5, § 14:3, n.29. It
seems probable, therefore, that a tenant who could not have a mobility-impaired guest
visit him because the tenant's building does not comply with § 3604(f)(3)(C) would have
standing to sue. Cf. 24 C.F.R. § 100.60(5) (2005) (providing HUD regulation outlawing the
eviction of tenants "because of the . . . handicap ... of a tenant's guest"). One race case
even held that the black guest in this situation has standing to challenge the landlord's
discriminatory policy. See Lane v. Cole, 88 F. Supp. 2d 402, 406 (E.D. Pa. 2000). The theory in Lane was that the black visitor suffered a distinct and palpable injury as a result of
the landlord's unlawful policy of conditioning rentals on exclusion of minority guests. If
Lane were extended to § 3604(f)(3)(C) cases, then standing could be recognized in disabled
would-be guests who are deterred by a building's inaccessible features from visiting there.
278. HUD lawyers have, however, prosecuted § 3604(f)(3)(C) cases on behalf of private
complainants in administrative proceedings. See, e.g., HUD v. Perland, Fair Hous.-Fair
Lending Rep. 25,136 (HUD ALJ 1998).
279. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text. The Department of Justice has also
prosecuted some § 3604(f)(3)(C) cases pursuant to its authority to handle cases that are

2006]

ACCESSIBLE HOUSING

partment of Justice must prove either a "group denial of rights"
or a "pattern or practice," but this has not been a significant obinvariably
stacle in § 3604(f)(3)(C) cases, because courts have
2 ' ° and have also
cases
such
found a "group denial of rights" in
recognized the possibility of a "pattern or practice" in these
cases.281
2. Privately Initiated Claims
Thus far, most privately initiated § 3604(f)(3)(C) cases have
been brought by one of three types of "aggrieved persons:" (1) disabled homeseekers; (2) disabled testers; and (3) advocacy organizations. The first two groups will be considered next; advocacy organizations will be dealt with in the following section; and a final
section will consider other potential plaintiffs.
a. Disabled Homeseekers and Testers
The right to sue of disabled homeseekers would seem rather
obvious,2 2 although it has been questioned on occasion when such

elected to court out of the HUD administrative process. See supra note 76 and accompanying text; see infra note 431 (listing cases).
Homes,
280. See, e.g., Taigen & Sons, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 2d at 1138-39, 1153; Hallmark
7990,
Inc., 2003 WL 23219807, at *4-6; Pac. Northwest Elec., Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
United States v.
at *33-36; Quality Built Constr., Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d at 760-61 (quoting
Hartz Constr. Co., No. 97C8175 1998 WL 42265, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 28, 1998)).
281. See infra note 431 (citing cases).
Supp. 2d
282. See, e.g., Baltimore Neighborhoods, Inc. v. Rommel Builders, Inc., 40 F.
uses a wheel700, 703, 713-14 (D. Md. 1999) (ruling in favor of a disabled individual "who
67-69 and 73
chair for mobility" and fair housing organization). See generally supra notes
and accompanying texts.
with mobility
Because § 3604(f)(3)(C) seems particularly intended to benefit persons
whether
impairments and certain other kinds of disabilities, there may be some question
(e.g., perhomeseekers with disabilities that do not benefit from the mandated features
claims.
sons with mental disabilities) should have standing to bring § 3604(f)(3)(C)-based
to the
Some of the features mandated by this provision are indeed specifically addressed
needs of individuals with mobility impairments. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(C)(ii), (iii)(IV)
by handi(2000) (requiring, respectively, that doors be "sufficiently wide to allow passage
that an indicapped persons in wheelchairs" and that kitchens and bathrooms be "such
features,
vidual in a wheelchair can maneuver about the space"). The other mandated
all persons
however, do not include such language, and one of them by its terms covers
use areas
with disabilities. See id. § 3610(f)(3)(C)(i) (specifying that public and common
the
limiting
without
persons"
handicapped
by
usable
and
to
accessible
must be "readily
latter phrase).
of disabiliThe FHA's enforcement provisions do not exclude persons with certain types
this issue.
ties from making § 3604(f)(3)(C)-based claims, and no case has thus far raised
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plaintiffs were not actually ready, willing, and financially able to
live in the defendant's housing.8 3 For example, in an unpublished
1996 decision, the Ninth Circuit in Ricks v. Beta Development
Co." held that a paraplegic individual who had alleged "merely a
general interest in . . . accessible housing" lacked standing to
bring a § 3604(f)(1) claim against the developer of a condominium
complex that was built in violation of § 3604(f)(3)(C).1 5 According
to Ricks, standing to assert such a claim requires a disabled
plaintiff to show that "but for the architectural barriers in the
condominium, he would purchase a unit"2 6 or at least that he was
"a prospective buyer"28 7 with an interest in the condominium.2 8
Ricks also held that standing was barred by the plaintiffs "failure
to allege that he had sufficient financial means to purchase a
condominium,"289 both because this failure meant there was no
"actionable causal relationship between [defendant's]
alleged discriminatory action[ I and [plaintiffs] asserted injury"29 ° and because "a court order directing the removal of architectural barriers will not remedy his problem,"29 1 i.e., "it is his financial
inability, rather than any action on the part of the developers and
designers, which prevents Ricks from obtaining a condomin"292

Still, it may be that courts will insist that a homeseeker-plaintiff present proof
of a "qualifying" disability to invoke § 3604(f)(3)(C). In any event, for present purposes,
this section's
conclusion that a disabled homeseeker has standing to bring a § 3604(f)(3)(C)-based
claim
assumes that the disability involved is one that would benefit from the §
3604(f)(3)(C)mandated features.
283. See Nat'l Alliance for the Mentally Ill v. St. Johns County, 376 F.3d
1292, 1295
(11th Cir. 2004) (denying standing for disabled persons who alleged that they
"might" live
in the particular housing involved and holding that such persons must instead
show that
they were "qualified" and "sought [to live there]"); Whitaker v. West Vill. Ltd.
P'ship, 2004
WL 2008502, at *4-5 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 8, 2004) (dismissing claims by disabled
individuals
who had no interest in seeking units at defendant's complex); Montana Fair
Hous., Inc. v.
Am. Cap. Dev., Inc., 81 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1064 (D. Mont. 1999) (questioning
standing of
disabled homeseeker whose application to defendant's housing complex may
have been
denied because of his income); infra notes 284-92 and accompanying text
(discussing
Ricks v. Beta Dev. Co., Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. 16,107 (9th Cir. 1996)).
284. Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. 16,107 (9th Cir. 1996).
285. Id. at 16,107.2.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 16,107.1-2.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 16,107.3.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 16,107.2.
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Although Ricks is clearly a restrictive holding, its importance
in limiting standing on behalf of disabled homeseekers and even
disabled testers is limited by the fact that it only considered a
claim under § 3604(f)(1)'s refusal-to-sell provision and not also
under § 3604(f)(2)'s guarantee of nondiscriminatory terms and
conditions.2 93 Thus, an internal HUD memo responding to Ricks
concluded that, while § 3604(f)(1) complaints based on §
3604(f)(3)(C) noncompliance "should be dismissed where the complainant did not have the interest in living in and/or the financial
means to live at the housing. Such complaints should be investigated as possible violations of [§ 3604(f)(2)1."294 More importantly,
the Ninth Circuit itself eight years after Ricks held that a disabled tester with no interest in purchasing or renting particular
housing had standing to bring a § 3604(f)(2) claim based on a development's noncompliance with § 3604(f)(3)(C) in Smith v. Pa2 95
cific Properties& Development Corp.
The plaintiffs in Smith were a polio victim who used a wheelchair (Smith) and a disability rights organization ("DRAC") on
whose behalf Smith had visited various properties to test for
29 6 The plaintiffs concluded that
compliance with § 3604(f)(3)(C).
five of the defendant's properties did not comply with §
3604(f)(3)(C), and they brought suit alleging that these developments violated their rights under § 3604(f)(2).297 The district court
dismissed, holding that § 3604(f)(2) "requires that a disabled person have an interest in actually renting or purchasing a dwelling
29
in order to allege a violation," " but the Ninth Circuit reversed.
Noting that § (f)(2) prohibits "a broader set of behavior" than §

293. See supra note 22 for the text of these provisions.
Housing
294. Memorandum from Sara Pratt, Director, Office of Investigations, Fair
and Program
and Equal Opportunity, to HUD Fair Housing Enforcement Center Directors
Light of
Operators and Compliance Center Directors, Standing in Accessibility Cases in
available at http://www.fairhousing.com/index.cfm?
Ricks v. Beta Development Co.,"
2 73
(last visited Feb. 22, 2006). Pursuant to this memo,
method=page.display&pageID=
claims were instructed to ask the complainaccessibility
(f)(1)-based
HUD investigators of
a unit
ant "to provide evidence showing that he/she actually was interested in purchasing
claim
(f)(2)-based
an
that
however,
concluded,
memo
The
Id.
so."
do
to
afford
could
and
able
or
purchasing,
in
interested
actually
not
is
who
may be brought by "[a] complainant
construct
to purchase, a unit ... against a respondent for the latter's failure to design and
housing so as to be accessible." Id.
295. 358 F.3d 1097, 1104-06 (9th Cir. 2004).
296. Id. at 1099.
297. Id. at 1100.
298. Id. at 1101.
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(f)(1)," the court of appeals rejected the lower court's view that
injury to a tester making an § (f)(2) claim "must arise from something more than merely observing a discriminatory architectural
feature."30 ' According to the Ninth Circuit:
To read an additional standing requirement into [§ 3604(0(2)] beyond mere observation ... ignores that many overtly discriminatory
conditions, for example, lack of a ramped entryway, prohibit a disabled individual from forming the requisite intent or actual interest
in renting or buying for the very reason that architectural barriers
prevent them from viewing the whole property in the first in30
stance.

1

The Ninth Circuit then went on to make what it considered an
even stronger point:
More importantly, the district court's reasoning fails to recognize the
dignitary harm to a disabled person of observing such overtly discriminatory conditions.
Interpreting § 3604(f)(2) to exclude these individuals from enforcing
their right to be free from discrimination undermines the specific intent of the FHAA, which is to prevent disabled individuals from feeling as if they are second-class citizens. The district court therefore
erred as a matter of law in interpreting § 3604(f)(2) to preclude
tester standing, and as a consequence, DRAC's representational
302
standing.

Smith's recognition of tester standing for § (f)(2) claims based
on a defendant's noncompliance with § 3604(f)(3)(C) was based on

299. Id. at 1104.
300. Id.
301. Id. (emphasis in original).
302. Id. (internal citations omitted). Because Smith died while the case was pending,
the parties and the Ninth Circuit treated the issue of his standing as whether DRAC had
representational standing based on the injuries that its members with disabilities, including Smith, suffered when they encountered § 3604(f)(3)(C)-based violations while testing.
Id. at 1100-02. This was appropriate pursuant to Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising
Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977). It is not true, however, that an individual's FHA claim
dies with him, for such a claim may be prosecuted on behalf of his estate. See SCHWEMM,
supra note 7, at § 12:1 n.5 and accompanying text. Smith's death may have mooted his estate's claim for injunctive relief, but not for damages. See, e.g., Havens, 455 U.S. at 371;
cf.
Tandy v. City of Wichita, 380 F.3d 1277, 1285, 1289 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that a disabled plaintiff's death moots his ADA claim for prospective relief, but not his claim for
damages). Indeed, the Ninth Circuit implicitly recognized that testers like Smith would
have such a damage claim by pointing out the dignitary harm they may suffer while testing a prospective defendant's noncompliant properties. See 358 F.3d at 1104. Still, to secure injunctive relief in Smith, DRAC needed to have standing, and the Ninth Circuit held
that it did, both in its representational capacity, id. at 1101-04, and, in a later part of the
opinion, on its own behalf. Id. at 1104-06.
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its view of the Supreme Court's 1982 decision in Havens Realty
Corp. v. Coleman."3 In Havens, the Court unanimously held that
a minority tester who had been falsely told by the defendants that
no units were available in their apartment complexes had stand30 4
ing to sue under the FHA's § 3604(d). This provision, the Court
noted, makes it unlawful "[t]o represent to any person because
of race ... that any dwelling is not available for inspection, sale,
or rental when such dwelling is in fact so available," meaning
that "Congress has thus conferred on all 'persons' a legal right to
truthful information about available housing. "30" The Court also
found significant that Congress in § 3604(d) "plainly omitted" the
requirement "that there be a 'bona fide offer' to rent or purchase,"
06
which it did include in § 3604(a). The congressional determinato truthtion in § 3604(d) to give all persons "an enforceable right
"3° 1 was the
ful information concerning the availability of housing
key to the Court's recognition that tester claims could satisfy Article III standing requirements. Because "[tlhe actual or threatened injury required by Article III may exist solely by virtue of
'statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates
standing,"' 30 ' Havens held that the minority tester there suffered
"specific injury" from the defendants' misrepresentations to her,
and thus "the Article III requirement of injury in fact is satisfied. 30 9

303. 455 U.S. 363 (1982).
304. Id. at 373-74.
305. Id. at 373 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d) (2000)).
wrong, amounted
306. Id. at 374. The Court's reading of § 3604(a) in Havens, while not
sell or rent after the makto a half-truth. That provision makes it unlawful "Itlo refuse to
of, or otherwise make
ing of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental
[or other prohibited
race
of
because
person
any
to
dwelling
unavailable or deny, a
modifies only the
ground]." 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2000). Thus, the "bona fide offer" phrase
to negotiate
refusals
discriminatory
against
prohibitions
the
also
not
and
first prohibition
Indeed, at
.unavailable."
.
.
"otherwise
housing
make
and discriminatory practices that
to sue under §
least one court after Havens has suggested that testers have standing
Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895
3604(a) based on the latter parts of this provision. See Vill. of
F.2d 1521, 1525, 1527 (7th Cir. 1990).
supra note 69.
307. 455 U.S. at 373. The Art. III standing requirements are identified
(1975)).
500
490,
U.S.
308. 455 U.S. at 373 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422
tester who had re309. Id. at 374. The Court went on to reject the standing of a white
"As such,
ceived truthful information from the defendants about their available units. Id.
coninformation
accurate
to
right
statutory
his
to
injury
no
alleged
has
[the white tester]
victim
a
was
he
that
allege
not
does
[he]
[B]ecause
cerning the availability of housing....
of action under [§
of a discriminatory misrepresentation, he has not pleaded a cause
375.
at
Id.
dismissed.
ordered
was
claim
his
3604(d)]," and therefore
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Extending Havens' precise holding to disability claims is both
easy and unhelpful. Clearly, Havens means that a disabled tester
has standing to bring a § 3604(d) claim if a housing provider
falsely tells him that no units are available. But such a § 3604(d)
claim is not what occurred in Smith nor could it be the basis for
claims challenging noncompliance with § 3604(f)(3)(C), which, by
its terms, defines discrimination only for purposes of § 3604(f)(1)
and § 3604(f)(2) (i.e., the disability equivalents of § 3604(a) and §
3604(b)),3 1 ° and not also § 3604(d). The real problem in Smith and
in other cases dealing with a disabled tester's right to challenge §
3604(f)(3)(C) noncompliance is whether Havens should be extended beyond § 3604(d) to include claims under § 3604(f)(2).
Two Seventh Circuit decisions have read Havens to authorize
tester claims under § 3604(b), the non-disability counterpart of §
(f)(2). 3 1 However, the problem with these decisions-and with the
Ninth Circuit's reliance on them to recognize a disabled tester's
standing in Smith312 -is that they too readily conclude that §§
3604(b), (f)(2) confer substantive rights on non-home-seekers. It is
true that these provisions outlaw discrimination against "any
person," which does contrast with § 3 6 04(f)(1)'s language banning
discrimination toward "any buyer or renter."313 But § 3 6 04(f)(2)'s
use of the "any person" phrase is quite different from how this
phrase is used in § 3604(d). The latter provision defines the pro-

310. See supra note 18.
311. See United States v. Balistrieri, 981 F.2d 916, 929 (7th Cir. 1992);
Vill. of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521, 1526-27 (7th Cir. 1990); see also
Wheatley Heights
Neighborhood Coalition v. Jenna Resales Co., 429 F. Supp. 486, 488 (E.D.N.Y.
1977) (finding, in a pre-Havens decision, that testers have standing under § 3604(b)
to challenge racial steering directed against them).
In the Dwivedi case, Judge Posner noted that "Congress can create
new substantive
rights, such as a right to be free from misrepresentations [referring
to Havens and §
3604(d)], and if that right is invaded the holder of the right can sue without
running afoul
of Article III, even if he incurs no other injury." 895 F.2d at 1526-27. Dwivedi
was a case
in which testers and other plaintiffs challenged racial steering by a real
estate firm under
§ 3604(a), § 3604(b), and § 3604(d), and the court concluded that, while
no misrepresentations had been proved, the testers had standing because "the logic of Havens
embraces discrimination in the provision of services, [which is] forbidden explicitly
by section 3604(b)
and implicitly by section 3604(a)." Id. at 1527. Two years later in United
States v. Balistrieri, another Seventh Circuit panel held that black testers who were offered
apartments at
higher rental rates than their white counterparts had standing to receive
damage awards
under § 3604(b) because Havens' "logic also extends to § 3604(b), which prohibits
discrimination against 'any person' in the terms or conditions of rentals, and, like
§ 3604(d), does
not require a bona fide offer." 981 F.2d at 929.
312. See 358 F.3d at 1103.
313. For the text of§ 3604(f)(1) and § 3604(f)(2), see supranote 22.
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hibited behavior as making a misrepresentation "to any person,"314 whereas § 3604(f)(2) bans discrimination "against any
person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a
dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection
5
with such dwelling."31 The implication is that the "any person"
protected by § (f)(2) must suffer discrimination in a sale or rental,
suggesting that § (f)(2) confers rights only on those persons who
6
have an interest in buying or renting a dwelling.
It is important here to note that the key to Havens' interpretation of § 3604(d) as including tester standing was not merely, or
even primarily, the "any person" phrase in that provision, but
rather the fact that Congress made clear in § 3604(d)-by banning misrepresentations "to any person"-that this provision confers on all persons the substantive right to be free from discriminatory misrepresentations. This is shown by Havens' additional
holding that the white tester there, who had not been given false
information, lacked standing to state a "cause of action under [§
3604(d)]," even though he was obviously covered by7 the "any per1
son" phrase just as much as his black counterpart.
The key, therefore, to determining whether Havens should be
extended to § 3604(f)(2) is to decide what substantive rights are
conferred on the "any person" of this provision and in particular
whether Congress intended to provide a cause of action under §
(f)(2) for non-homeseekers. As pointed out in the previous paragraph, § (f)(2)'s language does not compel an affirmative answer,
which suggests that the Ninth Circuit in Smith may have erred
in allowing disabled individuals to sue under it without having an
interest in actually buying or renting housing.
Certainly one questionable part of Smith's analysis is its conclusion that "the dignitary harm to a disabled person of observ314. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d) (2000) (emphasis added).
315. Id. § 3604(f)(2) (emphasis added).
provides that
316. Further support for this view occurs in a later part of (f)(2), which
residing in or
person
"a
of
disability
the
on
based
that
the discrimination banned includes
available." Id. §
intending to reside in that dwelling after it is so sold, rented, or made
3604(f)(2)(B). This same language also appears in (f)(1). Id. § 3604(f)(1)(B).
of Art. III,
317. See supra note 309. Because FHA standing extends to the outer limits
plaintiff has
particular
a
whether
of
issue
the
text,
accompanying
and
69
note
see supra
from Havens sugstanding to sue under a specific FHA provision is, as the textual quote
a substantive cause of
gests, essentially the same as the issue of whether that plaintiff has
in FairHousing
action under that provision. See Robert G. Schwemm, Standing to Sue
Cases, 41 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 23-25, 56-58, 66-67 (1980).
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ing" a development's inaccessible conditions could serve as an independent basis for upholding tester standing.3 1 It is true that a
proper FHA plaintiff is entitled to compensation for the dignitary
harm of being the target of illegal discrimination,3 19 and testers
may receive such awards.32 0 But to say that a tester who has been
sufficiently injured to have standing (e.g., by being the target of a
§ 3604(d) misrepresentation) may collect for the dignitary harm
illegal discrimination causes is far different from saying that dignitary harm itself creates a sufficiently particularized injury in
testers to establish standing. The standing issue, as already
noted, turns on whether § 3604(f)(2) was intended to confer legal
rights on testers who merely observe inaccessible housing. On an
analogous point-whether the FHA's ban on discriminatory advertising in § 3604(c) was intended "to confer a legal right on all
individuals to be free from indignation and distress" caused by
merely seeing a discriminatory ad-a 1990 opinion by thenCircuit Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg suggested a negative answer, 321 although some courts have endorsed such claims.32 2 As in
these § 3604(c) cases, 32 3 the concern in accessibility-based tester
claims brought under § 3604(f)(2) is that a particularized injury
to the plaintiff must be shown and that the harm suffered by an
individual who merely observes a building's noncompliance with §

318. See supra text accompanying note 302.
319. See SCHWEMM, supra note 7, § 25:5.
320. See, e.g., United States v. Balistrieri, 981 F.2d 916, 930-33 (7th Cir.
1992); Davis
v. Mansards, 597 F. Supp. 334, 347 (N.D. Ind. 1984).
321. Spann v. Colonial Vill., Inc., 899 F.2d 24, 29 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (questioning
individual plaintiffs standing who "alleged only that he 'incurred indignation'
and 'distress'
as a result of the [defendants' § 3604(c)] violation," while opining that an individual
would
"no doubt" have standing if she "alleged and later proved that an
advertisement indicating
a racial preference deterred her from seeking housing in the advertised property").
322. E.g., Ragin v. Harry Macklowe Real Estate Co., 6 F.3d 898, 904
(2d Cir. 1993)
(upholding § 3604(c) claim by minority individuals who were not actively looking
for housing when they saw defendant's ads, because there is "no significant difference
between the
statutorily recognized injury suffered by the tester in Havens and the injury
suffered by
the [plaintiffs here], who were confronted by advertisements indicating a preference
based
on race"); Saunders v. Gen. Servs. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 1042, 1053 (E.D. Va.
1987) (holding
that, "[ulnder the Havens Realty rationale," a minority individual's mere
receipt of "an
unlawful advertisement indicating a tenant preference based on race" is sufficient
to violate § 3604(c) and establish her standing).
323. The appropriateness of using § 3604(c) cases to reason by analogy
in accessibility
cases is supported by Congress's recognition that noncompliance with § 3604(f)(3)(C)
is the
functional equivalent of a sign saying "No Handicapped People Allowed."
See supra text
accompanying note 28.
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3604(f)(3)(C) cannot be distinguished from that of countless other
potential claimants who may be similarly exposed.3 24
Smith's other identified source of injury to disabled individuals
who inspect inaccessible housing, however, is legitimate. This is
the notion that a building's lack of § 3604(f)(3)(C)-mandated features would deter such an individual from developing a specific
interest in buying or renting at this particular property. 325 This is
the same concept that Congress recognized when it identified the
absence of some § 3604(f)(3)(C) features in terms of discouraging
disabled homeseekers as the functional equivalent of a sign saying "No Handicapped People Allowed."326 It is also similar to the
kind of deterrence by a specific property that was seen by Justice
Ginsberg as clearly sufficient to confer standing on a minority
homeseeker who observes discriminatory ads.327
Thus, while a disabled individual may have to be in the market
for housing to pursue a § (f)(2) claim, he should not be required to
have formed a specific interest in the defendant's development, so
long as the development's noncompliance with § 3604(f)(3)(C) can
be shown to have deterred him from further pursuing a housing
opportunity in that development. This might even be true for §
(M(1) claims as well-Ricks to the contrary notwithstandingbecause the development's lack of accessible features means that
such an individual is being discouraged from negotiating for or
otherwise becoming a prospective buyer or renter by the defendant's noncompliance with the FHA.
Thus, while Ricks may have been correct that a disabled individual needs to be "a prospective" buyer or renter with an "interest" in the defendant's development,3 28 it was wrong in thinking
that a second reason for denying standing was that the plaintiff
was financially unable to close the deal.3 29 This might be a relevant factor if the plaintiff had sought only injunctive relief (e.g., a

324. See Ragin v. N.Y. Times, Inc., 923 F.2d 995, 1005 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting in a §
3604(c) advertising case that "a multitude of plaintiffs," each claiming to be a newspaper
reader who "was substantially insulted and distressed by a certain ad," could lead to "large
numbers of... damage awards," but nevertheless allowing such claims based on the view
"that courts will be able to keep such awards within reason").
325. See supra text accompanying note 301.
326. See supra text accompanying note 28.
327. See supra note 321.
328. See supra text accompanying note 288.
329. See supra text accompanying note 292.
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specific performance order requiring the defendant to sell to Ricks
or an order directing the removal of architectural barriers). Apparently the Ninth Circuit in Ricks presumed this was the case,
for it held that Ricks's standing was barred by the absence of the
required elements of causation and redressibility because "it is
his financial inability, rather than any action on the part of the
developers and designers, which prevents Ricks from obtaining a
condominium."3 3 ° But Ricks's financial situation was irrelevant to
his ability to bring a damage claim, which would have been appropriate if he was sufficiently interested in the defendant's housing to have standing and if he suffered the kind of dignitary harm
that Smith recognized could result from contact with the defendant's inaccessible building." 1
The Ricks opinion shows no awareness of the fact that such a
damage claim is available to a proper FHA plaintiff.33 2 Thus,
Ricks was wrong to suggest that standing for all claims by disabled homeseekers require a showing that they are financially
able to buy or rent a unit at the defendant's inaccessible property.
The only requirements for such homeseekers to bring at least a
damage claim are that they be prospective buyers or renters with
an actual interest in seeking housing generally and that their
housing search brought them in contact with the defendant's inaccessible building (i.e., that they were ready and willing to proceed to form a specific interest in the defendant's housing and
might have done so but for its noncompliance with §
3604(f)(3)(C)). This would certainly be enough for a damage claim
under § (f)(2) and probably should be enough for such a claim under § (f)(1) as well.

330. Id.
331. See supra text accompanying note 302.
332. See supra text accompanying notes 319-20. The Ricks opinion does not indicate
whether the plaintiff's complaint included such a claim. In cases where only equitable relief is sought, such as those brought under Title III of the ADA, see supra note 162, recognizing tester standing is obviously more difficult than it is in FHA cases where damages
as well as injunctive relief are sought. See generally Adam A. Milani, Wheelchair Users
Who Lack "Standing":Another ProceduralThreshold Blocking Enforcement of Titles II and
III of the ADA, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 69 (2004). For a case showing how tester-standing
issues are treated differently for injunctive and damage claims under the ADA's Title II,
which does allow both types of relief, see Tandy v.City of Wichita, 380 F.3d 1277, 1286-90
(10th Cir. 2004).
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b. Advocacy Organizations
The Ninth Circuit in Smith not only upheld the tester's claim,
and therefore the standing of organizations whose members include such individuals, but it also recognized the standing of
DRAC, a disability rights organization, to sue on its own behalf.'
The latter holding was based on DRAC's allegations that the defendant's § 3604(f)(3)(C)-based violations had frustrated DRAC's
mission and caused it to divert resources.33 4 These allegations
were similar to the allegations in the Havens case, where the Supreme Court upheld the organization's standing. 3 5
In Havens, a fair housing organization named HOME alleged
that the defendants' FHA violations had "'frustrated ... its efforts
to assist equal access to housing through counseling and other referral services... [causing HOME] to devote significant resources
to identify and counteract the defendant's [sic] racially discriminatory steering practices. '336 The Court held that "[siuch concrete
and demonstrable injury to the organization's activities-with the
consequent drain on the organization's resources-constitutes"
to establish the standing "of the organization in
sufficient injury
337
right."
its own
In the wake of Havens, numerous organizations have been allowed to bring FHA claims on their own behalf based on the allegations that their efforts have been frustrated and/or their re338
sources diverted as a result of the defendant's illegal practices.
The standing of such organizations to bring § 3604(f)(3)(C)-based

333. See Smith, 358 F.3d at 1101-04 (discussing DRAC's representative standing),
1104-06 (discussing DRAC's organizational standing).
334. Id. at 1104-06.
335. Id.
336. Havens, 455 U.S at 379.
337. Id.
338. See, e.g., SCHWEMM, supra note 7, at § 12A:5, n.6 (citing cases in which fair housing organizations have been allowed to sue on their own behalf). In the post-Havens era,
some issues may still be disputed about organizational standing, such as whether the necessary diversion-of-resources injury can be based solely on litigation-related expenses
prompted by a particular defendant's FHA violation. See SCHWEMM, supra note 7, at §
12A:5, text accompanying notes 12-14 (describing a circuit split over this issue). If an organization's injuries are like those claimed by HOME, however, Havens establishes that it
satisfies the injury part of the requirements of standing. Havens, 455 U.S. at 378-79.
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claims has also been regularly recognized, both before and after
the Ninth Circuit's decision in Smith.33 9
Clearly Havens establishes that an advocacy organization may
suffer injury sufficient to allow it to sue, but this answers only
part of the standing problem in a § 3604(f)(3)(C) case. The other
part is whether a § 3604(f)(3)(C)-based violation caused the organization's injury. As noted earlier, the FHA authorizes suit by
anyone who "claims to have been injured by a discriminatory
housing practice" 340 (i.e., by "an act that is unlawful"3 4 1 under the
FHA's substantive provisions). 342 Thus, according to the Supreme
Court, standing in FHA cases extends to anyone who suffers actual injury "as a result of the defendant's [FHA-prohibited] conduct."343 Notably, the plaintiff organization in Havens alleged that
its injuries resulted from the "'defendants' racial steering practices, ' ' 3 € which were claimed to be "violative of § [3604]."
For an organization to be able to bring a § 3604(f)(3)(C)-based
claim, therefore, its injury (e.g., diversion of its resources) would
have to be caused by the defendant's FHA violation. If-as argued
earlier-a defendant's noncompliance with § 3604(f)(3)(C) results
only in a potential § 3604(f)(1)-(2) violation and such a violation
occurs only when an actual homeseeker with a disability is exposed to such noncompliance,3 46 then an organization that has diverted resources in response merely to becoming aware of the defendant's inaccessible property (e.g., through the reports of its

339. See, e.g., Eastern Paralyzed Veterans Ass'n, Inc. v. Lazarus-Burman Assocs., 133
F. Supp. 2d 203, 210-12 (E.D.N.Y. 2001); Baltimore Neighborhoods, Inc. v. Cont'l Landmark, Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep.
16,236, at 16,236.2-.3 (D. Md. 1997); see also Silver
State Fair Hous. Council, Inc. v. ERGS, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1219-21 (D. Nev. 2005)
(assuming that fair housing organization is a proper plaintiff); Hallmark Homes, Inc.,
2003 WL 23219807 (assuming that fair housing organization is a proper complainant in
election case); Baltimore Neighborhoods, Inc. v. LOB, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 456, 464-68 (D.
Md. 2000) (awarding damages to fair housing organization and assuming it may seek prospective relief); Baltimore Neighborhoods, Inc. v. Rommel Builders, Inc., 40 F. Supp. 2d
700, 703, 713-14 (D. Md. 1999) (ruling in favor of fair housing organization); HUD v. Perland, Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep.
25,136, at 26,128-31 (HUD AIJ 1998) (awarding
damages and other relief to organizational plaintiff).
340. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(i)(1) (2000).
341. Id. § 3602(f).
342. See supra notes 67, 273 (quoting, respectively, 42 U.S.C. § 3602(f) and § 3602(i)).
343. Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 103 n.9 (1979); see also infra
note 362 and accompanying text (discussing this standard in greater detail).
344. Havens, 455 U.S. at 379.
345. Id. at 366.
346. See supra text accompanying notes 180-85 and 310-24.
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testers) lacks a necessary element for standing to sue. In other
words, such an organization's diversion-of-resources injury cannot
be claimed to have been caused by an FHA violation.
This seems an unfortunate result. Making an organization's
standing turn on its awareness of an actual homeseekers' encounter with the defendant's building would presumably call into
question its ability to sue at an early stage of47construction when
noncompliance could be more easily corrected.1
In an analogous situation, the Department of Justice has been
allowed to sue at the pre-occupancy stage. For example, in United
States v. Edward Rose & Sons,348 the Sixth Circuit upheld a Justice-secured preliminary injunction halting further construction
of the defendants' noncompliant dwellings because their plans
called for an inaccessible front entrance in violation of §
3604(f)(3)(C)(i).3 49 The suggestion implicit in Edward Rose is that
in-progress construction of dwellings designed not to comply with
§ 3604(f)(3)(C) is a violation of the FHA, even before these dwellings are offered to actual homeseekers. In other words, a defendant's failure to design and construct dwellings as required by §
3604(f)(3)(C) may by itself violate the FHA, whether or not it also
violates any individual's rights under § (f)(1) or § (f)(2). The Department of Justice certainly takes this view, for its complaints in
Edward Rose and other § 3604(f)(3)(C)-based cases often allege
350
violations of § 3604(f)(3)(C) as well as § (f)(1) and § (f)(2). Also,

347. The Congress that passed § 3604(f)(3)(C) understood "that it is cheaper to make
housing available and accessible to the handicapped when it is being constructed, rather
than making modifications later on." 134 CONG. REC. S10,536 (1988) (statement of Sen.
Kennedy).
348. 384 F.3d 258 (6th Cir. 2004).
349. Id. at 260.
350. See First Am. Compl. at para. 16, United States v. Edward Rose & Sons, 246 F.
Supp. 2d 744 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (No. 02-73518), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crtl
housing/documents/rosemichamendcompl.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2006). The complaint
alleged that the defendants "have failed to design and to construct the covered dwelling
units" and thereby have:
a. Discriminated in the rental of, or otherwise made unavailable or denied,
dwellings to persons because of handicap, in violation of 42 U.S.C. §
3604(f)(1);
b. Discriminated against persons in the terms, conditions, or privileges of
rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection
with the rental of a dwelling, because of handicap, in violation of 42 U.S.C. §
3604(f)(2); and
c. Failed to design and construct dwellings in compliance with the requirements mandated by 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(C).
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the Department of Justice has been able to establish a "group denial of rights" in its § 3604(f)(3)(C)-based cases without having to
show that any actual homeseekers encountered the defendant's
housing, because courts thought it "obvious that housing that is
inadequately designed and constructed to serve persons with disabilities denies that class of persons rights granted by the
[FH{A] "351
Apart from whether noncompliant housing is itself an FHA violation or whether the Department of Justice's ability to bring preoccupancy claims should be extended to private advocacy organizations, 35 an additional argument for "early" organizational
standing is based on the fact that the FHA authorizes suit not
only by those injured by a discriminatory housing practice, but
also by those who believe they "will be injured by a discriminatory housing practice that is about to occur."35 3 This provision applies to situations where, if a potential complainant takes an action, it is clear that the complainant "will be subjected to a
discriminatory act which will result in an injury. " 3" HUD has
consistently interpreted this provision to permit complaints by
organizations that "allege[ ] that a discriminatory housing practice . . .is about to occur and which will result in an injury to
them."35 5 Because an inaccessible building is always "about to"
discriminate against disabled homeseekers in violation of § (f)(1)
and/or § (f)(2)-thereby triggering sufficient organizational in-

Id. at para. 17. The same basic allegations are made in other Department of Justice complaints in § 3604(f)(3)(C)-based cases. See, e.g., Complaint at para. 24, in United States v.
Cedar Builders, Inc., No. 05-478 (E.D. Wash. Sept. 14, 2005), available at http://www.us
doj.gov/crt/housing/docu ments/cedarcomp.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2006) (containing the
same allegations of FHA violations as quoted above in the Edward Rose complaint).
351. Hallmark Homes, Inc., 2003 WL 23219807, at *6 (quoting Pac. Northwest Elec.,
Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7990, at *35).
352. Such an extension is supported by the Supreme Court's observation that private
FHA complainants "act not only on their own behalf but also 'as private attorneys general
in vindicating a policy that Congress considered to be of the highest priority.'" Trafficante
v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972) (quoting the Solicitor General).
353. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(i)(2) (2000); see, e.g., Gorski v. Troy, 929 F.2d 1183, 1190 (7th
Cir. 1991) (holding that the defendants' acts of "informing the [plaintiffs] of their discriminatory policy and of their intention to enforce it" against the plaintiffs "provides the
[plaintiffs] with standing" under the "'about to occur'" language of § 3602(i)(2)).
354. Implementation of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 54 Fed. Reg. 3232,
3238 (Jan. 23, 1989) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. § 100.20).
355. Id.
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jury-an organization might well be permitted to sue before such
3 56
an encounter based on the FHA's "about to occur" provision.
Finally, even if an actual homeseeker's encounter with the defendants' building is required for an advocacy organization to
have standing, such an organization will always be able to challenge any dwelling built without the features mandated by §
3604(f)(3)(C) eventually (i.e., after such an encounter and based
on the organization's properly alleged and proven injuries).
What's more, as Havens and Smith make clear, a proper organizational plaintiff may sue on its own behalf with or without other
plaintiffs and regardless of whether its own testers have standing. This means that every potential defendant with an inaccessible building may be subject to a privately initiated claim under
the FHA, even if, as suggested in the previous section, disabled
testers lack standing in such a case.
c. Other Potential Plaintiffs
In addition to minority testers and fair housing organizations,
the Supreme Court has recognized FHA standing in two other
types of "indirect" victims of housing discrimination: local residents and municipalities. In 1972 in Trafficante v. Metropolitan
Life Insurance Co.,"' the Court held that current residents of a
large apartment complex had standing to sue their landlord for
its discrimination against minority applicants, which allegedly
deprived the plaintiffs of the social, professional, and economic
benefits of living in an integrated community. Seven years later
55
in Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, the Court upheld
a similar claim by a municipality and four of its residents who alleged that local realtors were destroying integration in their
community by steering white and black homeseekers to different
neighborhoods. 3 9 Havens also recognized the standing of local

356. Cf. Lonberg v. Sanborn Theaters Inc., 259 F.3d 1029, 1036 n.9 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that similar "about to be subjected" to discrimination language in the ADA's Title III
authorizes proper plaintiffs to sue for injunctive relief during the pre-construction phase of
a public accommodation that is likely to be built without the accessibility features mandated by this statute); Johanson v. Huizenga Holdings, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 1175, 1177 (S.D.
Fla. 1997) (holding the same as that of the Lonberg court).
357. 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
358. 441 U.S. 91 (1979).
359. Id. at 109-15.
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residents to complain about racial steering in their area,360 in addition to upholding the claims of the minority tester and the fair
housing organization as discussed above.36 ' The general rule underlying these decisions is that standing extends to anyone who is
"genuinely injured by conduct that violates someone's
[§ 3604]
rights."36 2
Thus far, few reported § 3604(f)(3)(C) cases have been brought
by either a local resident or municipality, 363 but these types of
plaintiffs would seem to have the right to do so in a proper case.
With respect to local residents, the basic Trafficante theory of injury based on lack of associational contacts seems easily transferable to disability cases.3" This would mean that any non-disabled
resident of a housing complex built in violation of § 3604(f)(3)(C)
could sue based on his loss of the benefits of living near disabled
individuals, 36 ' assuming this injury could be traced to the defendant's violation of the FHA.3 66
For a municipality to bring such a claim might be more difficult. The injury to the village recognized in Gladstone flowed from
the "adverse consequences attendant upon a 'changing' neighborhood," which included "an exodus of white residents" and the resulting "reduction in property values" that "directly injures a mu-

360. Havens, 455 U.S. at 375-78.
361. See supra notes 303-09 and accompanying text (minority tester), notes 336-37
and accompanying text (fair housing organization).
362. Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 103 n.9. Thus, a plaintiffs standing does not depend on
whether he has been "granted substantive rights" by the FHA nor on "who possesses the
legal rights protected by [§ 3604]." Id. Rather, standing is recognized "as long as the plaintiff suffers actual injury as a result of the defendant's [FHA-prohibited] conduct." Id.
363. See, e.g., Options Ctr. for Indep. Living v. G & V Dev. Co., 229 F.R.D. 149, 150
(C.D. Ill. 2005) (noting that a variety of individual and organizational plaintiffs sought
damages for, inter alia, "the community's deprivation of a diverse group of residents");
Baltimore Neighborhoods, Inc. v. Cont'l Landmark, Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep.
16,236, at 16,236.3 (D. Md. 1997) (upholding an organization's representational standing
based on the fact that two of its members lived in the defendants' allegedly inaccessible
housing and were thereby deprived of"living in a diverse community that includes persons
who use wheelchairs").
364. See Ventura Vill., Inc. v. City of Minneapolis, 318 F. Supp. 2d 822, 826-27 (D.
Minn. 2004), affd, 419 F.3d 725 (8th Cir. 2005) (recognizing Trafficante-type claim in FHA
disability case); cf. Hamad v. Woodcrest Condo. Ass'n, 328 F.3d 224, 231-34 (6th Cir.
2004) (applying Trafficante theory in FHA familial status case).
365. A resident of a building that does not comply with § 3604(f)(3)(C) might also have
a claim based on the fact that he is unable to entertain mobility-impaired guests. See supra note 277.
366. See supra text accompanying notes 343-56 for a discussion of the need to link the
plaintiffs injury to the defendant's FHA violation in § 3604(f)(3)(C) cases.
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nicipality by diminishing its tax base, thus threatening its ability
3 67
to bear the costs of local government and to provide services."
Whether similarly dire consequences could be shown by a municipality as a result of a housing complex's § 3604(f)(3)(C)-based
36
violations is an open question. ' The Gladstone theory of municipal standing, however, is at least potentially available.
Another potential set of plaintiffs in § 3604(f)(3)(C) cases is real
estate agents. For example, a realtor representing the owner of
an individual condominium unit whose sale is blocked because
the prospective buyer objects to the fact that the common areas
are not accessible may have a damage claim against those re36 9 Furthermore, a realtor represponsible for this FHA violation.
senting a homeseeker who would have purchased or rented a unit
but for the building's noncompliance with § 3604(f)(3)(C) may
have an FHA-based claim.37 °
Presumably, such realtor claims would only be for the monetary damages caused by the defendant's FHA violation (e.g., the
37
realtor's lost commission). ' This serves as a reminder of the fact
that every proper plaintiff in a § 3604(f)(3)(C) case does not necessarily have standing to seek all forms of relief authorized by the
FHA.37 ' Retrofitting relief, for example, may be inappropriate for
certain types of claimants. However, the availability of monetary
damages in FHA cases-and in particular the fact that actual
damage awards may include an element for intangible injuries
such as dignitary harm and the loss of associational benefitsmeans that establishing standing in a variety of potential plain-

367. Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 110-11. The Gladstone opinion also recognized "[o]ther
harms flowing from the realities of a racially segregated community," including the fact
that school segregation is often "linked closely to housing segregation." Id. at 111 & n.24.
368. In addition to showing sufficient injury, a municipal plaintiff would also have to
show that this injury was caused by the defendant's § 3604(f)(3)(C)-based violations. See
supra text accompanying notes 346-56 for a discussion of the latter issue in the context of
claims by advocacy organizations.
369. Cf. HUD v. Hope, Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. 25,160, at 26,284-85 (HUD AUJ
2002) (ruling for realtor of would-be house seller where sale was blocked by neighbors'
race-based discrimination).
370. Cf. Crumble v. Blumthal, 549 F.2d 462, 465, 468-69 (7th Cir. 1977) (endorsing
claims for lost commissions by realtors who brokered house purchase for minority couple
that was blocked by sellers' racial discrimination); Williams v. Miller, 460 F. Supp. 761
(N.D. Ill. 1978) (endorsing claim for lost commission by realtor who brokered house purchase for minority couple that was blocked by sellers' racial discrimination).
371. See, for example, supra note 370 for a listing of such cases.
372. See supra note 302 and text accompanying notes 330-32.
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tiffs should not be difficult' in § 3604(f)(3)(C) cases. Of course,
standing will be recognized and actual damages will be awarded
only if a plaintiff proves that the defendant's FHA violation
caused the plaintiff a particularized injury, but this is true for all
FHA plaintiffs, including those who are the more "direct" victims
of § 3604(f)(3)(C)-based violations.37 3
D. Timeliness Issues
1. The FHA's Statutes of Limitations and the Basic Problem
When is a § 3604(f)(3)(C) claim timely? This seemingly simple
question turns out to be quite difficult to answer. What's more, its
answer may well raise the biggest challenge to enforcement of the
FHA's design-and-construction requirements through the possibility that noncompliant housing may ultimately be deemed acceptable by virtue of the running of the FHA's statutes of limitations. This may be illustrated by considering the following
hypothetical:
On February 1, 2000, Developer D purchases land for a multifamily
housing development and hires Architect A to draw up plans for the
development, which are completed on July 1. By October 1, D has secured the necessary zoning and other land-use approvals from the local municipality and has hired Builder B, who obtains a building
permit on November 1, and completes the project on April 1, 2002,
when it receives a certificate of occupancy. Throughout the first half
of 2002, D seeks tenants and rents the final unit on June 30, 2002.
On July 1, 2004, an individual who uses a wheelchair (P) inspects a
unit whose original tenant has decided to move and observes that
the unit/development does not comply with one or more of the requirements of § 3604(f)(3)(C). On August 1, 2004, P files an FHA
claim against A, B, and D.

In determining whether P's claims are timely, the first step is
to identify which of the FHA's multiple statutes of limitations applies. For privately initiated claims, the two possibilities are the
one-year statute for administrative complaints to HUD under §
3610 and the two-year statute for direct lawsuits under § 3613. 374
373. See supra notes 69, 362 and accompanying text, and text accompanying note 343.
374. See supra text accompanying note 73 (§ 3610) and note 67 (§ 3613). Section 3610
provides that "[an aggrieved person may, not later than one year after an alleged discriminatory housing practice has occurred or terminated, file a complaint with the Secretary [of HUD] alleging such discriminatory housing practice." 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a)(1)(A)(i)
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Apart from the different time periods in these provisions, their
basic texts are virtually identical; that is, the limitations period
runs from when "an alleged discriminatory housing practice occurred or terminated" in § 3610 and "after the occurrence or the
termination of an alleged discriminatory housing practice" in §
3613. 3 " A "discriminatory housing practice" here means "an act6
that is unlawful" under the FHA's substantive provisions.
Thus, the statute-of-limitations question for both § 3610 and §
3613 raises the issue of whether a § 3604(f)(3)(C)-based violation
should be seen as having "occurred" or "terminated" at a particular time or for as long as the building continues to be noncompliant and, if the former, at what particular time.
While the difference between the one- and two-year limitations
periods in § 3610 and § 3613 might be crucial in some cases, it is
not in the hypothetical, for P has filed promptly (within one
month) after first encountering the defendants' building. On the
other hand, if the triggering date for these limitations periods is
when the defendants completed their design-and-construction
work, then P's claims are too late even if brought under § 3613,
because suit was filed over two years after the last act in the development process.
Of course, one could adjust the hypothetical's dates to make the
results differ for the individual defendants. For example, if P
were one of the initial prospective tenants and thus sued earlier,
say on August 1, 2002, then his claim would be within § 3613's
two-year period after D completed its work, but beyond this period as to A's completion of the architectural work. Indeed, as to
D, there may be an issue as to when its work was completed (e.g.,
when the building's construction was finished; when the certificate of occupancy was issued; when the first tenant was rented to;
(2000). Section 3613 provides that "[ain aggrieved person may commence a civil action...
not later than 2 years after the occurrence or the termination of an alleged discriminatory
under §
housing practice." Id. § 3613(a)(1)(A). With respect to HUD-initiated complaints
law to
the
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has
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but
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the
in
specified
is
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Mitchell v. Cellone, 389 F.3d 86, 90 n.5 (3d Cir. 2004); Tabrizi v. Vill. of Glen Ellyn,
F.2d 587, 593 (7th Cir. 1989).
375. See supra note 374.
376. See supra note 67.
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or when the last of the initial rentals occurred). And perhaps if P
files early enough so that his claim against D is considered
timely, then the claims should also be allowed against A and B,
for their participation in the overall "design and construction"
process could be seen as not being completed until D's last act.
The original hypothetical, however, serves to demonstrate the
key problem for privately initiated § 3604(f)(3)(C) claims: whether
the FHA's limitations periods begin to run when the defendants'
work in the design-and-construction process ends or not until an
individual with a disability is injured as a result of encountering
their noncompliant building. If the answer is the former-a position thus far taken by a number of courts 37 7-- then inaccessible
buildings will be able to achieve "repose" two years after their
construction is completed, and future disabled homeseekers will
never be able to bring timely § 3604(f)(3)(C) claims regardless of
how promptly they file their claims. On the other hand, if claims
may be brought so long as a building remains out of compliance
with § 3604(f)(3)(C)-the position taken by HUD and some
courts 3 7 -then no potential defendant will be able to enjoy repose, at least until the required accessibility features are added.
It must also be noted that § 3614, which is the FHA's third enforcement technique and which authorizes the Department of
Justice to bring "pattern or practice" and "group denial of rights"
actions,3 71 9 presents an additional set of its own statute-oflimitations issues. Such § 3614 actions may seek three different
types of relief (equitable orders, monetary damages to persons
aggrieved, and civil penalties), 3 ° and each of these types of relief
is governed by a different limitations period.
Section 3614 does not specifically provide for a statute of limitations for "pattern or practice" or "group denial of rights" actions.
In these circumstances, courts have uniformly held-both in §
3604(f)(3)(C) and in other types of FHA cases-that such actions
seeking equitable relief are not subject to any time limit.3"' On
377. See infra notes 418-19.
378. See infra notes 415-16.
379. See supra note 79 and accompanying. text.
380. See supranote 80 and accompanying text.
381. See, e.g., Quality Built Constr., Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d at 761 (rejecting "laches"
defense in a § 3604(f)(3)(C) case); Hallmark Homes, Inc., 2003 WL 23219807, at *4 (rejecting
statute-of-limitations defense in a § 3604(f)(3)(C) case); United States v. Marsten Apartments, Inc., 175 F.R.D. 257, 262 (E.D. Mich. 1997); United States v. Incorp. Vill. of Island
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the other hand, § 3614 claims for monetary damages for persons
aggrieved are subject to the three-year limitations period pro2
vided in 28 U.S.C. § 2415(b)," and those for civil penalties must
be "commenced within five years from the date when the claim
first accrued." 3 To make matters even more complicated, the
3 4
former contains an explicit discovery rule, " while the latter does
not and has generally been interpreted in § 3604(f)(3)(C) cases
85
not to be extendable by a discovery rule.
Applying these various rules to the hypothetical, the § 3614
claim for civil penalties could be brought against D any time up
through at least April 1, 2007 (i.e., five years after construction
was completed and the building received its certificate of occupancy), which would be well beyond the period in which P could
file under § 3613. With respect to the § 3614 claim for monetary
include P
relief for persons aggrieved-which presumably would
3 6 -the Detime-barred
are
even if his own § 3613/§ 3610 claims
partment of Justice could sue up to three years after its key official became aware of the facts materials to this claim (e.g., within
three years after P sends his complaint to Justice, if this is how
the responsible Justice official first learns of the defendants' §
494 F.
Park, 791 F. Supp. 354, 364-67 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); United States v. City of Parma,
Supp. 1049, 1094 n.63 (N.D. Ohio 1980). See generally SCHWEMM, supra note 7, at § 26:5,
nn.4-8 and accompanying text.
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3604(f)(3)(C) violations).3 8 7 Expansive as these time periods are
for the Department of Justice's claims for civil penalties and
monetary relief, they will eventually expire, but this is not true
for the § 3614 claim for equitable relief. That claim, not being
subject to any time limit, may be brought indefinitely into the future so long as the development does not include the features
mandated by § 3604(f)(3)(C). And because equitable relief in §
3604(f)(3)(C) cases includes retrofit orders,"' the specter of this
major type of relief will continue for as long as the building remains out of compliance with this provision.
As complicated as this may seem, the situation presented in
the hypothetical is obviously a relatively simple case. Given the
potential for additional defendants and plaintiffs identified above
in Parts IV.B and IV.C, the building involved could produce many
more types of claims (e.g., by a local fair housing organization
against a subsequent owner). In addition, the Department of Justice or an organizational plaintiff may want to sue early in the
design-and-construction process well before any units are available for sale or rental, so as to insure that the development is
built in compliance with § 3604(f)(3)(C) rather than having to be
retrofitted later,38 9 which raises the issue of how early-rather
than how late-such a claim may accrue.39 °
The remaining parts of this section deal with these problems as
follows: Part IV.D.2 considers the relevant doctrines, court deci-

387. It is not clear whether the triggering date for this time period is when the Department of Justice first receives such notice or sometime later (e.g., when Justice officials
have obtained sufficient facts to make them aware that a "pattern or practice" or "group
denial of rights" case under § 3614 is appropriate). See, e.g., Pac. Northwest Elec., Inc.,
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7990, at *27 (considering Department of Justice's argument that
discovery rule in § 3614 action should not begin until the Attorney General "has actual
notice" of a "pattern or practice" or "group denial of rights" violation); Taigen & Sons, Inc.,
303 F. Supp. 2d at 1133-34, 1145-47 (holding that § 2416(c)'s discovery rule was not triggered when HUD first received the § 3610 claim, but only when HUD completed its investigation and referred this case to the Department of Justice).
388. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
389. See supra text accompanying notes 347-56.
390. Defendants in reported § 3604(f)(3)(C) cases have yet to object that the claim was
being brought too soon, perhaps because they prefer to learn early whether their planned
developments are going to be seen as violating the FHA. In any event, such an objection
would probably fail, because the FHA defines those persons who are sufficiently aggrieved
to sue as including not only those who "have been injured" by FHA-banned discrimination,
but also those who "believe [they] will be injured" by a violation "that is about to occur."
See supra notes 273 and 353 (referring to 42 U.S.C. § 3602(f)(2) (2000)); cf. supra note 356
(providing citations to ADA cases).
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sions, and HUD guidance concerning how the FHA's statutes of
limitations in privately initiated cases should apply to a case like
the original hypothetical (i.e., one involving a single homeseeker
with a disability as plaintiff); Part D.3 provides a suggested approach for dealing with this basic, but crucial, issue; and Part D.4
reviews some of the additional issues that might arise in more
complicated types of claims based on noncompliance with §
3604(f)(3)(C).
2. Two Doctrines Justifying Later Claims and the Courts'
Responses
a. The Discovery Rule
Both § 3613's two-year statute of limitations and § 3610's oneyear period specify that the triggering event is the occurrence 3or
91
termination of the "alleged discriminatory housing practice."
The focus thus seems to be on the defendant's violation of the
FHA, rather than when the plaintiff became aware of this violation. If a "discovery rule," however, were followed in §
3604(f)(3)(C) cases, all of P's claims in the original hypothetical
would be timely.39 2
Courts in a number of privately initiated FHA cases based on
provisions other than § 3604(f)(3)(C) have held that the claims
after the
were timely if brought within the relevant time 3period
93 The theory of
plaintiff first discovered the defendant's violation.
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such a discovery rule is that it would be unfair to destroy the
claim of a plaintiff who was not responsible for the delay in filing
it.

394

Using a discovery rule in § 3604(f)(3)(C) cases would mean that
a noncompliant building could never be finally protected by the
FHA's statutes of limitations. If, for example, the hypothetical
plaintiff above did not first visit the development until many
years after it was completed, say April 1, 2010, but then promptly
filed suit on May 1, 2010, a discovery rule would deny defendants
statute-of-limitations protection even though all of their unlawful
activities took place many years before the suit was filed. And if
the discovery rule allows this plaintiffs claim, then it would also
presumably make timely the claims of other future disabled
homeseekers, even if brought decades in the future. 9 5 Indeed,
given the many different types of potential plaintiffs in such
cases-including fair housing organizations and non-disabled
current residents as well as homeseekers with disabilities 39 6-it
will always be possible to find some plaintiff whose discovery of a
"'97
defendant's violation is "new.
Courts have given a mixed reception to the discovery theory in
§ 3604(f)(3)(C) cases. The leading case opposing this theory is
Moseke v. Miller & Smith, Inc.,39 a decision that dismissed as untimely a § 3613 claim filed in 2001 where the defendants completed construction in 1995 but at least one of the plaintiffs did

in fair housing case that "[a] federal civil rights claim accrues when a plaintiff knows or
has reason to know of the injury that is the basis of the plaintiffs action"); cf. Nat'l R.R.
Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114 n.7, 123-24 (2002) (suggesting, in both the
Court's opinion and Justice O'Connor's partially concurring opinion, that some version of
the discovery rule should apply to discrete-act claims brought under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964).
394. See, e.g., Urie, 337 U.S. at 169-70. See generally James R. MacAyeal, The Discovery Rule and the Continuing Violation Doctrine as Exceptions to the Statute of Limitations
for Civil Environmental Penalty Claims, 15 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 589, 594-610 (1996) (discussing the discovery rule's development and rationale).
395. See Pac. Northwest Elec., Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7990, at *27-28 (D. Idaho
2003) (noting that adoption of the discovery rule in a § 3604(f)(3)(C) case "would mean that
twenty, thirty, fifty, even one-hundred years could pass between the completion of the design and construction of covered housing and the date a cause of action.., would accrue").
396. See supra Part IV.C.2.
397. See, e.g., Moseke v. Miller & Smith, Inc., 202 F. Supp. 2d 492, 509 n.19 (E.D. Va.
2002) (noting that, while one plaintiffs claim here would be too late under the discovery
theory, the other plaintiffs claim would be timely because the second plaintiff learned of
defendants' § 3604(f)(3)(C) violations later than first plaintiff).
398. 202 F. Supp. 2d 492 (2002).
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not learn of the § 3604(f)(3)(C) violations until 2000 (i.e., within
the applicable two-year limitations period). 39 9 According to
Moseke, § 3613's statute of limitations should not be extended by
a discovery rule, because it is written to be triggered by "the occurrence or the termination" of an illegal practice.4 °° Moseke
viewed this language as focusing on a defendant's actions, in contrast to differently worded statutes of limitations that either specifically provide for a discovery rule or are vague enough to permit such a rule by focusing on when the plaintiffs claim
"'accrues" or "'arises.'"4 0 ' Thus, Moseke rejected a discovery rule
in favor of holding that the limitations period begins to run when
the defendants' final act of construction occurs,4 °2 a decision at
odds with two earlier opinions,4 3 but one that was soon followed
with statute-of-limitations challenges
by other trial courts faced
40 4
claims.
3604(f)(3)(C)
§
to
b. The Continuing Violation Theory
i. Havens and the FHA's Use of the Continuing Violation Theory
A second way that § 3604(f)(3)(C)-based claims filed years after
a building's completion might be seen as timely is under the "continuing violation" theory, which is a well-established part of the
FHA.In 1982 in the Havens case,4 °5 the Supreme Court endorsed
this theory for purposes of dealing with the statute of limitations
for private lawsuits under the FHA.4 6 The plaintiffs in Havens

399. Id. at 501, 509.
400. See supranote 374.
401. 202 F. Supp. 2d at 509.
402. Id.
403. See Eastern Paralyzed Veterans Ass'n v. Lazarus-Burman Assocs., 133 F. Supp.
2d 203, 212 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (assuming that the date when plaintiff "became aware" of defendants' § 3604(f(3)(C) violations triggers § 3613's limitations period, but deciding case
on other grounds); Mont. Fair Hous., Inc. v. Am. Cap. Dev., Inc., 81 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1063
(D. Mont. 1999) (assuming that the date when disabled plaintiffs moved into defendant's
complex-and thus its § 3604(f)(3)(C) violations "were apparent" to them-would be the
earliest that the § 3613 limitations period could be triggered, but deciding case on other
grounds).
404. See Hallmark Homes, Inc., 2003 WL 23219807, at *2 (following Moseke in rejecting discovery rule in case originally filed as an administrative complaint under § 3610);
Taigen & Sons, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 2d at, 1143-44 (rejecting discovery rule in § 3614 claim
for civil penalties).
405. Havens, 455 U.S. 363.
406. Id. at 380-81.
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accused a real estate firm and one of its agents of illegal racial
steering, citing five specific incidents in which black and white
testers were directed to homes in different areas.40 7 Although only
one of these incidents occurred within the applicable limitations
period, the Court held that most of the plaintiffs' claims were
timely, stating that:
a "continuing violation" of the Fair Housing Act should be treated
differently from one discrete act of discrimination. Statutes of limitations such as that contained in [the FHA] are intended to keep stale
claims out of the courts. Where the challenged violation is a continuing one, the staleness concern disappears. [Defendants'] wooden application of [the FHA's statute of limitations], which ignores the continuing nature of the alleged violation, only undermines the broad
remedial intent of Congress embodied in the Act .... [Wie therefore
conclude that where a plaintiff, pursuant to the Fair Housing Act,
challenges not just one incident of conduct violative of the Act, but
an unlawful practice that continues into the limitations period, the
complaint is timely when it is filed
within 180 days of the last as40 8
serted occurrence of that practice.

Applying this principle in Havens, the Supreme Court held
timely the claims of two of the individual plaintiffs who had alleged that defendants' "continuing pattern, practice, and policy of
unlawful racial steering has deprived them of the benefits of interracial association arising from living in an integrated
neighborhood." 4 9 These claims were seen by the Court as "based
not solely on isolated incidents involving the two [defendants],
but a continuing violation manifested in a number of incidentsincluding at least one" that occurred within the limitation
period. 10 On the other hand, the Court held that another individual plaintiff in Havens could not take advantage of the continuing
violation theory, because her claim was that "on four isolated occasions"-all of which occurred prior to the limitations periodthe defendants had given her false information in violation of the

407. Id. at 366-68.
408. Id. at 380-81 (citations omitted). At the time of Havens, the FHA provided for a
180-day limitations period. See id. at 380. This limitation period was changed to one year
for administrative complaints and two years for private lawsuits by the 1988 Fair Housing
Amendments Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3610(a)(1)(A), 3613(a)(1)(A) (2000).
409. Havens, 455 U.S. at 381.
410. Id. In addition, Havens held timely the claims of the organizational plaintiff,
whose alleged injury stemmed not from certain dated incidents, but also "from a continuing policy and practice of unlawful racial steering that extends through the last alleged
incident." Id.
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FHA.4 1 Six years after Havens when Congress passed the FHAA,
it not only lengthened the limitations periods for filing private
lawsuits and administrative complaints,4 12 it also endorsed the
applicability of the continuing violation theory to these new limitations periods.41 3
Thus, under Havens and the FHAA, the continuing violation
theory may be invoked where the defendant is accused of an ongoing unlawful "policy" or "practice" that extends into the limitations period, but this theory is not appropriate where "isolated occasions" or "one incident" or a "discrete act of discrimination" is
alleged. For purposes of § 3604(f)(3)(C) cases, then, the question
becomes whether a defendant's FHA violation is a "discrete act of
discrimination" ending with the completion of the design-andconstruction process or an ongoing "unlawful practice" that continues as long as a building remains inaccessible.
ii. HUD and Judicial Responses to the Continuing Violation
Theory in § 3604(f)(3)(C) Cases
Judicial opinions-thus far, virtually all at the trial court
level-are divided over whether the continuing violation theory
may significantly extend the limitations period in § 3604(f)(3)(C)
cases. 41 4 For its part, HUD has endorsed an expansive view of this

411. Id.
412. See supra note 408.
413. This was done by identifying the starting time for these statutes of limitations as
either when a discriminatory housing practice "occurred" or when it "terminated." See supra note 374 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a) and § 3613(a) (using "occurrence" or "termination")). According to the FHAA's key congressional report, the use of the term "terminated"
here was "intended to reaffirm the concept of continuing violations, under which the statute of limitations is measured from the date of the last asserted occurrence of the unlawful
practice." 1988 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 16, at 33, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173,
2194.
HUD regulations promulgated shortly after the FHAA's enactment also endorsed the
continuing violation theory. The regulation governing the timeliness of an administrative
complaint under § 3610 originally provided: "Where a complaint alleges a discriminatory
housing practice that is continuing, as manifested in a number of incidents of such conduct, the complaint will be timely if filed within one year of the last alleged occurrence of
that practice." See 54 Fed. Reg. 3293 (Jan. 23, 1989) (promulgating 24 C.F.R. § 103.40(c)).
The current version of this regulation provides: "If you indicate that there is more than
one act of discrimination, or that the discrimination is continuing, we must receive your
information within one year of the last incident of discrimination." 24 C.F.R. § 103.35
(2005).
414. See infra notes 416-19 (citing cases). To date, the only appellate decision dealing
with this issue is Alliance for Disabled in Action, Inc. v. Renaissance Enters, Inc., 853 A.2d
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theory in design-and-construction cases, opining that §
3604(f)(3)(C) complaints may be filed "at any time that the building continues to be in noncompliance, because the discriminatory
housing practice-failure to design and construct the building in
compliance-does not terminate."4 15 Some courts have agreed.4 16
The leading case rejecting this view is again Moseke. There,
Judge Lee, noting that the continuing violation theory requires at
least one unlawful act within the limitation period and not
merely the continuing effects of an old violation,4 17 held that the
last unlawful act in a § 3604(f)(3)(C) case-and therefore the time
when § 3613's statute of limitations begins to run-is when construction is completed on the noncompliant building. 4 8 A number
of subsequent decisions have agreed with the Moseke analysis.4 1 9

334 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004); see infra note 419 (discussing Renaissance Enters.).
The Sixth and Ninth Circuits are currently considering cases that raise this issue. See
Fair Housing Council v. Village of Olde St. Andrews, No. 05-5862 (6th Cir. 2006) (reviewing 250 F. Supp. 2d 706 (W.D. Ky. 2003)); Thompson v. Gohres Construction Co., No. 0615042 (9th Cir. 2006) (reviewing unreported decision from D. Utah in Thompson v. Rancho
Del Norte Villas, Inc.); Garcia v. Brockway, No. 05-35647 (9th Cir. 2006) (reviewing unreported decision from D. Idaho).
415. HUD DESIGN MANUAL, supra note 39, at 22; see also U.S. Department of Housing
and Urban Development, Handbook 8024.01: Title VIII Complaint Intake, Investigation,
and Conciliation Handbook, CHG-1, at 3-5 (1995) (providing that a person aggrieved by a
§ 3604(f)(3)(C) violation may file a "continuing violation" complaint with HUD "regardless
of when
construction
of the
building
was
completed"),
available at
http://www.hudclips.org/sub-nonhud/cgi/hudclips.cgi (last visited Feb. 20, 2006).
416. See Eastern Paralyzed Veterans Ass'n v. Lazarus-Burman Assocs., 133 F. Supp.
2d 203, 205-06, 212-13 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding that claim that 438-unit development
violated § 3604(f)(3)(C) in numerous ways so as to be "unavailable to wheelchair users"
describes "an unlawful practice that began on November 17, 1993, and has continued to
the present day" and is therefore timely under the continuing violation theory); Mont. Fair
Hous. Inc. v. Am. Capital Dev., Inc., 81 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1063 (D. Mont. 1999) (relying on
the "termination" language of § 3613's statute of limitations to hold that defendants' §
3604(f)(3)(C) violations continue, at least until a "cure'" occurs); cf. Ohio Civil Rights
Comm'n v. Jupiter Realty Corp., No. 05-CVH-02-1638 (Ohio Common Pleas 2005) (applying the continuing violation theory to uphold accessibility claims under the Ohio fair housing law on the ground that the "fact that violations have not been remedied and remain in
place indicates that they are continuing in nature") (copy on file with the author).
417. Moseke v. Miller & Smith, Inc., 202 F. Supp. 2d 492, 506-07 (E.D.Va. 2002) (citing
Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258 (1980), and United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431
U.S. 553, 557-58 (1977)). For further discussion of this point, see infra notes 470-77 and
accompanying text.
418. Moseke, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 507-09.
419. See Taigen & Sons, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 2d at 1139-42; Hallmark Homes, Inc., 2003
WL 23219807, at *2; Pac. Northwest Elec., Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7990, at *9-20; see
also Renaissance Enters., Inc., 853 A.2d at 342-44 (agreeing with Moseke that limitations
period starts on the date construction is completed, but finding that this date was within
limitations period here); infra note 427 (describing cases).
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Moseke and its progeny do not, of course, reject the fact that the
continuing violation theory is available in FHA cases, a fact that
is firmly established by Havens, the 1988 FHAA, and HUD regulations.4 2 ° Rather, their view is that the "discriminatory housing
practice" in a § 3604(f)(3)(C) case is limited to the defendants' design-and-construction activities, thereby occurring and terminating at a definitive time.
Some courts taking this view have been willing to extend the
triggering date to a slightly later time based on the particular
facts involved. For example, in Fair Housing Council, Inc. v. Village of Olde St. Andrews, Inc.,42 the court held timely a complaint
against a condominium development whose construction was
completed before § 3613's two-year time period, but whose last
unit was not sold until within this period, because the court
viewed the defendants' illegal acts as including the sale of their
4 2
Having thus
improperly designed-and-constructed dwellings.
determined that "at least one incident of alleged discrimination
occurred during the limitations period," the Olde St. Andrews
court held that, under the continuing violation theory, all of the
defendants' acts pertaining to this development could be challenged in this suit.423 A limited version of the continuing violation
theory was also employed in Silver State,4 24 which held timely a
complaint against a developer of two apartment complexes, one of
which had been completed many years earlier, because the court
viewed the completion of that project and the beginning of the
second project, which was still under construction when this suit
was filed, as "seamless in time" and involving "the same or similar FHA violations."4 2" Because "the development of multiple
FHA-violating apartment complexes" was seen as a single illegal
practice that "can ensnare discriminatory occurrences that took
place outside of the two-year statute of limitations," the Silver

420. See supra text accompanying notes 405-11 and note 413 and accompanying text.
421. 250 F. Supp. 2d 706 (W.D. Ky. 2003).
422. Id. at 718-19.
423. Id. at 719; accord Baltimore Neighborhoods, Inc. v. Rommel Builders, Inc., 40 F.
Supp. 2d 700, 709-10 (D. Md. 1999) (relying on the continuing violation theory to hold
timely a complaint against a condominium development where the defendants offered to
sell at least one of their newly constructed units within the applicable limitations period).
424. 362 F. Supp. 2d 1218.
425. Id. at 1220-22.
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State court held that the suit was timely as against both projects
under the continuing violation theory.4 26
In both Olde St. Andrews and Silver State, however, the courts
made clear that they did not think the continuing violation theory
could be used in § 3604(f)(3)(C) cases to prolong liability indefinitely.42 7 Thus, while these courts used the continuing violation
theory to extend the limitations period in the particular circumstances presented (i.e., where first-time sales occur beyond the
construction-completion date and where similar developments are
constructed in a serial fashion), their views are consistent with
Moseke in that a noncompliant development's time period does
eventually begin to run, thus rendering it safe from suit at some
point.
iii. Further Analysis of the Continuing Violation Theory in §
3604(f)(3)(C) Cases
Though not spelled out in the cases, there are essentially three
arguments in favor of viewing a § 3604(f)(3)(C) violation as continuing indefinitely. The first argument contends that §
3604(f)(3)(C)-based claims are challenging, in the words of the
Supreme Court's opinion in Havens, "an unlawful practice that
continues into the limitations period" rather than merely an "isolated incident."4 28 Cases such as Silver State that involve the
same developer producing a series of buildings with the same de426. Id. at 1221-22; accord Memphis Ctr. for Indep. Living v. Makowsky Constr. Co.,
No. 01-2069 D/Pha, 4-7 (W.D. Tenn. 2003) (relying on the continuing violation theory to
hold timely a complaint against three apartment complexes-only one of which was completed within § 3613's two-year time period-that were constructed by the same developer
using essentially the same design plans and were therefore seen as amounting to a single
"pattern or practice" of illegal discrimination) (unpublished opinion) (copy on file with the
author).
In the Silver State case, the court did dismiss a claim against the subsequent owner of
the first-completed development on the ground that this new owner was "an independent
entity" which took no part in the design and construction of this development and which
had no connection with the second development. 362 F. Supp. 2d at 1220. This part of the
Silver State opinion is discussed supra text accompanying notes 147-49 and 153.
427. The Olde St. Andrews opinion specifically rejected the plaintiffs' argument that
"the statute of limitations never begins it [sic] run so long as the offending buildings remain non-compliant." 250 F. Supp. 2d at 719 n.ll. Similarly, the court in Silver State
noted that there had to be some "outer limits of the 'continuing violation' doctrine in FHA
construction claims" and made clear its agreement with Moseke that an "'open-ended period of liability' would 'read the statute of limitations right out of existence.'" 362 F. Supp.
2d at 1222.
428. See supra text accompanying note 408-10.
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sign flaws have concluded that such a developer's acts may
amount to an ongoing illegal "practice" justifying use of the continuing violation theory to capture older as well as recent violations.4 29
The argument based on Havens' use of the term "practice" can
be taken farther than this, however.: Even a single building designed and constructed in violation of § 3604(f)(3)(C) may be seen
as an unlawful "practice" rather than simply a single "isolated incident." There is some support for this view in § 3604(f)(3)(C)
cases brought by the Department of Justice under its "pattern or
practice" authority pursuant to § 3614.430 The Department of Justice regularly alleges that it may proceed against a single building because the design-and-construction violations there amount
to a "pattern or practice" of FHA violations, and a number of
courts have accepted this argument, some in cases that began
41
simply as private claims under § 3610. 1 All of these cases, however, have involved sizeable developments with numerous designand-construction violations, and the courts have generally concluded that, while a "pattern or practice" may exist in such a
situation, the resolution of this issue depends on the particular
facts of the case.4 32 In other words, the argument that a designand-construction violation is an ongoing "practice" for purposes of
the Havens continuing violation theory, while appropriate for
some single-development claims, would not succeed in all §
3604(f)(3)(C) cases.433

429. See supra notes 424-26 and accompanying text.
430. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
431. See Hallmark Homes, Inc., 2003 WL 23219807, at *5 (holding, based on the size of
defendants' single apartment complex, the length of time it took to construct, and the
number of alleged violations, that sufficient evidence exists to create a fact issue as to
whether defendants engaged in a § 3614 "pattern or practice" of discrimination); Taigen &
Sons, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 2d at 1135, 1138 (holding, in case involving single apartment
complex with 86 units in four buildings, that whether defendants engaged in a § 3614
'pattern or practice" of discrimination in constructing this complex is a question of fact not
appropriate for summary judgment resolution); see also Quality Built Constr., Inc., 309 F.
Supp. 2d at, 760 (holding that alleged violations consisting "of numerous features planned
and constructed in over one hundred units at two separate developments ... clearly indicate a regular or repeated violation of the protections afforded by the [FHA]" sufficient to
establish a § 3614 "pattern or practice" of discrimination).
The Hallmark Homes and Taigen & Sons cases began as private claims under § 3610.
See Hallmark Homes, Inc., 2003 WL 23219807, at *1; Taigen & Sons, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 2d
at 1133.
432. See supra note 431.
433. It may also be argued that a "pattern or practice" of discrimination for purposes of
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The second argument for viewing design-and-construction violations as continuing is based on § 3604(f)(3)(C)'s description of
the unlawful activity as "a failure to design and construct" covered multi-family dwellings in a certain manner.43 4 The argument
is that while the acts of design and construction may have occurred at specific times in the past, the "failure" that is the essence of a § 3604(f)(3)(C) violation is inherently an ongoing concept (i.e., one that continues as long as the improperly designedand-constructed dwelling fails to meet the statute's specified requirements). This view finds some support in the fact that the
language used to describe the features mandated by §
3604(f)(3)(C) is in the present tense (e.g., that a dwelling's common areas "are readily accessible"). 435 Thus, the argument goes,
when a decision like Moseke concludes that no "discriminatory
act" has occurred within the limitations period,4 36 it is applying
too narrow an understanding of the nature of the "act" barred by
§ 3604(f)(3)(C).
The problem with this argument is that the term "failure" does
not always connote an ongoing activity. A common dictionary
definition of this word-the "omission of performance of an action
or task; esp.: neglect of an assigned, expected, or appropriate action"43 7 -suggests that a "failure" may indeed be tied to a specific
time period (i.e., when the "omission of performance" takes place).
This might seem particularly so for purposes of § 3604(f)(3)(C),
which speaks in terms of "a failure" to properly design and construct, thereby suggesting that the offending behavior is seen as
an isolated event. Furthermore, courts dealing with other civil
rights claims based on a defendant's failure to act have generally
not been receptive to viewing the violation as ongoing, noting that
justifying a Department of Justice action under § 3614 is not the same as a discriminatory
"practice" under Havens for purposes of justifying use of the continuing violation
theory.
See, e.g., Taigen & Sons, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 2d at 1138-43 (holding in single-development
case that sufficient violations may exist to justify a § 3614 "pattern or practice" action and
also that the continuing violation theory is inapplicable here). But see Wallace v. Chicago
Hous. Auth., 321 F. Supp. 2d 968, 971-75 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (applying the continuing violation theory on the ground that the plaintiffs were essentially alleging a "pattern or practice" of FHA violations).
434. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(C) (2000); see supranote 24 (quoting § 3604(f)(3)(C)).
435. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(f)(3)()(i)-(iii) (using "are" and "contain").
436. Moseke v. Miller & Smith, Inc., 202 F. Supp. 2d 492, 505 & n.15 (E.D. Va. 2000);
see supra notes 417-19 and accompanying text (discussing Moseke).
437. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 815 (unabridged ed. 1986); see
also THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 692 (unabridged ed.

1987) (defining "failure" as "nonperformance of something due, required, or expected").
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the continuing negative effects of an unlawful failure are not suf43
ficient to justify use of the continuing violation theory.
The third argument for using the continuing violation theory
derives from the fact that the FHA is written so that a failure to
design and construct in accordance with § 3604(f)(3)(C) is declared to be unlawful "discrimination" for purposes of § 3604(f)(1)
and § 3604(f)(2), the FHA's bans on discriminatory sales and
rentals, and discriminatory terms, conditions, privileges, and facilities.439 The fact that housing built in violation of § 3604(f)(3)(C)
is a form of illegal discrimination in sales and rentals under §
(f)(1) may underlie decisions like Olde St. Andrews, which hold
that the limitations period does not begin to run until the last
unit in an illegally designed-and-constructed building is first sold
or rented." °
Seeing a plaintiffs § 3604(f)(3)(C)-based suit as a claim under §
(f)(1)-(2) would, however, take the relevant time period even farther than this moment, because the discriminatory sales and
rental practices outlawed by § (f)(1)-(2) are those based on a
handicap of "any buyer or renter." This language suggests, in a
438. E.g., Tolbert v. Ohio Dep't of Transp., 172 F.3d 934, 939-41 (6th Cir. 1999); see
also Middlebrook v. City of Bartlett, 341 F. Supp. 2d 950, 957 n.5 (W.D. Tenn. 2003), subsequent decision, 103 Fed. Appx. 560 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Tolbert, 172 F.3d at 942, for
the proposition that "[plassive inaction ... does not support a continuing violation theory"
in holding that this theory does not apply to claims by a black property owner that defendant failed to provide him with city water and sewer services in violation of federal civil
rights laws); Deck v. City of Toledo, 56 F. Supp. 2d 886, 892-95 (N.D. Ohio 1999) (applying
the continuing violation theory to an ADA claim based on the defendant's failure to install
curb ramps in streets and sidewalks worked on over many years only because some of this
work was done within the limitations period). But see Palmer v. Bd. of Educ., 46 F.3d 682,
686 (7th Cir. 1995) (applying the continuing violation theory in a race discrimination claim
based on defendant's closure of a black school and subsequent failure to assign students to
it on the ground that "each year's decision to leave the building shuttered is a new violation").
Tolbert was a race discrimination case brought under the FHA and other civil rights
laws by residents of a poor black area who alleged that the defendant-officials failed to
provide the same degree of noise protection from a nearby interstate highway to plaintiffs
as they did to a similarly situated white neighborhood. The Sixth Circuit refused to apply
the continuing violation theory, noting that the basic allegation of discriminatory failure
to provide equal public amenities could not justify this theory because "[plassive inaction
does not support a continuing violation theory." 172 F.3d at 940. The Tolbert opinion
...
there
distinguished the Seventh Circuit's decision in Palmer, noting that the defendants
had regularly revisited their decision to close the school and concluding that the continuing violation theory does not apply to cases challenging discriminatory failures to act absent such a systematic and repeated revisiting by the defendant of its original action. Id.
at 940-41.
439. See supra text accompanying notes 21-22, 180-85.
440. See supra text accompanying notes 421-23.
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condominium situation such as Olde St. Andrews, that the prohibited discrimination is not merely the initial sale of units, but
also subsequent offers of sale to any disabled prospect. And even
if the "any buyer or renter" phrase in § (f)(1) might be considered
ambiguous enough to justify limiting that provision to initial purchasers and tenants, this cannot also be true for § (f)(2), which
specifically bans discrimination "against any person" in, inter
alia, the "privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling" and in the "facilities in connection with such dwelling."" 1 Given that a failure
to design and construct in accordance with § 3604(f)(3)(C) is a
type of discrimination banned by § (f)(2), and that § (f)(2) bans
discrimination in the "privileges" and "facilities" of rental, it is
certainly arguable that a nonconforming building amounts to an
ongoing discriminatory denial of "privileges" or "facilities" to disabled tenants and homeseekers regardless of how many years
have passed since the building was completed." 2
This argument has some traction, as will be further explained
in the next section. For now, it need only be noted that the success of this argument on behalf of P in the original hypotheticalas well as all other disabled homeseekers regardless of their date
of contact with the defendant's building-does not require either
the discovery rule or the continuing violation theory. The discovery rule is not needed because for a disabled homeseeker asserting a "new" § (f)(1)-(2) claim, the date of his injury and resulting
cause of action is the same as the date he became aware of this
injury (i.e., when he first encountered the defendant's inaccessible housing)." 3 The continuing violation theory, which focuses on
the defendant's behavior rather than the plaintiffs discovery to

441. See supra notes 22 and 183 and accompanying text.
442. See also supra text accompanying notes 183-85.
443. See supra note 392. Thus, the only potential applicability of the discovery rule
here might be the disabled homeseeker's argument that the time period should not begin
to run until he first learns that the inaccessible features of the defendant's building violate
the FHA, which might be after his first encounter with the building. This argument is
likely to fail, however, because the discovery rule serves only to extend the limitations period to the time when "the plaintiff knows both the existence and the cause of his injury"
and not also to a later time when he learns "that the acts inflicting the injury may constitute" unlawful behavior. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 113 (1979). According to
Kubrick, the equitable factors favoring a plaintiff who is ignorant "of the fact of his injury
or its cause" do not extend to "ignorance of his legal rights," because if a plaintiff is "in
possession of the critical facts that he has been hurt and who has inflicted the injury," he
is "no longer at the mercy of the [defendant]. There are others who can tell him if he has
been wronged, and he need only ask." Id. at 122.
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trigger the limitations period, 4" is not needed because the discriminatory housing practice alleged is the defendant's current
isolated violation of the plaintiffs § (f)(1)-(2) rights, not a continuous series of violations that date back to the time of the building's
original construction.
3. A Suggested Approach to Statute-of-Limitations Problems
a. Seeing the Basic Claim as a "New" (f)(1)-(2) Violation
As noted above, the FHA declares that a failure to design and
construct in accordance with § 3604(f)(3)(C) is "discrimination" for
5
purposes of § 3604(f)(1) and § (f)(2)." Thus, a building constructed without the features mandated by § 3604(f)(3)(C) does
not by its mere existence violate the FHA; a statutory violation
occurs only when the discrimination embodied in the building violates someone's rights under § (f)(1)-(2). This means that, while
such a building may be a potential source of § (f)(1)-(2) claims, a
particularhomeseeker with a disability such as P in the hypothetical has no FHA claim until his § (f)(1)-(2) rights are violated
by, for example, visiting the building and encountering its inaccessible features. As with all FHA violations, a § (f)(1)-(2) claim
brought by such a homeseeker requires a showing that this particular plaintiff was injured as a result of the defendant's FHAprohibited behavior. 46
Also as noted above, the Supreme Court requires that the FHA
be governed by ordinary tort principles absent explicit instruction
to the contrary in the statute." Traditionally in tort claims, the
limitations period begins to run "when the plaintiffs claim accrued."" Thus, for example, a negligence claim does not accrue
and therefore the statutory clock does not start to run "until (a)

444. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 160, § 220, at 561.
445. See supra text accompanying notes 21-22, 180-85.
446. This causal connection between the plaintiffs injury and the defendant's behavior
is a basic requirement both for a substantive cause of action under the FHA and for the
plaintiff to have Article III standing to bring an FHA claim. See supra notes 69, 317 and
accompanying text.
447. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
448. DOBBS, supra note 160, § 217, at 553.
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the defendant ha[s] committed a negligent act and (b) it ha[s]
caused legally cognizable harm."" 9
Consistent with this approach, the Supreme Court has made
clear that a limitations period "ordinarily does not begin to run
until the plaintiff has a 'complete and present cause of action.' 450
Furthermore, "[u]nless Congress has told us otherwise in the legislation at issue, a cause of action does not become 'complete and
present' for limitations purposes until the plaintiff can file suit
and obtain relief."451' Thus, as Judge Easterbrook has observed in
rejecting a statute-of-limitations defense in another civil rights
context: "A wrongful act does not mark the accrual of a claim... ;
the time begins with the injury rather than with the act that
leads to the injury."" 2
Applying this insight to § 3604(f)(3)(C) cases, a disabled homeseeker's cause of action does not become complete until he personally encounters the defendant's inaccessible building. This encounter creates the claim-triggering injury, which may take the
form of the homeseeker being denied access to a particular unit or
having his intent to rent blocked "for the very reason that archi-

449. Id.; see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 120 (1979) (noting
that the
"general rule under the [Federal Tort Claims] Act has been that a tort claim accrues
at the
time of the plaintiffs injury").
450. Bay Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp.
of Cal.,
522 U.S. 192, 195 (1997) (quoting Rawlings v. Ray, 312 U.S. 96, 98 (1941)).
451. Bay Area Laundry, 522 U.S. at 201; see also Graham County Soil & Water
Conservation Dist. v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 2444, 2450 (2005) ("We have repeatedly
recognized that Congress legislates against the 'standard rule that the limitations period
commences when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action.'") (quoting
Bay Area
Laundry, 522 U.S. at 201); Bay Area Laundry, 522 U.S. at 201 ("'While it is theoretically
possible for a statute to create a cause of action that accrues at one time for the
purpose of
calculating when the statute of limitations begins to run, but at another time for
the purpose of bringing suit, we will not infer such an odd result in the absence of any
such indication in the statute.") (quoting Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 258, 267 (1993)). The
Graham
County opinion also quoted with approval Justice Scalia's concurrence in TRW Inc.
v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 37 (2001), to the effect that "[aibsent other indication, a
statute of
limitations begins to run at the time the plaintiff" may apply to the court for relief.
125 S.
Ct. at 2451.
452. Palmer v. Bd. of Educ., 46 F.3d 682, 685 (7th Cir. 1995) (ruling on a § 1983
case).
In Palmer, Judge Easterbrook distinguished two cases-Delaware State College
v. Ricks
and United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans-that did not find ongoing violations. Id. at
685-86
(noting that the premise of those cases was "that the employer took one dispositive
act.
Like punching someone in the nose, this act may lead to injury in the future,
but when
there is only one wrongful act the claim accrues with the first injury."). See
infra notes
470-77 and accompanying text (discussing Ricks and Evans). Based on this
analogy, a
disabled homeseeker complaining about an apartment building's noncompliance
with §
3604(f)(3)(C) has not been "punched in the nose" until he first encounters this building.
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tectural barriers prevent [him] from viewing the whole property
53
in the first instance."4
If a disabled homeseeker's § (f)(1)-(2) rights are not violated until his first encounter with the defendant's building, then a complaint filed promptly thereafter is timely, regardless of how old
the building is. Furthermore, as noted above, the continuing vio4 54 Of course,
lation theory is not needed to uphold such a claim.
from the point of view of a defendant who constructed this building years ago, allowing such an individual to sue now may feel
like being subjected to a continuing violation charge. But this is
inherent in the way Congress wrote § 3604(f)(3)(C): a violation of
this provision is "discrimination" but is only actionable discrimination if and when it violates the rights of an aggrieved person
under § (f)(1)-(2).455
456
The situation is somewhat analogous to Bazemore v. Friday,
a Title VII case that challenged the use of different salary schedules which paid black employees less than whites. The pay
schedules dated back to before the time Title VII applied to the
Bazemore defendants, and they argued that their behavior was
excused by the fact that they had not engaged in any new discrimination. The Court disagreed, concluding that "[e]ach week's
paycheck that delivers less to a black than to a similarly situated
white is a wrong actionable under Title VII, regardless of the fact
that this pattern was begun prior to the effective date of Title
VII." 45 7 Like a building constructed without the § 3604(f)(3)(C)mandated features, the salary structure in Bazemore was discriminatory, but only actionable when applied to specific employees. The Court in Bazemore distinguished this situation from the
58
one in United Airlines, Inc. v. Evans, where only the consequences of an old violation were now occurring, noting that the
employer in Evans was simply not engaged in a discriminatory

453. See supra text accompanying note 301 (quoting Smith v. Pac. Prop. & Dev. Corp.,
358 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2004)).
454. See supra text accompanying note 444.
based on the con455. Cf. Bay Area Laundry, 522 U.S. at 204 (rejecting an argument
here would
limitations
of
statute
the
for
date
triggering
cern that choosing a particular
of the plaintiff" on
improperly plac[e] the running of the limitations period in the control
adopted").
the ground that "that is an unavoidable consequence of the scheme Congress
456. 478 U.S. 385 (1986).
457. Id. at 395-96.
note 473.
458. 431 U.S. 553 (1977). Evans is also discussed supra note 452 and infra
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practice that currently violated Title VII. 459 On the other hand,
the focus in Bazemore was properly "on the present salary structure, which is illegal if it is a mere continuation of the pre-1965
discriminatory pay structure."4 6 ° Just as a new black employee in
Bazemore would have a current Title VII claim even though his
inferior wages were based on a previously adopted pay structure,
so too would a new homeseeker with a disability have a current §
(f)(1)-(2) claim even though the housing discrimination he is subjected to is based on a previously constructed dwelling.
A number of policy reasons support the idea of allowing a current disabled homeseeker to bring a prompt § (f)(1)-(2) claim even
though the building involved was constructed some years before.
First, focusing on the rights to nondiscriminatory sales and rentals guaranteed by § (f)(1)-(2) provides a reminder that the whole
point of § 3604(f)(3)(C) is to help insure equal access to housing
opportunities for people with disabilities. As Congress noted in
enacting § 3604(f)(3)(C), its required features are "essential for
equal access" by mobility-impaired people and their absence can
"just as effectively exclude[ such people] from the opportunity to
live in a particular dwelling ... as by a posted sign saying 'No
Handicapped People Allowed.' 46 '
Second, to bar a disabled homeseeker who files promptly after
first encountering the defendant's building because of the building's age would, by making it impossible for such a person ever to
assert a claim involving this building, be inconsistent with the
key goal of § 3604(f)(3)(C)-to make all post-1991 multi-family
dwellings accessible-and the FHA's reliance on private complainants to enforce the statute. 6 2 Supreme Court decisions dealing with federal statutes' limitations periods invariably interpret
these provisions in light of the legislative intent underlying the
substantive statute involved.46 3
Third, equitable considerations favor a disabled homeseeker
who files suit promptly after first visiting an inaccessible build-

459. 478 U.S. at 396 n.6.
460. Id. at 397 n.6.
461. See supra text accompanying notes 27-28.
462. See supra text accompanying notes 16-17, 27-29 and 352 (quoting Trafficante,
409 U.S. at 209, 211).
463. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 408 (quoting Havens, 455 U.S. at 380
(1982)); United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117-20, 125 (1979).
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464
ing, regardless of that building's age. Certainly, one major reason given for barring tardy claims-that the plaintiff has not
4 65
been diligent in asserting his rights -does not exist here. In
addition, two major justifications for statute-of-limitations dismissals-courts' preference for dealing with evidence whose quality has not been unduly diminished by the passage of time and
potential defendants' entitlement to eventual repose 6-are weak
or nonexistent here. The preference for fresh evidence is rarely a
concern in § 3604(f)(3)(C)-based cases for, as one court has noted,
because this provision "requires no showing of intent, defendant's
architectural plans and apartment complexes can themselves
speak to the alleged construction violations."467 And potential §
3604(f)(3)(C) defendants can never achieve full repose from FHA
liability, because a § 3614 action by the Department of Justice for
retrofits and other equitable relief may always be brought against

them.

468

A final point needs to be made about Moseke and other decisions that have held untimely a § 3604(f)(3)(C)-based claim because they saw the plaintiff as merely complaining about the cur469
rent "effects" of the defendant's "prior discriminatory acts."
These decisions ignore the fact that the only unlawful act involving this particular disabled individual-the discriminatory denial
of housing access and privileges to him in violation of § (f)(1)-(2)-
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is happening now. This situation is fundamentally different from
those in which the Supreme Court has ruled against the continuing violation theory because only discriminatory "effects" occurred
within the limitations period.
The principal Supreme Court decision on this point is Delaware
State College v. Ricks,4 7 ° a Title VII case in which a college professor claimed that he was denied tenure for discriminatory reasons.
After the college's Board of Trustees denied Ricks tenure, he was
given a standard one-year "termination" contract before being
discharged, and he also pursued internal grievance procedures.
The question for the Supreme Court was whether Title VII's limitations period began to run when the Trustees denied Ricks tenure or at a later date, either when this decision was affirmed at
the end of the grievance proceedings or when Ricks was ultimately discharged. The Court held that the earlier date controlled, because only the tenure-denial decision was claimed to be
based on discrimination.4 7' Ricks's loss in the internal grievance
procedure and his ultimate dismissal were not alleged to have
been prompted by discrimination and thus were seen by the
Court as merely the "effects" of the denial of tenure.4 7 2 "'[Tihe
proper focus,"' according to Ricks, "'is upon the time of the discriminatory acts, not upon the time at which the consequences of
the acts became most painful."'4 73
The Ricks opinion made two other points that are important for
purposes of § 3604(f)(3)(C) claims. First, having based its decision
on the fact that Ricks was complaining only about his tenure de470. 449 U.S. 250 (1980).
471. Id. at 257-58.
472. Id. at 258.
473. Id. (quoting Abramson v. Univ. of Haw., 594 F.2d 202, 209 (9th Cir. 1979) (emphasis added by the Supreme Court)). Another case relied on in Ricks was United Air Lines,
Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977), where the Court rejected the continuing violation
theory in a Title VII case brought by a female plaintiff who alleged that, having been
discharged by the defendant some years earlier based on a discriminatory policy, her
later
rehire without retroactive seniority should be seen as a continuing violation. The
Evans
opinion recognized that the defendant's "seniority system does indeed have a continuing
impact on [plaintiffs] pay and fringe benefits," id. at 558, but concluded that:
the emphasis should not be placed on mere continuity; the critical question is
whether any present violation exists. [Plaintiff) has not alleged that the system discriminates against former female employees or that it treats former
employees who were discharged for a discriminatory reason any differently
from former employees who resigned or were discharged for a nondiscriminatory reason. In short, the system is neutral in its operation.
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nial, the Court noted that employment termination cases can
"present widely varying circumstances" and that therefore "application of the general principles discussed herein necessarily must
be made on a case-by-case basis."4 74 Thus, even in Title VII cases
involving faculty terminations, the determination of the triggering date for statute-of-limitations purposes depends on when the
defendant's discrimination against a particular plaintiff occurred.
In a § 3604(f)(3)(C)-based case brought by a homeseeker with a
disability, this will presumably be when he first encounters the
inaccessible features of the defendant's building and is thus denied equal opportunity there in violation of § (f)(1)-(2).
The Ricks opinion also made a point to recognize that "limitations periods should not commence to run so soon that it becomes
difficult for a layman to invoke the protection of the civil rights
475 The Court held, however, that Ricks could not benefit
statutes."
from this concern, since he was "abundantly forewarned" in this
case (e.g., because the Trustees' tenure-denial decision was simply the customary response to the faculty's earlier "no tenure"
476
recommendations and was therefore "entirely predictable").
Ricks's situation is in stark contrast to that of a disabled homeseeker, who is likely to have had no prior contact with the defendant's building and whose encounter with its illegal features may
well be his only interaction with the defendant. Indeed, as noted
above, an individual homeseeker with a disability simply has no
FHA claim until he477encounters a dwelling that fails to comply
with § 3604(f)(3)(C).
b. Variations on the Basic Theory
The previous section argued that a disabled homeseeker's §
3604(f)(3)(C)-based claim does not occur until that individual personally encounters, and is thereby injured by, a building's inaccessible features. If, indeed, the proper triggering date for the
FHA's statutes of limitations in privately initiated cases is when
a plaintiff first sustains injury, then it is clear that a disabled
homeseeker's complaint brought within the applicable limitations

474. 449 U.S. at 258 n.9.
475. Id. at 262 n.16.
476. Id.
477. See supra text accompanying notes 445-53.
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period after his first encounter with the defendant's building
would be timely, regardless of the building's age.
As noted above in Part IV.C, a number of other types of plaintiffs may have claims as a result of a building's noncompliance
with § 3604(f)(3)(C), and resolution of the statute-of-limitations
problem for these claims may be more difficult, even if the dateof-first-injury theory is conceded to govern. This section deals
with these more complicated cases in two categories: (i) claims
that may later be made by disabled tenants and those individuals
associated with them; and (ii) claims by other types of plaintiffs.
i.

Additional Claims by Disabled Tenants and Persons
Associated with Them

Assume that a homeseeker with a disability who visits a housing development that does not comply with § 3604(f)(3)(C) decides
not to sue, but rather moves into the building despite its inaccessible features. After living there for a time that is longer than the
applicable limitations period, he then decides that these features
are unacceptable and files a claim under the FHA's ban on discriminatory "terms and conditions" in § 3604(f)(2).
While § (f)(2) does provide a cause of action for current residents,4 78 the reported cases have rarely discussed the timeliness
of such claims, perhaps because they have generally been brought
promptly in response to the defendant's challenged behavior.47 9
Thus, there is little guidance on when a § (f)(2) claim by a current
tenant accrues.
Unlike the situation where a homeseeker with a disability files
promptly after first encountering an inaccessible building, a current tenant's delayed § (f)(2) claim does not seem to be complaining about any "new" discrimination experienced by him. Rather,
the complaint is about the painful consequences of a violation of
his § (f)(2) rights; in other words, the very situation where plaintiffs are not permitted to invoke the continuing violation the-

478.

See, e.g., Neudecker v. Boisclair Corp., 351 F.3d 361, 363-65 (8th Cir. 2003). See

generally SCHWEMM, supra note 7, at § 14:3.

479. Cf. Neudecker, 351 F.3d at 363 (holding timely tenant's (f)(2) claim of disability
harassment based on the continuing violation theory, where the harassment allegedly occurred throughout the latter years of plaintiffs tenancy up to within the FHA's limitations
period).
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ory.4" ° One reason that mere consequences of a violation are insufficient to extend a limitations period is that they could go on
indefinitely, thereby essentially negating a statute of limitations.
Allowing a current tenant to file a § (f)(2) claim whenever he decides that the building's discriminatory features have become intolerable seems to be a classic example of this problem. Nor would
the discovery rule help such a tenant, for he was in a position to
and probably did know all of the facts relevant to his potential
claim early in his tenancy.4 "' Furthermore, because this individual has been on notice of his building's inaccessible features for
some time, the equitable considerations, which helped lead to the
conclusion than a homeseeker with a disability should be allowed
to sue promptly after first encountering a building's inaccessible
features,4 8 2 are absent here. Finally, even if a disabled tenant in
these circumstance might succeed in arguing that his claim is not
barred by the statute of limitations, a defense based on the related doctrine of laches might block this claim.4" 3
Assuming that a disabled tenant's § (f)(1)-(2) claim is time
barred in this situation, the same might not be true for an individual who is associated with him. The rights protected by both §
(f)(1) and § (f)(2) extend not only to buyers and renters with disabilities, but also to those buyers and renters who either reside or
are associated with a disabled person.4" Presumably, this means
that such an associated person would be injured at the same time
as his disabled companion, with the result that such a person's §

480. See supranotes 471-73 and accompanying text.
481. See supra notes 392-94 and accompanying text; see also supra note 443.
482. See supratext accompanying notes 464-65, 475-77.
483. See, e.g., Nat'l R.R. PassengerCorp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 121 (2002), where
the Court, in dealing with statute-of-limitations issues under Title VII, noted that courts
have discretionary power to reach "a just result" to protect employers "when a plaintiff unreasonably delays filing a charge" and that, in addition to other equitable defenses, "an
employer may raise a laches defense, which bars a plaintiff from maintaining a suit if he
unreasonably delays in filing a suit and as a result harms the defendant." According to
Morgan, a laches defense "'requires proof of (1) lack of diligence by the party against whom
the defense is asserted, and (2) prejudice to the party asserting the defense.'" Id. at 121-22
(quoting Kansas v. Colorado, 514 U.S. 673, 687 (1995)).
A potential problem with the laches defense in § 3604(f)(3)(C) cases is that establishing
the second element might be difficult. This element is usually shown by proof that the
plaintiffs delay has caused the defendant to lose valuable evidence, see, for example,
Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 282-83 (1961), but, as noted above, the key evidence in § 3604(f)(3)(C) cases usually remains available for an indefinite period of time.
See supra text accompanying note 467.
484. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1)-(2) (2000).
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(f)(1)-(2) claim would occur at the initial encounter with an inaccessible building and similarly would be time barred to the same
extent as the disabled tenant's in the previous paragraph. But
what if the person residing or associated with a disabled resident
leaves and is replaced by another individual? This new renterassociate would not only seem to have a § (f)(2) claim, but his
claim would be "new" (i.e., his first injury and thus the occurrence
of his claim would not take place until he started to reside or associate with the disabled person). Thus, absent proof that this
new arrangement was created simply to manufacture the necessary recent injury-claim-which might result in its dismissal
based on some equitable doctrine 4 8 -the theory of first-injury argued for in the previous section would make this § (f)(2) claim
timely, so long as it is brought within the limitations period after
the new companion begins his association with the disabled person.
Finally, what if a non-disabled tenant moves into an inaccessible building, lives there for a number of years, and then becomes
mobility-impaired due to a car accident or other cause? He then
brings an FHA claim, either under § (f)(1) because the inaccessible features make the dwelling "unavailable" to him (i.e., he has
to move) or under § (f)(2) because a "terms-and-conditions" violation affects his current residency. Even assuming that he knew or
reasonably should have known of the building's noncompliance
with § 3604(f)(3)(C) when he first moved in, the issue is whether
this knowledge triggered his § (f)(1)-(2) claim. Such knowledge
may have allowed the tenant during his period of non-disability
to assert a lack-of-association claim-an issue dealt with further
in the next section-but not a § (f)(l)-(2) claim as a disabled
renter. For the latter claim, the plaintiffs disability is a necessary
pre-requisite,8 6 which means that this claim could not accrue until the tenant's disability occurs. Only upon becoming disabled,
and thereby suffering an injury to his § (f)(1)-(2) rights, is this
tenant in the same position as the homeseeker with a disability,
whose claim does not occur until he encounters a noncompliant

485. See supra note 483.
486. See, e.g., Burgess v. Alameda Hous. Auth., 98 F. App'x 603, 605-06 (9th Cir. 2004)
(noting that the plaintiffs disability is a necessary element of his § 3604(f)(1) claim based
on the defendant's failure to reasonably accommodate under § 3604(f)(3)(B)); Prindable v.
Ass'n of Apartment Owners of 2987 Kalakaua, 304 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1254-55 (D. Haw.
2003) (reaching same conclusion for a plaintiffs § 3604(f)(2) claim).

20061

ACCESSIBLE HOUSING

building. Based on the nature of his injury and the equities of this
situation, the newly disabled tenant should have as long to file
his claim as a disabled homeseeker does after his first encounter
with an inaccessible building.
ii. Claims by Other Types of Plaintiffs
As shown in Part IV.C.2, a building that lacks the features
mandated by § 3604(f)(3)(C) may be the target of claims not only
by disabled homeseekers and their associates, but also other
plaintiffs, such as testers, local residents, and fair housing organizations. The timeliness of claims by these other types of
plaintiffs is considered here.
With respect to testers, it was argued in Part IV.C.2.a that, despite a recent Ninth Circuit decision to the contrary, they should
not have standing to bring § 3604(f)(3)(C)-based claims. 7 That
argument was based on the view that testers lack substantive
rights under § (f)(1)-(2). Here, it is noted that an additional reason for questioning testers' claims is that they could raise serious
equitable issues with respect to timeliness.
If, as argued in Part IV.D.3.a, a disabled homeseeker's §
3604(f)(3)(C)-based claim does not begin for statute-of-limitations
purposes until he first encounters an inaccessible building, then
presumably the same would be true for a disabled tester with
such a claim. Assuming for present purposes that testers do have
standing based on injury to their § (f)(1)-(2) rights caused by encountering such a building, they could presumably generate an
endless series of such injuries by repeated visits to the building.
These injuries would not just be the consequences of the violation
that occurred during the first visit. If a single encounter violates
a tester's substantive rights under § (f)(1)-(2), then a second encounter would be an independent violation of these rights creating a "new" cause of action, as would a third, a fourth, and so on,
indefinitely. Eventually, the limitations periods would run on the
claims based on the earlier encounters, 48 but the tester could always start a new clock by returning to the building.

487. See supra text accompanying notes 295-327.
488. See Havens, 455 U.S. at 381 (holding that a tester's claims were based only on
those "isolated occasions" when the defendants gave her false information and therefore
could not "take advantage of the 'continuing violation' theory").
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The problem may not seem inherently different from that of an
actual homeseeker who makes repeated visits to an inaccessible
building, but it is. An actual homeseeker may make additional
visits to further evaluate the building as a potential place to live,
although further visits for other purposes, such as evidencegathering for potential FHA claims, would not be in the role of an
actual homeseeker. Thus, subsequent homeseeking visits would
simply involve being subjected to the on-going consequences of
the discrimination suffered in the original visit, which would not
extend the limitations period for this claimant.
In any event, there can be no doubt that an actual homeseeker
has § (f)(1)-(2) rights and therefore standing to sue. Tester standing is problematic, however, and the specter of difficult statute-oflimitations problems in testers' claims provides an additional reason to avoid recognizing their standing in the first place.
The problem is different when considering the timeliness of
claims by non-disabled residents, fair housing organizations, and
other "indirect" victims of FHA violations caused by an inaccessible building. Recall that for these types of plaintiffs, while an injury sufficient to satisfy Article III is required, it need not be an
injury based on violation of their own substantive FHA rights;
their standing is established if they are "genuinely injured by
conduct that violates someone's [N 3604] rights."48 9 In §
3604(f)(3)(C) cases, the rights being violated are those under §
(f)(1)-(2), which belong to disabled buyers and renters and those
associated with them. A violation of such rights may cause sufficient injury in another to create standing, but the question for
statute-of-limitations purposes is when the clock begins to run on
this other plaintiffs claim.
For non-disabled residents who make a Trafficante-type lackof-association claim because of their building's noncompliance
with § 3604(f)(3)(C), 49 0 this would probably be when they first
moved in or otherwise became aware of the building's inaccessibility. The nature of this claim is that the plaintiffs are being deprived of the ability to associate with disabled persons in an inte-

489.
490.

Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 103 n.9 (1979).
See supra text accompanying notes 357-66.
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grated setting generally, not with a specific disabled person who
491
may have applied on a particular date, as Havens recognized.
In Havens, where the defendants' alleged violation was racial
steering, the Court held that the plaintiffs making an associational claim could invoke the continuing violation theory, because
at least one of the incidents manifesting the defendants' steering
occurred within the limitations period.49 2 This part of Havens,
however, does not translate easily to § 3604(f)(3)(C)-based claims,
where a defendant's discrimination is not manifested in specific
incidents, but in its building's lack of accessibility features. The
building's very status is what is depriving current residents of the
opportunity to associate with people with disabilities. That injury-to the extent it can be shown to be caused by noncompliance with § 3604(f)(3)(C)-presumably began for each individual
resident when he moved into the building. The harm may continue throughout an individual's tenancy, but this will probably
be seen as merely the consequences of the building's noncompliance, thus barring a resident from invoking the continuing violation theory. Havens, however, does leave open the possibility that
a recent incident of a disabled homeseeker being deterred from
moving into the building because of its inaccessibility could allow
a current resident to use this theory.4 93 In any event, each new
resident will have his own individual lack-of-association claim, so
barring the claims of older tenants on statute-of-limitations
grounds will not protect a building from generating these types of
claims in the future.
As with the residents' claims, the Court in Havens recognized
that the injury of the organizational plaintiff was "not only from
the incidents involving [specific individuals who dealt with the
defendants], but also from a continuing policy and practice of
unlawful racial steering that extends through the last alleged incident."4 94 Because this last incident occurred within the limita491. See Havens, 455 U.S. at 381 (holding that plaintiffs' associational claims "are
based not solely on isolated incidents" of the defendants' discrimination against individual
applicants, but rather on the defendants' "continuing violation manifested in a number of
incidents").
492. Id.
493. In addition, to the extent that a current resident has a § 3604(f)(3)(C)-based claim
for his inability to entertain a specific mobility-impaired guest, see supra notes 277 and
365, this claim would presumably not occur until that particular guest was deterred from
visiting by the building's inaccessible features.
494. Havens, 455 U.S. at 381.
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tions period, Havens held that the organization's claim was
timely based on the continuing violation theory.495 Again, however, § 3604(f)(3)(C)-based claims by advocacy organizations raise
some special timeliness problems.
To sue on its own behalf under Havens, an organization must
divert some resources or have its mission frustrated by the defendant's discrimination.4 96 Since an organization will not have
standing to sue unless it suffers such an injury, it has no claim
until this occurs. In the typical situation, a fair housing organization learns of a building's noncompliance with § 3604(f)(3)(C) either through a complaint by a homeseeker with a disability or the
organization's own testing program, after which it diverts some
resources to deal with this problem. 49 7 The resources whose diversion is the key to an organization's standing obviously will not be
spent until after the organization becomes aware of a building's
noncompliance. Thus, the trigger for the limitations period applicable to this claim will occur some time after this initial awareness date.
What's more, new complaints against this building and therefore the need to devote additional resources may always occur,
potentially creating fresh claims for the organization and thus extending its time to sue.49 8 This situation, like that of the testers
discussed earlier, has some potential for self-generated injuries
designed simply to create "new" claims. Unlike testers, however,
organizations clearly have standing in a proper § 3604(f)(3)(C)
case. Of course, the possibility of a laches or other equitable defense to an organization's complaint filed well after it first
learned of a building's noncompliance with § 3604(f)(3)(C) always
exists.4 99

495. Id.
496. See supra text accompanying notes 336-37.
497. See, e.g., Fair Hous. Council, Inc. v. Vill. of Olde St. Andrews, Inc., 250 F. Supp.
2d 706, 709-10 (W.D. Ky. 2003); Moseke v. Miller & Smith, Inc., 202 F. Supp. 2d 492, 495,
499-500 (E.D. Va. 2002); Eastern Paralyzed Veterans Ass'n v. Lazarus-Burman Assocs.,
133 F. Supp. 2d 203, 207-08, 211-12 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).
498. In Havens, the Court recognized that the injury of the fair housing organization
there was "based not solely on isolated incidents involving [specific individuals who dealt
with defendants]," but also from a "continuing pattern, practice, and policy of unlawful
racial steering" that extends through the last alleged incidents, which occurred within the
limitations period. See 455 U.S. at 381.
499. See supra note 483.
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V. CONCLUSION

In order to help guarantee persons with disabilities equal access to housing, Congress in the 1988 Fair Housing Amendments
Act provided in § 3604(f)(3)(C) that virtually all new multi-family
housing be designed and constructed with certain accessibility
features. Scores of states and localities quickly followed suit by
amending their fair housing laws to include the same requirement. Despite these provisions, a large portion of the millions of
multi-family units built since § 3604(f)(3)(C) became effective do
not include the mandated features.
A "failure to design and construct" under § 3604(f)(3)(C) is not
excused by ignorance of the law, lack of discriminatory intent, or
any other defense, except for a very narrow one involving unsuitable terrain. Thus, every noncompliant dwelling is not only a
lawsuit waiting to happen, but is also a lawsuit that generally
cannot be defended on the merits.
This leaves three questions: (1) who are proper defendants in §
3604(f)(3)(C) cases; (2) who are proper plaintiffs; and (3) when are
§ 3604(f)(3)(C)-based claims timely. These questions are not
merely "procedural." They go to the very heart of what is at stake
in § 3604(f)(3)(C); that is, defining the rights Congress intended
to create in this law and determining whether these rights can be
effectively enforced.
The FHA does not specify who may be sued for § 3604(f)(3)(C)based violations. The most obvious defendants are developers, architects, and builders, whose activities are specifically targeted by
the "failure to design and construct" language in § 3604(f)(3)(C).
The Supreme Court's determination to interpret the FHA according to traditional tort principles, however, suggests other proper
targets, including engineers, subcontractors, and anyone else who
is a substantial participant in the design-and-construction process.
Perhaps the most important issue involving potential defendants is how the sale of a noncompliant dwelling will affect the
potential liability of the original builder and the new owner. The
original builder's liability probably continues, based on the analogy to modern products liability law. The new owner, despite not
having participated in the faulty design-and-construction process,
may also be liable. This is because the FHA makes noncompliance
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with § 3604(f)(3)(C) discrimination for purposes of § 3604(f)(1)
and § 3604(f)(2). These provisions ban disability discrimination in
sales, rentals, and the provision of a dwelling's privileges and facilities, and are obviously directed toward housing providers. Furthermore, holding a current landlord liable for its building's failure to provide the features mandated by § 3604(f)(3)(C) would be
consistent with the view of modern torts law that landlords are
often responsible for dangerous conditions on their property.
The issue of who is a proper plaintiff under the FHA received a
great deal of attention prior to enactment of the 1988 FHAA. Reflecting the broad standing recognized by pre-1988 Supreme
Court decisions and confirmed by Congress in the FHAA, privately initiated cases involving § 3604(f)(3)(C) have been brought
not only by homeseekers with disabilities, but also by testers and
fair housing organizations. This article argues that the Supreme
Court's recognition of tester standing in Havens should not be extended to tester standing in § 3604(f)(3)(C) cases, although disabled actual homeseekers should be able to sue, at least for intangible damages, without having to establish their financial
ability to live in the defendant's housing. Havens' recognition that
fair housing organizations can sue on their own behalf for FHA
violations does translate to § 3604(f)(3)(C) cases, at least if their
injuries are caused by such a violation. Furthermore, a variety of
other types of plaintiffs, including non-disabled residents of the
defendant's housing, should be able to challenge a building's inaccessibility.
Determining the timeliness of § 3604(f)(3)(C)-based claims has
already caused much difficulty among the lower courts. For privately initiated claims, the FHA provides a one-year limitations
period for administrative complaints and a two-year period for direct lawsuits. No time limit applies to Department of Justice actions under § 3614 for injunctive relief, but two different limitations periods govern such actions for civil penalties and monetary
damages. The key issue in privately initiated claims is whether
the time period begins to run when the faulty design-andconstruction process is completed. Two doctrines that might extend the limitations period-the discovery rule and the continuing violation theory-have thus far been given a cool reception by
the courts.
This article argues that, as in analyzing the proper-defendant
issue, the timeliness issue must recognize that the FHA makes
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noncompliance with § 3604(f)(3)(C) a violation of § 3604(f)(1) and
§ 3604(f)(2), and that, consistent with Supreme Court treatment
of other federal statutory claims, the statute-of-limitations trigger
for § (f)(1)-(2) claims does not occur until a particular plaintiff has
a complete and present cause of action. This means that the limitations period would not begin to run for a homeseeker with a disability until he first encounters the defendant's building, no matter how long ago this building was constructed. Such a claim
would be timely if brought within the limitations period after this
first encounter, even without the benefit of the discovery rule or
the continuing violation theory.
For the tens of thousands of developments built in violation of §
3604(f)(3)(C), full repose can never occur, because Department of
Justice claims seeking retrofits and other injunctive relief are always possible. Furthermore, litigation brought by individuals
with disabilities and some other types of private plaintiffs may
also turn out to be appropriate for as long as a building remains
inaccessible. Obviously, the better solution for all interested parties would be voluntary compliance with § 3604(f)(3)(C). In the
meantime, this article provides a blueprint for analyzing the key
litigation issues in § 3604(f)(3)(C) cases.

